MALIK BENNABI



THE QUESTION OF IDEAS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

Translated, annotated
and with a Foreword by
Mohamed El-Tahir El-Mesawi

The Question of Ideas in the Muslim World is a quintessential summary of Malik Bennabi's philosophical and sociological thought. Besides being a profound analysis and holistic critique of the political and intellectual situation in the Muslim world, the book offers a passionate formulation of what makes the essence of human society and civilization.

Malik Bennabi (1905-1973) could easily be regarded as the most eminent scholar and thinker of post-World War II Algeria and one of the foremost intellectuals of the Muslim world. Educated in Algiers and Paris, he graduated in electrical engineering from a polytechnic school in Paris. His works include among others, *The Qur'anic Phenomenon*, *Islam in History and Society*, *Fikrat Commonwealth Islāmī*, *al-Muslim fī ʿĀlam al-Iqtiṣād*, *Mudhakkirātu Shāhidin li'l-Qarn (Memoirs of a Witness of the Century)*, *Les Conditions de La Renaissance*, *Les Grands Thèmes* and *On the Origins of Human Society* and *The Question of Culture.*

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MALIK BENNABI

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Mohamed El-Tahir El-Mesawi

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2003

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Foreword

With the publication of this book, the major works of Malik Bennabi dealing with man and religion, society and culture and the philosophy of history and civilization are readily accessible to the English readership (see a list of Bennabi's works in English on the blurb). Although, as the author tells us in the Preface, the idea of the present work had been conceived somewhere in late 1960 or early 1961, its materialization in a book form was delayed by a whole decade. We may indeed have good reason to be thankful for the circumstances that had compelled him to such a delay. During that period of ten years, Bennabi must certainly have gained better insights and further deepened his thoughts on the subject of this book. Had he written it as first planned, we would no doubt have had something different – less mature perhaps.

Without indulging in unnecessary speculation, *The Question of Ideas in the Muslim World*, as it stands now, is in fact a quintessential summary of Bennabi's philosophical and sociological thought. On the surface, the book is an analysis and holistic critique of the intellectual and political situation of the Muslim world during the author's time. The views he formulated and conclusions he made are as fresh and pertinent to the present situation in Muslim lands as they were when first expressed over thirty years ago. On a more fundamental level, Bennabi's work is a deep and far-sighted reflection on the human condition in general as well as a passionate formulation of what constitutes the essence of human society and civilization. Without underestimating the first aspect, it can be asserted that the utmost importance and enduring value of this book lie with the second aspect whereby a universal theory of human society and civilization is worked out and a fundamental philosophical framework is developed.

Bennabi's analysis of the triad, which he calls the three realms of human beings (*personnes*), ideas (*idées*) and things/objects (*choses*) and the different types of relationship between them, is an attempt to trace the essential components and dynamics of human society. In other words, human socio-historical existence is inconceivable without the presence of three essential components or worlds, namely the human world, the ideational world, and the material world that consists of both nature-given and man-made things or objects. By reflecting on the historical encounter between the world of Islam and modern Western civilization, in which the former has stood on the lower and receiving end vis-à-vis the of the latter's cultural impact and expansion, Bennabi's aim was to unveil the fundamental dynamics and laws governing human history and civilization. He also pointed out how self-generated processes of cultural renaissance and civilization building can be launched in the Muslim world. His analysis is done within the framework of a cyclical view of history and civilization that is far from being deterministic, as I have shown in my study of his sociological thinking.

Within the framework of that cyclical conception of history and civilization, Bennabi draws an analogy between the psycho-mental development of the individual and the socio-historical and cultural development of society. In that development, human society passes through three main stages: the pre-civilization stage, the stage of civilization and the post-civilization stage. The yardstick for measuring these different stages lies at the level of the realm of ideas. This measurement can be done on the basis of the types of relationships between the human personality and ideas in their different categories. In its unfolding through the space-time continuum in the form of culture and civilization, human socio-historical existence depends utterly on the realm of ideas. It is this ideational world that exclusively distinguishes human society from all kinds of 'social' or 'herd' life that we can find in the animal world. However developed and complex 'social life and organization' amongst some animal species, its determinant factors will never transcend the animal's instinctual make-up or vital energy (*énergie vitale*).

Although human beings share with other animal species certain essential aspects of that vital energy, human life and existence can never be reduced to the set of impulses embodying man's vital energy. To use the terminology of the great Indian scholar Shāh Walī Allāh al-Dihlawī, man is endowed with a universal or comprehensive vision (*ra'y kullī*) that marks human singularity and distinctiveness vis-à-vis other kinds of animals. Encompassing the spiritual, rational, ethical and aesthetical dimensions, this characteristic vision of mankind is what makes man look, as Bennabi indicates in his *Les Conditions de la Renaissance*, beyond his immediate physical presence to discover in his own self and the vast horizons of the universe the sublimity of existence and to embrace the transcendental value of things. According to Bennabi, it is this ideational aspect springing from man's universal vision that allows human beings to transcend their worldly life and their mere biological and material nature, and act in accordance with the demands of a metaphysical ideal or at least to seek a certain future historical goal. Hence, the ideational world or realm of ideas is the manifestation of humanity's universal vision. Any degeneration in this world is a reflection of the spiritual, intellectual, moral and aesthetical befalling the human being and character of society.

In his analysis of the realm of ideas, Bennabi distinguishes between two main categories, the impressed (*imprimées*) and the expressed (*exprimées*) ideas. The first category of ideas makes up what he considers the archetypes of society; these archetypes are the fundamental ideas and everlasting values constituting the axiomatic principles and ideational matrices handed down by successive generations almost intact or in their pristine state. Thus, they provide the essentials of the common character and cultural and historical continuity of civilization. In other words, the archetypes or impressed ideas constitute the core of civilization, and it is at this level that differences between civilizations really matter. In Bennabi's view, the advent of any civilization in the true sense of the term can never be conceived without the existence of such archetypes or core ideas and enduring values whose prime role in sparking off human spiritual forces and channeling man's vital energies has always been testified by history. To put in slightly different terms, the impressed ideas constitute the necessary foundations for the socio-historical existence and cultural identity of any human community.

The category of expressed ideas, on the other hand, consists of a wide range of philosophical, scientific, technical and operational ideas produced by society in the course of its civilizational experience, and by means of which it expresses, projects and actualizes its impressed ideas or archetypes in history. It also comprises whatever ideas a society acquires from other civilizations and subjects to various processes of adjustment, adaptation and assimilation so that they conform to its archetypes. It is here, i.e. at the level of the archetypes, that Bennabi visualizes and, indeed, clearly stresses the importance and necessity of cultural borrowing and acculturation between different civilizations and societies, understood as cultural entities or civilizational units.

In the sociology of ideas developed in this book, Bennabi lays strong emphasis on the unchangeable and permanent nature of the first category of ideas and attributes to it the paramount role of ensuring the historical continuity of society and preserving its distinctive character and essential cultural spirit. If society loses touch with its archetypes and fails in keeping a spirited and creative relationship with them, it disintegrates and will be assimilated in another civilization. As for the second category, he clearly stresses its flexible and changing nature that allows for various forms of change and transformation in the society's social being and institutional set-up. Its foremost significance lies in enabling society to cope with the changing circumstances of its history and respond to the internal and external challenges facing its existence. If this category of ideas loses its flexible character and turns into fossilized forms, the society will become petrified and insensible to the flow of time and incapable of responding to the demands of history except by recoiling upon itself and seeking what the late Professor Fazlur Rahman calls delusive shelters in the past.

Accordingly, Bennabi teaches us, a necessary and fundamental balance has to be always realized in the society's ideational world between impressed and expressed ideas. This can only be achieved by a sustained genuine and creative relationship of the people in general and the élites in particular with the society's archetypes. In other words, authenticity and fidelity to tradition or origins cannot be achieved except by remaining faithful to the society's foundations through a continuous process of positive creativity that shall enable it to develop new dimensions for its inner aspirations and give a new meaning and scope for its ideals. Otherwise, so Bennabi strongly ascertains, no true renaissance and no viable cultural revival can take place.

In the light of this sociological analysis and understanding of the problem of ideas in the Muslim world, Bennabi passes his severe judgment on modern Muslim efforts of socio-economic develop-ment and political reconstruction. As he sees it, those efforts have generally been doomed to futility and failure owing to the fact that they have been carried out in the context of what he considers an historical treason whereby the leading elites have betrayed the inherited ideals and values of Islam and failed to subject their cultural borrowings from Western civilization to necessary adjust-ment, assimilation, absorption and rejection so as to make them consonant with those ideals and values. As a result, Muslim society over the last two centuries or so has been experiencing what Bennabi terms as nemesis or revenge of both its archetypes and cultural borrowings in which respect dead (*mortes*) and deadly (*mortelles*) ideas have dominated its cultural universe. This aspect of Bennabi's sociology of ideas is indeed of special importance and suggests the possibility of developing more authentic and viable thought categories and analytic frameworks in the Muslim context. By dead ideas he refers to the notions, thought schemes and institutions developed by earlier generations of Muslim scholars and intellectuals to address the challenges of their respective times and places, but which have lost their relevance to the present situation simply because the context which they addressed and the issues they were meant to resolve have changed. As for the deadly ideas, they refer to whatever cultural borrowings (whether in the form of abstract concepts and theoretical ideas or in the form of operational modalities) which, once separated from their roots in the civilization from which are taken, namely Western civilization, have not been subjected to any critical and creative process of adaptation, absorption and reorientation so that they become an integral part of the cultural world of the borrowing society. Thus, they have remained alien elements inconsonant with the ideational and moral foundations of that world and have turned into rather destructive forces. Likewise, in Bennabi's sociology of ideas, the negative and destructive effects of dead and deadly ideas are the expression of the twofold revenge or nemesis mentioned previously.

At a time when enormous earthquakes are shattering the Muslim world in many of its parts, and as the whole of humanity is witnessing the return of imperial colonialism in its most brutal forms in the name of lofty notions such as freedom and democracy, there is urgent need for Muslim leadership, both as scholars and political leaders, to transcend the political and economic factors that might have constituted the immediate causes of such events. We need to look for the enduring and deep-seated intellectual and socio-cultural causes that have allowed the perpetuation of an attitude which, coupled with the hostile designs of the enemies, has led to all catastrophic developments in modern Muslim history. It is my firm belief that Bennabi's thought in general and in this book in particular is of pertinent relevance to such concern. Without overstating its originality, it provides an appropriate theoretical and analytical body of ideas that can be further developed and substantiated towards a more elaborate conceptual framework for cultural and socio-historical analysis capable of enabling us to better understand the recurrent and chronic problems of Muslim society and visualize the proper and viable ways to overcoming them.

Having said that, I must make the following confession. This is the second translation of this seminal work of Bennabi that I have undertaken. I first translated it during the period 1992-93. That translation was published in 1994 under the title "The Problem of Ideas in the Muslim World". But when, somewhere in the year 2000, I returned to the book for some research purposes, I felt there was room for much improvement in the translation. I therefore took it upon myself to look afresh into the book and to revise what I had done previously in a sincerely critical manner in light of my accumulated experience both as student of Bennabi's thought and as translator. And here it is, but with a slight change in the title. In fact, I was hesitating between adopting the present title and another one that would possibly reflect the approach followed by the author in tackling the issue of ideas, which is essentially sociological. Hence, the title could have been "The Sociology of Ideas in the Muslim World". However, I preferred to remain as literally close to the original as possible in order to reflect one important aspeçt of Bennabi's thinking, which consists in addressing his subject not as a mere isolated issue, but as part of a complex problematic.

Finally, I must express my indebtedness to at least three persons. First, I should thank my colleague Adnan Holden of the Centre for Language and pre-University Development (CELPAD) at the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) for having edited the translation and put in it more "English spices". Second, I am grateful to my old-time friends El-Tigani Abdelgadir Hamid of the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences, Virginia and Ibrahim M. Zein of the Department of Usuluddin and Comparative Religion at IIUM for their continuous moral support and for reading this foreword and making useful remarks and suggestions from which I have benefited a lot. Last but not least, I have to record with much gratitude my indebtedness to my family whose understanding and patience has always been an invaluably encouraging factor in my academic and intellectual pursuits.

Above all, our deepest thanks are due to God almighty without whose guidance and goodly acceptance our endeavors will be mere futility.

Mohamed El-Tahir El-Mesawi

Gombak/Kuala Lumpur:
Ṣafar 1424/April 2003

Preface

I began this work one decade ago, when I was in Cairo. As I had just gathered within and around myself all the necessary material for its completion, some abrupt circumstances the mentioning of which is beyond the special context of this preface diverted me from it. It would, however, suffice to just indicate that they had to do with the ideological struggle. This compelled me to change my work plan. Indeed, I right away undertook another work to face those very circumstances.[1] Resuming this work was constantly being postponed over the years until recently, when my friend Dr. Ammar Talbi visited me upon his return from his studies in Egypt. Knowing, since his student days in Cairo, the state in which I had abandoned this study, this dear friend now insisted that I should resume it. Finally, he persuaded me to do so.

As I decided to carry it on, I was aware of what was irremediably lost in the old rough sketch I had hastily outlined in Cairo. When I went back to my notes, I failed to rediscover the content I had wanted to formulate therein, though I could still recognize the very words I had already written. In fact, those notes were strewn on the sheets merely as guide-marks or markers that would help me recall the elements inherent in myself. Other elements derived either from a bookshelf or elsewhere would only complement these elements.

In short, my notes were as dead as the bones one would discover by turning over an old grave. Thus, their content looks distant, hazy and uncertain; I would rather leave them as a memory… and perhaps the patient reader will one day discover in their yellowed pages the torn thread that may become for him, in the pages of this book as well as beyond, Ariadne's thread[2] which would guide him with more certainty in "the problem of ideas in the Muslim world".

We are far from presenting here an exhaustive study of this problem. However, I believe that by throwing light on both its topography and specific structure, this book will provide a fairly accurate idea about it, not only with regard to Muslim society, but also with regard to any other society. In so far as we succeed to pinpoint that idea, the aim of this book will have been achieved.

Algiers: 22 Ramadan 1390 A.H.
22 November 1970 A.D.

Chapter One

The Two Reponses to the Cosmic Void

When left on his own, man is assailed by a feeling of cosmic void. It is the way he fills this void that determines the type of his culture and civilization, that is to say, the internal and external characteristics of his vocation in history. There are two ways for him to fill that cosmic void: either to look down to his feet, to the earth, or to raise his eyes towards the heavens. The first way will populate his solitude with objects, since his domineering look drives to acquisition, whereas the second one will populate it with ideas as his interrogative look is in pursuit of truth.

Likewise, two types of culture come into existence: a power-driven culture (*culture d'empire*) with technical materialistic roots, and a civilizing culture (*culture de civilisation*) with moral and metaphysical foundations. The religious phenomenon comes about as man raises his eyes towards the heavens. It is here that the prophet appears, a man with a mission and message who has ideas to communicate, such as Jeremiah[1], Jesus and Muhammad.

The cradle of so many great men, Europe seems, however, to have been excluded from the religious phenomenon in terms of the standard of such messengers, as if the nature of the European man, full of his sense of humanness, leaves no place for the divine. On the contrary, the Semites seem to be very dedicated to metaphysics in such a manner that the sense of the divine in them hardly leaves room for worldly preoccupations. Halfway between the Semites and Northern Aryan people, stand the Greeks who populate their universe with forms. They fill their solitude with the sense of the *beautiful*, which they end up calling the *good*, as pointed out by Tolstoy[2] in his profound reflections on art. Generally speaking, Europe has realized in its culture a synthesis of objects and forms, of techniques and aesthetics, while the Islamic East has synthesized in its culture the two notions of *truth* and *virtue*.

This scheme corresponds not to one historical phase alone, but to all the stages of history whose pendulum marks, by means of its consecutive swings (*systoles* and *diastoles*), both the rise of universal civilization towards the peak and its downfall to the bottom. It is sometimes the apogee of one culture and the perigee of another and vice-versa. In the transitional periods of history, we witness the moments of mutual fertilization. These moments also coincide with the periods of confusion both in the historical Babylon[3] and twentieth century Babylon.

Such is the phenomenal movement of civilization in both its phases and fluctuations. Sometimes, it is the apogee of a civilization in which objects are centered on an idea. At other times, it is the apogee of another civilization in which ideas are centered on an object. This phenomenon manifests itself clearly as the intellect expresses itself in the most free and spontaneous way through direct communication with the roots of culture without any beating about the bush or rhetorical undertones.

In this respect, folk literature is of special significance. Indeed, even sophisticated literature may still preserve the popular features in the very essence of its theme. Moreover, nothing is more revealing, in literary genres, than the tale. One can take two examples: the story of *Robinson Crusoe* and that of *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān.* These two solitary people illustrate perfectly the abovementioned two types of culture. It is from a blank slate in terms of material means (objects) that Daniel Defoe[4] develops the adventure of his hero, whereas it is from a blank slate in terms of ideas that the adventure of Ibn Ṭufayl's[5] hero proceeds.

The genius of the two tales lies exclusively in the way each author has filled the time of his respective solitary character. Here is the daily schedule of Robinson Crusoe on the island in which he took refuge upon his survival after the shipwreck:

> Nov. 4. This morning I began to order my times of work, of going out with my gun, time of diversion, viz., every morning I walked out with my gun for two or three hours, if it did not rain; then employed myself to work till about eleven o'clock; then eat what I had to live on; and from twelve to two I lay down to sleep, the weather being excessive hot; and then in the evening to work again. The working part of this day and of the next were wholly employed in making my table; for I was yet but a complete natural mechanic soon after, as I believe it would do any one else.[6]

This is a portion of Robinson Crusoe's time on his desert island. First, time for him flows in the form of concrete acts – eating, sleeping, and working – whose characteristic feature consists of computing each and every instant for the sake of a purely individualistic and utilitarian economy. Thus, working is Robinson's means to overcome the anguish of solitude. For the whole day, all his realm of ideas is centered on an "object", the table he wanted to make for himself.

As for Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān, the adventure of solitude has a completely different turn. Actually, it only starts with the death of the gazelle, the adoptive mother of the solitary boy:

> …[A]nd when she (the gazelle) grew old and feeble, he used to lead her where there was the best pasture, and pluck the sweetest fruits for her, and give her them to eat. Notwithstanding this, she grew lean and continued a while in a languishing condition, till at last she died, and then all her motions and actions ceased. When the boy perceived her in this condition, he was ready to die for grief. He called her with the same voice, which she used to answer to, and made what noise he could, but there was no motion, no alteration. Then he began to peep into her ears and eyes, but could perceive no visible defect in either; in like manner he examined all the parts of her body, and found nothing amiss, but everything as it should be. He had a vehement desire to find that part where the

> defect was, that he might remove it, and she return to her former state. But he was altogether at a loss how to compass his design, nor could he possibly bring it about.[7]

Thus, Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān fails to "identify the defect". However, Ibn Ṭufayl makes us follow the spiritual ascent of his character. This ascent leads Ḥayy gradually to discover first the Soul, then the immortality of the Soul and finally the notion of the one Creator. From then onwards, the adventure is pursued in the form of a meditation which leads Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān, after many failures, to perceive the Divine order, to an inward vision of God and a conception of His attributes.

Here, time flows throughout the different phases of this spiritual ascent up to a moment very much similar to that of Nietzsche's[8] Zarathustra[9] as he was descending from the mountain carrying out his message.[10] As for Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān, he would set out, with Asāl, a friend of fortune, to carry the fruits of his meditations and reflections to the fellow citizens and subjects of the sage Salamān[11]. The world here is such that things in it are centered on an idea. Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān overcomes his anguish not by making a table, but by constructing and discovering ideas. It is a universe in which time is not computed for the benefit of an "object".

During the last Verna World Congress of sociology, Professor Sicard was correct in pointing out that the continuous industrial time never leaves the isolated person to himself, in contrast to the discontinuous time in Third World countries, although his interpretation of this fact is not accurate. The reason is that whoever experiences involvement in a process of industrial production knows very well that the machine which produces and the "thing" produced actually never allow one single minute for the self, nor any vanity or any psychic and mental availability. Thus, Robinson Crusoe's day was filled up with a "table".

Moreover, Professor Sicard was also correct when he pointed out, on the contrary, the discontinuity of time in the developing countries. However, his interpretation of this phenomenon is once again inaccurate. This discontinuity has appeared to him in the form of innumerable voids joining together, if one may say, the moments of life.

Professor Sicard's analysis, we would like to readily admit, is objective and sound, and we ourselves have already signaled the phenomenon of under-valuation of time (*détemporalisation*) in the present Muslim world.[12] It reveals exactly the cultural roots we have mentioned above. In fact, for Professor Sicard, time is computable only in the realm of things. Life itself seems to acquire its meaning only when its "instants" flow, for example, through the *table* of a certain Robinson Crusoe.

Evidently, there is here an under-valuation of time whose disastrous results the present Western society can well evaluate. Certainly, Muslim countries have to know how to estimate in their present-day culture the negative effects of under-valuation of time in their activities, without falling in the opposite extreme, that is, over-valuation of time (*temporalisation*) whose negative aspects one can easily see in the industrialized countries! While signaling these two excesses, we are, however, aware that we are dealing with two cultures at the moment of their perigee. This fact escaped Professor Sicard's attention in the Verna conference on sociology, precisely because Western thought is ignorant of the two swings - systole and diastole - of history.

Be that as it may, Europe has been, before and after Lecretius[13] as well as before and after Planck,[14] a suitable breeding ground for quantitative thinking, thus giving rise to both the positivism of Auguste Comte[15] and the dialectical materialism of Karl Marx. Likewise, Western thought seems to be essentially revolving around the concept of the ponderous and quantitative. When it deviates towards the extreme, it inevitably ends up in materialism in two forms of materialism: the bourgeois form of the consumer society and the dialectical form of the Soviet communist society.

When it is at its perigee as is the situation at present, Islamic thought sinks into mysticism, into vagueness and fuzziness, into imprecision, and into mimesis and craze vis-ā-vis the Western "thing"! However, this is not its original orbit. From the beginning, when the Qur'an gave it the initial impulse, Islamic thought has essentially revolved around an idea oscillating between the love of *good* and aversion for *evil*. This is precisely the vocation of the Muslim mind as determined by the Qur'an in which we read:

> *You are indeed the best community that has ever been brought forth for [the good of] mankind: you enjoin the doing of what is right and forbid the doing of what is wrong, and you believe in God.*
>
> Āl 'Imrān 3:110.

Muslims are thus called upon to carry out that mission under all circumstances, from the most to the least significant. No doubt, the division of the inheritance of a deceased person is an ordinary social circumstance; yet look at how the Qur'an deals with it:

> *And when [other] near of kin and orphans and needy persons are present at the distribution [of inheritance], give them something thereof for their sustenance ...*
>
> al-Nisā' 4: 8.

This is an arrangement, one might argue, that that can be found in any 'progressive' civil code. This is true. But the Qur'an requires more than just this. It does not want society to simply distribute "goods" in the manner slot machines would throw out metal tokens. This, the consumer society can also do. Muslim society has to do more than merely distributing the "goods" which constitute an inheritance. It has also to distribute "good". Thus, the above-cited verse, which we have intentionally truncated in order to show what it has in common with any man-made civil legislation, ends with another recommendation and arrangement:

> *... [A]nd speak unto them in a kindly way.*
>
> al-Nisā' 4: 8

Now, the verse is complete: distribute, indeed, "goods", but add to them a thought, a word or a gesture that will express your feeling as well as your sense and conception of good. This purely moral complementary recommendation is indeed inconceivable in any other civil legislation. It endows the social relationship emanating from the Islamic ideal with a specific character. What is called "the contradictions amongst the masses" would thus have no meaning within the context of Muslim society.

Chapter Two

The Child and Ideas

An isolated individual cannot survive his loneliness except by reliving, at his own expense and in a limited lapse of time, the millennial experience by means of which mankind has adapted itself to its environment.[1] His adventure starts either from a blank slate of ideas like that of Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān, or from a blank slate of means (and things) if he has carried with him his realm of ideas as did Robinson Crusoe before the shipwreck. However, whatever the degree of his destitution and the type of his culture, his activity to secure his survival will always correspond to certain psychosomatic processes. The scheme of such an action can be found in any form of human activity.

The simplest form of his activity may be represented by the action of the craftsman examining his piece of work with a chisel in his hand, by that of a ploughman stooping over his plough or by the soldier armed with his gun. In all these cases, the action of the craftsman, the ploughman and the soldier is accomplished by means of two visible factors: a man and his tool.

However, these two factors conceal a more complex reality. That is, no action can actually be accomplished except within certain conditions answering the question of "how" and "why". This is because we do not act haphazardly lest our activity becomes impossible, nor do we act for no motive lest we undertake an absurd action.

Therefore, no action can be performed without a given scheme that encompasses, simultaneously with the visible elements, an ideational element that represents its motivations and operational patterns. These motives and patterns summarize every social and technological development of society and serve to distinguish societies from one another. As a distinctive element of the human species, the ideational element inspired in Karl Marx the following picturesque meditation:

> What distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this: that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality.[2]

In the final analysis, the components of any action belong to three categories: the category of things (*objets*), the category of human beings (*personnes*) and that of ideas (*idées*). Moreover, all the social, economic and political characteristics of a given action are necessarily engraved in its specific scheme woven from these three categories throughout the universal canvas of any activity. In the case of the isolated individual, this network is far from being complex. It is necessarily simple either by virtue of the lack of means (objects) as was the case with Robinson Crusoe, or due to the lack of ideas as in the case of Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān.

But the more the individual becomes integrated in the society that has already been involved in the process of the division of labor, the more important the ideological factor becomes in his action. That is to say, his action has to be specialized, to respect a set of rules and observe certain norms in order to be incorporated into the collective action of society. The moral and technical conditions of his integration are an integral part of the psychosomatic processes, which cannot easily be assimilated, as was noticed by Robinson about the making of the table.

In fact, the child is an isolated human being whose integration is under way. Thus, he has necessarily to undergo those processes in order to achieve his integration in a proper way. Needless to say, the family as well as the school will help him in that process of integration. However, this social assistance can never replace the integration process of the child. Rather, it can and, indeed, must function only in such a manner as to make it shorter and better. Let us now simply follow his steps in order to realize the phases of that process.

When the child is born, objects, human beings and ideas are arranged around him in three realms, all of which are alien to him. Even his hand is a mere object for him. It amuses him just like the lamp hanging over his cradle does. It permits him to scratch his cheek, which itself is another object not yet integrated to his own being. Yet, he at least starts to feel around himself a realm of things represented by his hand, his fingers, his pacifier and the lamp hanging over his cradle.

At this stage, he still has no idea about the realm of human beings in which he does not even recognize the face of his mother. Indeed, the mother herself is for him nothing but the nourishing breast that a feeding bottle could easily replace, had she disappeared because of some misfortune. Moreover, he does not recognize his own self as an integral entity, for he is not yet aware of any specific personal ego.

As his experience in the realm of objects develops and takes root therein, his eyes start discerning certain faces. Firstly, the face of his mother, then the face of his father and those of his brothers and sisters will start making up the strange realm of persons around him. Yet, he still cannot be at ease even when he is three or four years old. It would suffice to just leave him alone on the pavement near the doorstep of the family's home to see the signs of anguish of solitude immediately painted on his face due to the presence of passers-by whom he is not familiar with.

Even at the age of six, the day of his admission to school is for him an awful test in a realm of human beings that is alien to him. Only gradually will he be integrated in that realm, little by little, so to speak, up to a point that corresponds to his level of sociability. His sociability varies for reasons which cannot always be enumerated, but which can, however, be classified according to Jung's analytic psychology[3] with regard to its types as follows: The extroverted type discovers the realm of persons more rapidly than the introverted type. The latter type would perhaps discover more rapidly the realm of ideas without, however, skipping any stage. Yet, as far as both types are concerned, the discovery of the realm of ideas always takes place after that of the realm of human beings. The process of the child's integration to society is at the same time biological and logical. It thus embraces his three ages:

1. The age in which he spontaneously discovers the realm of things by playing with his fingers and his pacifier.
2. The age in which he gradually discovers the realm of persons by discerning the face of his mother.
3. The age in which he finally discovers the realm of ideas.

It is the last discovery that is important to analyze here. We are well aware that, for the child, the discovery of objects is made by means of possessing them, since the bonds which link them to him are of nutritive order; thus he spontaneously picks any object up to his mouth. However, his discovery of the realm of human beings reaches perfection as soon as emotional and social bonds link him to them.

Similarly, it is the moment in which he succeeds in establishing personal links with abstract concepts that marks his entrance into the realm of ideas. Indeed, we need to observe a child failing to handle a simple problem in order to realize the effort he makes, sometimes desperately, to prize open the gates of this realm. In general, such small tragedies go unnoticed both at school and at home. However, the child sometimes remembers that, after having come up against a difficulty many times without overcoming it, his thought and reasoning one day made considerable headway for him to solve it, thus discovering the solution on his own. Such a moment is for him the Archimedean moment. Like Archimedes, he may cry "*eureka! eureka*!"[4] It is the moment when, between seven and eight years of age, he steps into the realm of ideas without relying on anybody.

This is a crucial stage in the process of his social integration because it makes him take root in specific original cultural plasma. This will make of him a certain Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān or a Robinson Crusoe. By entering the realm of ideas, he actually steps into a cultural world and, in certain cases, into certain ideational systems distinguishing ideological societies (*sociétés engagées*) from neutral and primitive ones.

Such a psychological transformation opens for him new horizons and unexpected perspectives. Thus altering his psychic being, this discovery of the realm of ideas transforms him even at the physical level. Ideas, indeed, have a far-reaching effect. This effect marks the difference, even at the level of appearances, between an illiterate person and someone who is familiar with making use of the alphabetic characters to read a thought or express an idea. This fact in the child's process of integration must be taken into account, for it enables us to make the necessary comparison with the infantile signs which may still be evident in adulthood.

A half-open mouth, ready to grab and suck anything, is a salient feature of the small child. However, as he grows older, his mouth closes as if driven by some internal springs. This morphological detail actually corresponds to a specific phase in the child's psychological development. It represents one moment in the process of integration whose significance can be appreciated either by comparing it to a similar moment in the process of the social integration of an adult person if such an experience were possible, or by making a comparison between two adults – a literate and an illiterate one who belong to the same family.

I myself had the opportunity in 1938 to experiment this phenomenon with a group of illiterate Algerian workers in France whom I taught to read and write. As the experiment was gradually progressing during its nine-month period, I could see the faces of my pupils changing. Their eyes, which used to send a wild glimmer, were progressively becoming more humane. Their animal-like glimmer disappeared, thus giving way to something that denoted an inward thought process, that is, the presence of an idea. Moreover, their lips were shut or, at least, came closer to each other. Thus, their head, which receives ideas, makes the temporal muscles work and function like a spring that pulls the lower jaw upward to close the mouth. Subsequently, the faces themselves underwent a visible transformation, which, one would believe, could significantly be measured by those who are interested in the psychosomatic relations.

We can make the same observation by means of a direct comparison between the faces of two brothers who have different intellectual levels. This is a situation frequently observed in Algerian rural areas where the schooling opportunities are unequally distributed even at the level of one and the same family. We may find, in the same family, two brothers, one educated and the other illiterate.

It is a matter of fact that there are similarities between such persons indicating their common genetic origin. But there are also some outstanding differences in their looks and their faces that reveal different processes of integration. In general, the population of any country consists of two types: the rural and urban types that sociologists can readily distinguish by the way they dress. Whatever rural clothes he wears, the townsman can easily be recognized, for he is but a false countryman. Similarly, the countryman is only a false city dweller even if he is in his Sunday best.

Two brothers sharing the same genetic origin and belonging to the same rural environment are also distinguishable from one another by similar obvious signs depending on whether one of them has been to school and the other not. These signs mark the process of integration of the individual who has stepped into the realm of ideas.

However, following this first step, the above process will be carried on throughout all the stages of the individual's life – maturity, adulthood and extreme old age – in such a manner as to be gradually transformed into a process of disintegration. At the age of senility, the individual seems to reverse his movement, thus going back over his psychological ages. He will successively quit:

1. The realm of ideas thus losing every creative power.
2. The realm of persons out of indifference or misanthropy.

3. The realm of objects out of feebleness and *désengouement*.[5]

Likewise, he breaths his last at the end of a process alluded to by the Qur'an:

> ... *and then, after [a period of] strength, ordains [old age] weakness and gray hair.*
>
> al-Rūm 30: 54.

However, throughout the individual's life, the three realms coexist with one of them having some preponderance over the others according to both the individual and the type of society to which he belongs.

In a society in which the realm of ideas is centered on objects, the individual tendencies are orientated accordingly. It once happened that I questioned, in an Arab country, a boy about what they were giving him at school without my use of the word giving being intentional. Yet, his spontaneous answer was so revealing: they give us biscuits, he said. It is evident that the meaning of give for him is first articulated in the realm of objects, though it is expressly used within the context of school.

Thus, the individual pays the tribute of his social integration to both nature and society. The more unbalanced the latter's development, the higher this tribute.

Chapter Three

Society and Ideas

Biologists consider that the embryology of the fetus reproduces the morphological stages of the species. From the Islamic point of view, there is no doctrinal reason to confirm or reject this thesis outright. This is because, like all religious systems, Qur'anic thought has rather purposely remained allegorical on this and many other issues. On the contrary, it is possible, from the historical point of view, to point out certain similarities between some traits of the mental development of the individual and the psycho-sociological evolution of society. The latter also seems to undergo the three stages of development:

1. The age of the object,
2. The age of the person, and
3. The age of the idea.

However, the passage from one stage to another in the case of society is not as obvious as in the case of the individual. In fact, every society has, whatever its level of development, its own complex cultural universe. In this universe, the realms of objects, human beings and ideas are intertwined through the society's concerted action.

It goes without saying that the scheme of this action, no matter how simple it might be, includes necessarily a set of motivations and operational modalities, that is to say, a set of moral motives and technical ideas. But there is always a preponderance of one of the three factors over the others. It is through this preponderance, which manifests itself in thought and action, that human societies are distinguished from one another.

An under-developed country is not necessarily poor in terms of material means (objects). The lack of ideas might be the real source of its underdevelopment. This lack of ideas manifests itself especially in the way such a society utilizes, more or less efficiently, the means already at its disposal and in its inability to create new ones. More importantly, it manifests itself in the society's way of posing its problems or not posing them at all when it gives up any desire, no matter how vague it might be, to tackle them.

According to economists who study the problems of the Third World, land is the most reliable means for the "take-off" and passage of a society from the primary to the secondary stage, such as China has done since 1951. Yet, it is a well-known fact that the most fertile lands existing in Iraq and Indonesia have not enabled these two countries to realize their take-off.

There is here a real lack of ideas that is politically and economically translated in the form of impeding inhibitions. From the sociological point of view, this situation corresponds to the psycho-sociological characteristics of the present Muslim world. The historian, the economist and the sociologist can explain this situation, each according to his own perspective. By relying on the theory of the three stages, we are here giving it a psycho-sociological explanation. The antecedents of contemporary societies will certainly justify this theory. In general, on the axis representing the stages of development, a historical society – both past and present – has to occupy a specific position. Thus, history reveals the existence of three stages:

1. The pre-civilized society,
2. The civilized society, and
3. The post-civilized society.

Usually, historians distinguish between the first and the second stages, but no distinction is made between the second and the third. For them, a post-civilized society is simply a society that pursues its course on the track of its civilization. This regrettable confusion its course on the track of its civilization. This regrettable confusion generates all other kinds of confusion by distorting the premises underlying reasoning at the philosophical, moral, and sociological levels, and even at the economic and political levels. Accordingly, it is claimed that the problems of under-developed countries will be solved on the basis of such premises.

Experts of the ideological struggle sometimes artfully exploit such confusion when they themselves take charge of, or entrust some of their disciples with, the task of convincing us by means of false syllogism that Islam has failed to promote a developed society.[1] To remove this confusion, we should say that a post-civilized society is by no means a fixed society. Rather, it is a society that has reversed the direction of its movement. Thus, it evolves backwardly, for it has deviated from the path of its civilization and broken away from it. A historian who rightly grasped this phenomenon described it dramatically as follows:

> The (Islamic) East [*al-Mashriq*], it seems, was similarly visited, though in accordance with and in proportion to [the East's more affluent] civilization. It was as if the voice of existence in the world had called out for oblivion and restriction, and the world responded to its call. God inherits the earth and whomever is upon it.[2]

This was none other than Ibn Khaldūn. One century after the fall of Baghdad and before that of Granada, he noted the breaking point in the cycle of Islamic civilization, the point from which started the post-Almohad era, that is the post-civilization era of the Muslim world.

By following the historical journey of this society from its beginning as marked in the *Hijra* calendar, one can form an idea of the stages through which it had passed as well as about their psycho-sociological significance. Originally, it was only a small tribal society living in the Arabian Peninsula in a limited cultural universe in which even religious beliefs were centered on inanimate objects, that is, the idols of the *Jāhiliyyah* (pre-Islamic Arab era).

In fact, the *Jāhilī* (pre-Islamic Arab) environment was a perfect reflection of society in its age-of-the-object stage. Besides, one must note that, at this pre-civilization stage, the realm of objects itself is very poor; the 'object' is rudimentary, consisting of the sword, the spear and stake, the quiver, the bow and arrows, the camel, the horse, the saddle without stirrups provided with a simple wood support (the iron stirrup was to be invented later by al-Muhallab b. Abī Ṣufrah[3]), the tent and the miserable utensils.

All these things are characteristic of nomadic life. Anyway, the "object" soon resumes its hold on the person in the post-civilized society. Like any consumer society, a post-civilized society still possesses a world stuffed with objects. These objects are rather apathetic, devoid of any social dynamics.

Be that as it may, the realm of human beings of the *Jāhilī* society was confined to the boundaries of the tribe. As to its realm of ideas, it was clearly embodied in those brilliant poems known as the *mu'allaqāt.*[4] In short, just like the realm of human beings, it was a narrow and restricted world from which the poet of the *Jāhiliyyah* would draw his sparkling verses to celebrate the glories and victories of his tribe in one of those epic episodes historically recorded under the name of Arabian days (*ayyām al-'Arab*), chanting the memory of his beloved, mourning, like al-Khansā',[5] a hero who had died, or immortalizing a name such as that of Ḥātim al-Ṭā'ī[6] for his largesse and hospitality.

Such was the visage of that *Jāhilī* society, shut in on itself. On it borders would fade away the historical waves and movements of its great neighbors: the Byzantines and Persians to the north and east and, the Ethiopians to the south.

Suddenly, an idea illuminated a grotto, Ghār Ḥirā',[7] where a solitary man was meditating. Its flash brought about a message commencing with the word "Read". This word broke the darkness of the *Jāhiliyyah* and the solitude of its society as well. A new society, integrated into, and communicating with, the world and history, came into existence. It started breaking its tribal frontiers, thus edifying its new realm of human beings. In this new realm, every individual was the bearer of a message. A new cultural universe in which objects had to be centered on ideas was being constructed.

From the beginning, as the integration process of Muslim society started in history, its realm of human beings was founded on a prototype embodied in the community of the *Anṣār* and *Muhājirūn*[8] who fraternized with each other in Madīnah. This archetype was to become the embodiment of the Islamic ideal. It was to become the model to inspire, and be emulated by, subsequent Muslim generations. Its memoirs which were carefully recorded would inspire the early writings in the Muslim world such as the *Ṭabaqāt* of Ibn Sa'd.[9]

Every step of the new society toward the realm of ideas – that is, towards the age of the idea – has necessarily to pass through the realm of human beings, that is to say, through the age of the person. Just as in the case with the individual, the process at the society's level would also follow its course up to the point of inversion and regression. Then, ideas would freeze, the movement would become a backward one, and Muslim society would turn back reversing its course, hence going over its previous ages.

Likewise, the society's realm of human beings no longer reflects the image of its original archetype. Rather, it first becomes a world of mystics, thus giving way to a world of all sorts of deceivers and charlatans, notably the category of *za'īm*.[10] Moreover, its realm of objects is no longer as simple and necessary as it was during the time of the *Jāhiliyyah*.

Finally, the "object" regains its authority over the minds and consciences. Superfluous and gleaming as it often is, the "object" may be very costly, especially when it has to be purchased abroad. The process is then locked up and Muslim society, turning back, realizes that, centuries ago, it entered the post-civilization age.

Chapter Four

Civilization and Ideas

Civilization is the product of a fundamental idea that imparts to a pre-civilized society the thrust that drives it onto the stage of history. Such a society would start constructing its system of ideas in accordance with that fundamental idea or archetype. It thus takes root in such original cultural plasma that will determine all its distinctive characteristics with regard to other cultures and civilizations.

The Christian idea gave rise in history to Europe. The latter has constructed its system of ideas accordingly. With the Renaissance, Europe rediscovered the Greek world in which it recognized Socrates, Plato and Aristotle who were, respectively, the instigator, the historian and the maker (*législateur*) of ideas. However, the Greek world that Europe discovered in the wake of the Islamic civilization had already borne a Christian stamp, since the time of St Thomas Aquinas.[1]

The role of ideas in any civilization is not figurative or decorative like a chimney's decoration as it turns out to be in post-civilization. During the time of a society's integration into history, the role of ideas is functional. This is because civilization is but the ability to carry out a specific mission and fulfill a definite function. In effect, civilization can be defined as being the sum-total of the moral and material conditions enabling a given society to provide each of its members with all social guarantees necessary for his development.

The individual achieves self-fulfillment thanks to a will and a power. This will and power is not and cannot be his, but they stem from the society to which he belongs. When left to their own power and will, both the solitary individual and the one who has lost contact with his group are no more than a poor wisp of straw despite all the literary embellishments with which a novelist would surround their miserable existence. That is because reality is one thing and its literary image another. Since Daniel Defoe published his *Robinson Crusoe*, the generations who read it have forgotten the unfortunate adventure of the poor English sailor who, four years after his shipwreck, was found on a desert island in the ocean from which he was taken back to England dressed in the skins of wild goats. Although it was this sad adventure that inspired Daniel Defoe, it has, however, fallen into oblivion.

This is the true reality of individuals when they are left to their own will and power: they are either completely cut from their original environment as in the English sailor's case, or they no longer find in that environment the will or the power to provide assistance. Just like an animal surviving its extinguished species following a geological cataclysm, their tragedy is similar to that of the last mammoth of the Pleistocene Epoch wandering in the frozen and inclement steppes where it could find no food.

In fact, the will and power of society give the civilizing process its objective character. That is to say, the sum-total of the moral and material conditions necessary for the individual's development. These conditions take the form of legislations and policies that practically represent the direct projection of the society's realm of ideas on the social and moral planes. The society's will and power vary according to the phases of its civilization as represented in the following diagram, which we have used in another work.[2]



Diagram representing Islamic Civilization

Representing the psycho-temporal values of civilization, this diagram gives us an idea about the variation of those values throughout the phases of a civilization whose will, objectifying its moral conditions, is born at the point zero. This will is at its maximum level in the first spiritual phase in which the nascent society faces its problems by suppressing its needs on the one hand, and by making use of all its simple means in order to meet the largest possible sector of those needs, on the other.

It is a stage characterized by the most beautiful forms of asceticism for which the Prophet of Islam set the highest example in his personal and family life. It is also characterized by the most generous acts of the companions who mobilized their wealth for the service of Islam and the Muslim community, as did Abū Bakr and 'Uthmān.

As for the power objectifying the material conditions of civilization and enabling society to fulfill its sustenance function, it is still in its formative stage and in the process of developing, in this first phase. Muslim society had to use arms to defend its power when the latter was threatened after the death of the Prophet by the heretic movement in the apostasy wars[3], which aimed at the abolition of *zakāt*, the right of the poor. However, Muslim society was able to face that heresy only because it had kept its "will" intact, that is, the inner tension created in it by the Qur'anic inspiration and Prophetic teaching. It is this tension that characterizes and distinguishes a society at the beginning of its civilization, thus distinguishing it from a society at its pre- or post-civilization age or even at the civilized stage in the AB phase, when the realms of both objects and ideas start counterbalancing each other and when, later, the "object" gradually gets the upper hand over the idea especially in the BC phase.

This tension which has in modern history marked the take-off of the Soviet Union with the experience of Stakhanovism[4] and has recently marked that of Popular China especially after its Cultural Revolution, has always stamped the most dynamic phase of the formation and integration process of a nascent society. It is a driving idea (*idée-force*), which can be disseminated neither by means of a doctrine nor by any dialectical teaching method whatsoever.

The most favorable circumstances for the advent of this kind of tension have been interpreted by a historian like Toynbee[5] as being those conditions in which a human group is compelled to respond to a challenge by means of an organized and concerted action. Nevertheless, this interpretation does not provide an explanation for the genesis and formation of the present historical societies whose number may be counted on the fingers of one hand. For we do not understand why the Buddhist society did not, in the beginning of the Christian era, respond to the challenge posed by the renaissance of Vedic thought,[6] though the latter had condemned it to exile in China. Neither can we understand why the Buddhist society has failed in the twentieth century to resist, in its new land, the Marxist challenge imported by Mao Tse-tung who has for ever erased Buddhism from the ideological map of the world.[7]

As far as the experience of contemporary Muslim society is concerned, it is worth noting the following. This society could not derive from the cultural universe of its western-educated elites or from the so-called revolutionary pragmatic ideologies the civilizing élan that would endow that universe and those ideologies with the spark that had fired the masses and allowed them to block Moshe Dayan's way in the Six–Day War[8]. It has also failed to benefit from the rigor of thought inherited from Descartes' time.

Whereas, fourteen centuries ago, the *idée-force* of Islam could pass its lightening blaze from the Arabian Peninsula to far distant areas, thus uniting the Muslim peoples in that magnificent concerted action, that is, the Islamic civilization which lasted until the fall of Baghdad and Granada. Even when Muslim society, turning back, reached the point 'C' in the third phase of its civilization, i.e. the post-Almohad era,[9] the *idée-force* of Islam could still enable it to resist the colonial aggression and, ultimately, to regain its independence.

The great miracles in history have always been related to certain *idées-forces*. It was the Communist ideology that allowed the Soviet society to stop Hitler's march on Stalingrad during the Second World War. If such an external interpretation is not sufficient to explain the origin and source of such driving forces in all cases, it should, however, be noted that it is these driving forces themselves that have made those societies spring out from nothingness to be projected onto the historical scene in which they last inasmuch as they remain supported by those forces.

Chapter Five

The Vital Energy And Ideas

Whatever their way of life, whether a solitary person like Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān or living in a big city, individuals have to fulfill their vital needs. In order for them to do so, they must use the vital energy constituting part of their being. However, the vital energy of individuals cannot be assimilated, in its natural state, by life within the society unless their social integration is realized with account being taken of their personal needs on the one hand, and of those of society, on the other.

In reality, society imposes certain rules, norms, laws and customs and, indeed some tastes and prejudices representing needs that are no less vital for it. The integration process of individuals will, therefore, take place by responding to their own nature, on the one hand, and by observing, on the other hand, a certain code of life that can, at an advanced stage, be defined as a social contract. Accordingly, the abovementioned process acquires a specific significance thus determining a certain conditioning pattern of the individual's vital energy.

The Pavlovian School has shed the first light on the conditioning process in general. In an interesting book entitled *Le Viol des Foules*, Serge Tchakhotine, one of its followers, has given us a pertinent analysis and classification of the vital energy under what he has named "natural impulses".[1] Whether the four impulses he pointed out are sufficient to categorize the entire vital energy is an issue that we leave aside.

What is important to verify, instead, are the limits within the framework of which the vital energy does and has to operate in such a manner that society can assimilate it in its concerted action; that is, in all the forms of its activity.

It is evident that if we could, by supposition, get rid of one of the forms of the vital energy such as what Tchakhotine calls the 'nutritive impulse', the 'acquisitive or the reproductive impulse', all the biological forces and possibilities of social life would have been abolished in one go. Had we, also by supposition, done the contrary by liberating the vital energy from all kinds of restrictions, a purely natural order would have substituted the social order. Consequently, the individual would be living under the law of natural selection, the law of the jungle, which permits the survival not of the best but of the fittest.

Therefore, when we abolish the vital energy, we in fact destroy society, whereas when we liberate it completely, it itself destroys society. So it has necessarily to function within the framework of two limits. Accordingly, one has reason to enquire about the power that subjugates the vital energy so as to contain it within those limits. Raised at the very origin of the process of integration of a pre-civilized human group at the moment when it starts moving on to the following stage, this question actually enlightens us on the nature of the conditioning process which the vital energy has to undergo in order to meet all the requirements of this passage.

In other words, the power guaranteeing this conditioning is essentially linked to the factors that contribute to the advent of a civilization. More particularly, it is linked to that factor which plays a preponderant role in the transformation of a primitive (pre-civilized) human group into a civilized society. In this connection, the *Jāhilī* society provides us with an excellent picture of this process.

Originally, it is a question of dealing with a type of society in which the vital energy is hardly conditioned by anything. The *Jāhilī* cultural universe was almost void of any principles of social constraint. Its principles were did not transcend some rules of honor, certain obligations towards the group (tribal cohesion whose political significance in the formation of the North-African states Ibn Khaldūn has shown under the term *'aṣabiyyah*), and to some beliefs commercialized by Qurayshite Makkah.

In that environment, nothing used to condition its vital energy. It was almost in its natural state, thus incompatible with the particular conditions of civilization. Nevertheless, when the trans-formation of that primitive society into a civilized one took place, neither the historian nor the sociologist was able to notice in that interval of time the emergence of any novel fact that could explain such a change. The cultural universe, which appeared with the Qur'anic Revelation, was the only novel fact. The causal nexus between the two events – that is, the Qur'an and the advent of a civilization – is rigorously implied by their concomitance. Accordingly, it was the Islamic idea that subordinated the vital energy of the *Jāhilī* society to the exigencies of a civilized society.

It is impossible to explain otherwise that conditioning process which disciplined the biological forces of life in order to put them at the service of history. In fact, at the origin of every civilization, it is the same integration process of the vital energy that is repeated in such conditions thus enabling it to fulfill its historical function. However, the power of integration is not inevitably the same as regards the various cycles of civilization, nor is it a fortiori as regards the different phases of one and the same cycle.

On the other hand, the conditions of integration do not manifest themselves through one and the same pattern in all civilizations. For example, instead of containing the sexual impulse within practical reasonable limits, Christian society tried to abolish it. It thus faced the libido[2] by the ideal of chastity. No doubt, this is a lofty ideal, although it is incompatible with the finalities of history. It succeeded in bringing about some very good examples among the human species in the form of saints, but it has left the rest of the people prey to sexual hallucinations. Today, one can clearly see in those pornographic exhibitions,[3] arising here and there in the West, to what lengths such hallucinations may go.

It is thus already clear that the power subordinating the vital energy does not lie in a deliberate choice of an extreme solution. Generally speaking, the solution lies neither in a too rigorous position nor in a too liberal one. Even a happy balance between the two extremes is not a solution. No matter what the solution is, its effectiveness will, in principle, depend upon the nature of the *idée-force* underlying it, and upon its power at that moment.

In order for these considerations to be of more practical significance, one could examine a specific case of the conditioning process of the vital energy in two different societies on the hand, and at two different stages of the same society, on the other. The history of anti-alcohol legislation provides us with an appropriate case in this regard. Muslim society dealt with the problem of alcohol by means of a legislation scheme that involved three texts:

1. A text introducing the problem into the Muslim conscience thus representing, in a way, the psychological stage of the solution.

2. A text putting restrictions on the consumption of alcohol. This corresponds to a phase of des-intoxication.

3. Finally, a text of prohibition, thus legally establishing the solution.[4]

Parallel to this scheme, one can point out another more or less identical example as regards the method of treatment. Such is the anti-alcohol legislation (the prohibition law) of the USA after the First World War. It consisted of almost the same stages as the first one that is:

1. In 1918, the American press introduced the problem to public opinion.

2. In 1919, it was incorporated into the American constitution

under the name of "the 18th Amendment".

3. In the same year, the prohibition law came into force under the name of the Volstead Act.[5]

In the light of history, one has good reason to note, first, the difference in the conditioning power of the two legislations. Fourteen centuries ago, the prohibition of alcohol did not create any shock waves in the nascent Muslim society. On the contrary, in the American society contemporary to the Volstead Act, the shock was so violent that it broke all the dykes, turned all the roadblocks upside down and generated all kinds of morbid reaction: unlawful trade, gang formation, and mass drunkenness by adulterated alcohol. Consequently, the Act of Prohibition was repealed by the 21st Amendment ratified in December 1933.

The idea of "prohibition" is decisively extirpated from the cultural universe of American society, for it has no roots in that universe. Indeed, one may observe in parallel a certain retreat in the present Muslim society with regard to the problem of alcohol, especially when it takes the form of defiance (calculated or not) to the simple conventions of social life.

The ironical existence, in a small city like Tebessa in the south-eastern region of Algeria, of four taverns along a very narrow alley that had been named *shāriʿ al-nabiy* [the Prophet's Street] during the heroic times of the anti-colonialist struggle, is in fact nothing but a blatant form of defiance.

Regardless of the laws adopted at present in contemporary Muslim society, the latter has not, however, extirpated the idea of "prohibition" from its cultural universe. Even without having the force of law such as, for example, in the self-claimed progressive countries, this idea continues to play, in the least, a certain role in social constraint. I know quite a number of Muslim girls who pay due consideration to this idea in the choice of a husband.

Thus, an idea has deploringly failed to fulfill its social function in a society like the American society which has invented the most effective methods to launch its ideas and machines and which bases, in general, its legislative resolutions on the most accurate statistics and then subjects them, in the course of implementation, to the strictest scientific means of control. In contrast, this same idea has relatively preserved its conditioning power in Muslim society which, at present, has nothing at its disposal to face the deviations of its vital energy except the mere good will of each person to build up its required social constraint.

Two conclusions can be drawn from the above:

1. The conditioning power of an idea is not the same in two societies that have different cultural roots. In American society based on technical and materialistic values, that is to say, oriented to the realm of objects, this power is weaker than in Muslim society that is centered on ethical values.
2. In the same process, that of the Muslim society for example, the conditioning power varies from one stage to another.

Reaching its apex in the first stage (see the diagram in the previous chapter), it progressively gives up insofar as the *original idea* gives way to the acquired ideas and inasmuch as the latter, in their turn, give way to objects.

In the third stage, the instincts are liberated, the original conditioning process comes to an end and the cultural universe is reduced to a mere realm of objects. As a result, the vital energy, which is entirely liberated, destroys the society by abolishing the network of its social relations, thus breaking its concerted action into thousands of conflicting activities undertaken either individually or in small groups, a phenomenon that has been examined by the Marxists under the name of class conflict.

Be that as it may, this is but the end of a civilization! Thus, society is no longer able to carry on its march with brains that are either empty or full of dead ideas, with feeble and worried consciences, and with the relations network (that is, its unity) destroyed. As for Muslim society, this is then the post-Almohad era that commences.

Chapter Six

The realm of Ideas

A society in its pre-civilization stage meets the requirements of its simple activities by means of a set of motivations and operational modalities that correspond to its modest cultural universe. Even at this stage, this universe includes certain key ideas (*idées maîtresses*) or archetypes that each generation inherits from the preceding one and passes on to the next. It also includes some practical ideas more or less modified by each generation in order to face the specific circumstances of its history. At this stage, the key ideas supporting the society's activity constitute its ethos (*éthique*), while the practical ideas guiding that activity constitute its technique.

As a society moves on to the second stage, thus getting involved in a civilizing process, its transformation will correspond exactly to a cultural revolution which will more or less alter, indeed less, its technique but which will radically shatter its ethos. On the threshold of a civilization, it is not the realm of objects that undergoes transformation, but it is the realm of persons that undergoes fundamental change. At this very stage, even the technique is not object-oriented but man-oriented. It is thus a social technique meant to shape the new relations within society on the basis of a new charter, divinely revealed like the Qur'an, or man-made like the Iassa of Genghis Khan[1] or the 1793 French Constitution. Yet, the primary condition for a society to secure the network of its relations is, as we have just seen, to set the limits for its vital energy.

There is a certain hierarchy in the realm of ideas between the ideas transforming human beings and those transforming things. The first category represents the power that conditions the vital energy on the threshold of a civilization, whereas the second embodies the power that conditions matter in the second stage of its cycle.

The power of the first category depends, as far as the degree and duration of transformation are concerned, on the origins, whether sacred or secular, of the cultural universe that has risen in the new society. In fact, a purely secular cultural universe cannot exist from the beginning because such a universe is unable to provide the motivations that can support the early steps of a nascent society.

It is a matter of fact that the founders of a civil society realize such a phenomenon. This was the case with Robespierre[2] who, after the event, added the idea of Supreme Being (*Être Suprême*) to the ideology of the French Revolution. As this idea failed, the France of 1798 replaced it with a demiurge embodied in a certain Napoleon.

This aspect of the problem shows that an incipient order will always seek support in some sacred values. Moreover, history shows that a cultural universe will always tend, even if originally founded on such sacred values, towards desecration inasmuch as society advances in the second stage, that of technical problems and expansion. This phenomenon can be explained in two ways. In the understanding of an economist, it is progress, whereas it reflects, according to a historian-philosopher, a loss of energy denoting the beginning of ageing.

These two contradictory interpretations can be reconciled in the necessary law of energy transformation. Governing history and physics, this law implies that in order to generate activity and movement, there must be a degradation or loss of potential (*chute de potentiel*).[3] Mechanics call as "moment of strength" the instant at which the lever arm (*levier*) is ready to move a certain resistance, that is to say, to accomplish a specific activity. The *idée-force* has also its "moment", that in which its projection in our activity exactly represents the integral image of its archetype in the original cultural world. It is at this moment, in particular, that its control over the vital energy reaches its peak. It thus could allow Bilāl b. Rabāḥ[4] to challenge, if only by raising his finger as a sign pointing to the oneness of God, the entire *Jāhiliyyah* despite the atrocious tortures to which he was subjected. It also allowed the Christian martyrs to defy Roman paganism in spite of the dreadful circus to which they were exposed during the time of the Catacombs.[5]

All ideas, those which concern the moral order and those which govern the material order, have their moment of grace, their Archimedean moment, as their entry into the cultural universe is marked by the cry of joy *"eureka"!* It was the shout of the Prophet Moses as he saw the Burning Bush[6] of which Pascal[7] was reminding the Christian conscience in the high French style of the seventeenth century: "*Feu, feu... Joie...! Larmes de joie!*" (*Fire, fire! Tears of joy... Bonafire!*" It was the cry of Nietzsche too, as he discovered his *die ewige Wiederkehrung* (law of eternal recurrence)![8] It was also the cry of Christopher Columbus and his seamen shouting, "*Land... Land...*" as they discovered the Antilles islands in 1492; he was thus announcing to the world not only the discovery of America, but also the decisive entry into the cultural universe of Europe of the idea that "the earth is round, perfectly round!" It is the cry announcing the victory of an idea... Shouted by the Parisian population, the notions of freedom, equality and fraternity succeeded to blow away the Bastille[9] on 14 July 1789! The waves of that historical day would later on in October 1917 blow away the throne of Peter the Great[10]!

The Archimedean moment of ideas depends on the state of their relationship with its archetypes. The latter represent, in the cultural universe, the matrices according to which the ideas expressed through our activities are molded. However, time affects both our subjective and rational being, in a manner that obliterates the salient traits of that molding, just as the characters of a printing press or foundry are obliterated with the passage of time.

It may happen that the printed forms are only pale images of the archetypes. That is, the expressed ideas (*idées exprimées*) betray the ideas impressed (*idées imprimées*) in the original matrices. This betrayal will be resounding throughout all our activities, thus exposing them to nemesis – a vengeance that is sometimes terrible on the temporal level. For, whenever betrayed, ideas take vengeance for themselves. This can be well understood on the technical level when an ill-manufactured machine explodes or an ill-constructed bridge collapses.

Very often, however, societies, civilizations and empires fall in the same way. All historical debacles are mostly nothing but the more or less immediate results of the nemesis of betrayed ideas. The fall of Carthage as a result of a political mistake committed by its Senate is the tragic but not the sole illustration of such a betrayal.

Therefore, we have to give due consideration to the relation of ideas with the parameters of action lest the latter becomes absurd or impossible. These relations consist of three levels:

1- The political, ideological and ethical level in relation to the realm of persons. Even the physiological level can be included if account is to be taken of eugenics.

2- The logical, philosophical and scientific level with regard to the realm of ideas.

3- The sociological, economic and technical level in respect of the realm of objects.

Whenever one factor or another distorts any of the above articulations of the ideas, we should only expect the effects of such a distortion to be manifested in the judgments and activities of society as well as in the behavior of its members. The afore-mentioned effects are manifested in aberrant, sometimes laughable forms.

In a painting exhibition in 1957 in Los Angeles, the prize-winning picture, entitled *Cafè Laos,* was the work of a one-eyed parrot when its owner left it wading in the paint near a canvas. Such an artistic mystification, a sign of the surrealistic times, was possible only because the perverted aesthetical canons of surrealism have distorted the juror's aesthetical criteria. Here, at least, the deception was easily discovered because its author himself – the parrot's owner – confessed to it later. In so many other cases, the deception can neither be confessed nor denounced either by hypocrisy when sordid interests are gagging one's opinion, or more simply due to unawareness.

Be that as it may, any alteration in the relations within the realm of ideas (philosophical and logical order etc...), between the latter and the realm of persons (political and ideological order etc...), or between it and the realm of objects (sociological, economic and technical order) will necessarily generate much disorder in the social life and many types of discrepancy in the individuals' behavior. This is so especially when the rupture with the archetypes reaches its extreme, that is, when the matrices of our impressed ideas are almost wiped out in our subjectivity, and as our expressed ideas molded according to those matrices become shapeless, incoherent and valueless.

Ideas thus die leaving empty brains and even helpless tongues. Then, society falls into a state of infantilism. For lack of ideas, infants express themselves in a primitive way by means of gestures and sounds. A society falling into such infantilism will then display very curious phenomena to compensate for its lack of ideas. It is thus condemned to make up for them, especially in its intellectual activities, by ersatz[11] ideas.

It is then the gesture that carries on the incomplete sentence because one is unable to complete it: because of lack of ideas, there are no words. Nicholas Boileau,[12] the great seventeenth-century French literary critic, has accurately expressed this fact in his book *Art Poétique* (Poetic Art):[13]

> That which is properly thought out is said clearly,
> And the words to express it come forth easily.

Indeed, when ideas are lacking, incoherence looms large. The voice then rises increasingly to substitute a missing argument. Moreover, it is rhetoric that gains ground in literature manifesting itself in the excessive use of superlatives and in the pomposity of words such as the phrase "the valiant people" inserted in the constitution of an Arab country. In a newspaper of that same country, underneath the photo of a person who has slipped into the Algerian revolution (no one knows how) is the astounding legend that reads, "A giant of the Revolution."

It is, then, pure pathos to say that "it is very serious" instead of merely giving a precise idea about the respective situation. It is the maximizing solemnization as one spells out that "everybody knows..." to support an opinion. It is as well the minimizing attitude as one states that "no one believes..." to undermine another. Briefly, it is the verbiage in which every word casts more shadow of doubt on the subject concerned instead of clarifying it. As for incoherence and inconsistency in the realm if ideas, their manifestations are clearly seen in the most elementary activity of society.

For example, in an Arab capital, one can read in a cinema poster the title of the film "Uncertainty and youth", whereas it would have been more appropriate and logical to entitle it "Youth and Uncertainty"! I am personally convinced that the author of the film did not think for one single moment about the question of the natural order of ideas in such a simple title.

Likewise, when incoherence in the realm of ideas distorts their logical relations, we only have to expect all sorts of confusion of the minds that will not attempt, in the political domain for instance, to distinguish the causes from their effects. It is in this manner that Muslim society has dealt with the problem of colonialism, while neglecting that of *colonizability.*[14]

Chapter Seven

Impressed and Expressed Ideas

The realm of ideas is a disc that individuals carry within themselves at birth. It is a disc that differs from one society to another by certain fundamental notes. One may be astonished that Hindu music is not like any other music. I have always enjoyed it without being able to know the reason; all that I can say is that it addresses the spirit in a different manner for it is differently impressed in India's subjectivity. Each society's disc is impressed in a different way. Individuals and generations record in it their own notes as harmonics of the basic notes. The realm of ideas is also a disc, which bears its fundamental notes, its archetypes: these are but the impressed ideas.

The Greek genius was thus molded according to the essential of Homer, Euclid, Pythagoras, Socrates and Empedocles and the harmonics of Plato[1] and Aristotle that were enriched by the subsequent Athenian generations. This has provided mankind with that melody some echoes of which are found in modern civilization.

In physics, the relationship between the basic vibration and its harmonics is such that the latter vanish as soon as the former stops vibrating. The same phenomenon manifests itself at the level of the relationship between the impressed and expressed ideas. As the impressed ideas start fading away from a civilization's disc, the expressed ideas start, first, producing false notes, whistling and crackles and, finally, silence and rest.

Fourteen centuries ago, Muslim society received its impressed message in the form of revelation. That message was readily engraved in the subjectivity of the generation contemporary to Ghār Ḥirā' which made the world listen to the heroic symphony of a "religion of men", as Nietzsche used to say about Islam. The ideas impressed in that disc have raised a host of storms in the history of mankind for the last fourteen centuries. At the beginning, they had radically transformed a primitive environment by putting its vital energy within the limits of civilization and subjecting it to its rules, norms and strict discipline.

The Archimedean moment experienced by Arabia while it was receiving its message was incomparably great. On the material level, it generated totally unprecedented events and completely new social results with the same means already available since the realm of objects had not yet undergone any change at least at the moment when the Anṣār and Muhājirūn were pooling together their resources in order to face the demands of the new stage. On the intellectual level, it created many criteria and a new way of thinking in order to meet the imperatives of a new organization and orientation of the activities of such a nascent society.

Finally, on the psychological and moral levels, it brought about new centers of polarization for the vital energy. Around those new centers, one could well witness the birth of incommensurate moments of greatness such as when Muslims, in accordance with Salmān's advice,[2] dug the ditch (*khandaq*) which stopped the last *Jāhilī* wave at the foot of the walls of Madīnah. The paucity in the realm of objects could only allow them to make use of primitive means to undertake a very hard and difficult task. So aware of their pain, the Prophet used to sustain them by repeating a scanned wish and promise:

> O God, no life is but the life of the hereafter.
> Have mercy on the Helpers and the Emigrants!

While the companions, echoing him, were singing the hymn that successive Muslim generations have passed on to us:

> We have sworn fidelity to you and to Islam

O Muḥammad, as long ass life remains in us![3]

These centers of polarization focused the vital energy on the new concepts, new ideas and archetypes of a new cultural universe. It was thus converged in an explosive manner and its dramatic explosion was of a novel and different type. A man kissed a woman. This was but a moment in which the vital energy overflowed its new limits. The reminding forces of the new cultural universe were immediately triggered off. Consequently, the drama exploded within the conscience of the man who rushed to the Prophet to confess his sin. The answer that was to clear up such a drama was but the following Qur'anic verse:

> *And be constant in praying at the beginning and the end of the day, as well as during the early watches of the night: verily, good deeds drive away evil deeds: this is the reminder to all who bear [God] in mind.*
>
> Hūd, 11:114.

Then, the man asked: is this (verse) for me alone? The Prophet answered: "It is for all my community".[4]

In another instance, a woman came before the Prophet to confess that she had committed the sin of adultery. The term adultery was no longer a simple word on one's lips. It rather condensed in it all the horrible things that would deeply agitate the human conscience since the *sharīʿah* had laid down the most severe punishment for it: stoning to death. The lady was thus aware of what she was incurring. Nevertheless, the punishment on her flesh was for her far more tolerable than the effect of the sin on her conscience. Her feeling was so strong that that she had to present herself on three occasions to the Prophet who every time postponed the pronouncement of the verdict.

Firstly, he wanted to give the woman enough time for reflection. Secondly, he wanted to allow her to deliver since she was pregnant. On the third occasion, he sent her back to wait until the end of breastfeeding her newly born baby. Finally, the law was put into effect as the sinner never ceased to demand its implementation since she had committed the sin![5]

The dramatic events knotted around the new centers of polarization, the archetypes of the new cultural universe, did not concern only their authors. Rather, they included in their tension the whole community. This was the case of the *mukhallafūn,* those who failed to join the Tabūk expedition. They were three persons: Ka'b b. Mālik, Marārah b. al-Rabī'al-'Amrī and Hilāl b. Umayyah al-Wāqifī. It was Ka'b who gave the detailed account of the dramatic event.[6]

It was the Qur'an that had disclosed the explosive degree of tension within the conscience of those who lived it and cleared it up in the following verse:

> *And [He turned in His mercy, too] towards the three [groups of believers] who had fallen prey to corruption, until in the end – after the earth, despite all its vastness, had become [too] narrow for them and their souls had become [utterly] constricted – they came to know with certainty that there is no refuge from God other than [a return] unto Him; and thereupon He turned again unto them in His mercy, so that they might repent: for, verily, God alone is an acceptor of repentance, a dispenser of grace.*
>
> al-Tawbah 9: 118.

It was a day of joy and happiness not only for the three *mukhallafūn,* but also for the entire community.[7]

In such a strained environment, the impressed ideas put their sacred note in all the expressed ideas, thus stamping all the attitudes everywhere such that the Prophet used to say: "All the earth has been made a place of prayer for me".[8] There was nothing simply profane. Everything bore the sense of the sacred. The world was all made sacred. One can easily realize the weight of the slightest sin in such a universe as it scrapes the disc of the cultural universe. Each individual would realize and react to the distorted tone emanating from the scraped spot. In such blessed moments, there is, in each person, a melodic sensitivity spotting the sources of dissonances.

When this ethical and aesthetical sensitivity is exhausted, the degree of its exhaustion in fact reflects the incoherence of the realm of ideas and the degree of social deterioration in general. This deterioration will continue up to the moment when the concert of ideas stops as the disc becomes obliterated and erased in every person, up to the moment of complete silence as there is no longer any enthusiastic reaction to the lofty notes, nor any reprobate reaction to dissonances.

When the archetypes are obliterated, one can no longer hear the tone of the soul in the concert. At their turn, the expressed ideas, having lost their roots in the original plasma, fall silent, for they have nothing to express. Indeed, they are no more able to express anything. Reaching such a point, society is atomized because of the lack of common motivation, as was the case in Algeria after the Revolution. Thus, the individual either commits suicide or gives himself up to egoism as in Europe at the present moment. It is then the advent of dead ideas.

After it had experienced the glorious moments of the birth of its civilization, the Archimedean moment of its impressed ideas during the time of the Prophet and the righteous caliphs and that of its expressed ideas during the brilliant periods of Damascus and Baghdad, Muslim society is now facing the morbid age of dead ideas.

As the Muslim pilgrim lands at Jeddah seaport, his attention is agreeably caught as he reads on the poster hanging on a door: "Office of enjoining good" [*al-amr bī al-ma‘rūf*]! But as soon as he takes a few steps in the country, he realizes a fact against which the previous poster is but mere irony, for it is only a dead idea.

However, the situation becomes more tragic as a movement is launched to revive a cultural world – saturated with dead ideas – by means of deadly ideas borrowed from another civilization. The latter category of ideas, already deadly in their original environment, becomes even deadlier as they are uprooted from that environment. Generally speaking, such ideas leave, together with their roots that cannot be borrowed, the antidote which would temper their pernicious character in their original environment.

It is under such circumstances that the present Muslim society borrows modern and "progressive" ideas from Western civilization! This is a natural outcome of a process determined by the dialectic of things, human beings and ideas that has shaped Muslim history. Nevertheless, what is unnatural is its inertia and apathy in this stage, as if it wished to stay in it forever! Starting from the same point, other societies such as Japan and China have, on the contrary, succeeded to pull themselves out of their state of inertia by rigorously subjecting themselves to the conditions of new dynamics and new historical dialectic.

Thus, Muslim society is at present paying the tribute for its betrayal to its archetypes. The betrayed ideas, including the borrowed ones, turn against it and take revenge. This is only a painful situation in which the Muslim undergoes a state of dichotomy, thus being divided into two personalities: the practicing Muslim who performs his prayers in the mosque which he leaves to become a pragmatic Muslim immersed in a totally different world.

Chapter Eight

Dialectic of the Cultural Universe

The cultural universe is not an inert world. Rather, it has both a life and history if its own. This life and history can be interpreted according to Hegelian thought in the sense there is a becoming of the realm of philosophy and a philosophical becoming of the world. It can also be interpreted in the light of the Marxist principle according to which any change in the infrastructure determines the changes that would occur in the superstructure.

Here, we raise the problem from a pragmatic point of view. In general, the characteristics of action, both at the individual and collective levels, depend upon the internal relations between the parameters of the cultural world: the objects, the human beings and the ideas. To each historical stage of society, there is a corresponding internal dialectic that determines at every moment the involvement of these three categories in its activities. In other .words, to every instant corresponds a specific relationship between the objects, human beings and ideas integrated in the weft of action. Such an instant is but a matter of normality in the course of that dialectic. Yet, there are instants which generate a more exclusive relationship in which one of the parameters is preponderant when the society's activity is centered either on the objects, on the persons, or on the ideas in a more particular manner.

Hence, there is certain imbalance that marks this particular moment of the historical development of a society. That is, it marks an abnormal phase in the dialectics of the society's cultural universe. Such imbalance reflects some excess, and any excess is a kind of despotism to the detriment of social activities.

The demarcations between the different phases of imbalance are far from being very clear. The phenomenon of interference does not allow for any peremptory decision pinpointing the moment in which a society moves from one type of excess to another. Nevertheless, the present Muslim society is a field research that provides the sociologist interested in such issues with valuable data. The significance of such data is not solely of a clinical order.

Muslim intellectuals analyzing the social pathology of Muslim countries should not diagnose the latter's maladies with the spirit of merely knowing things or make others know them as they are. They should rather do so with the hope that the few conclusions they draw from their studies and reflections would find their way to those who have in their hands the therapeutic means in those countries, namely their political and cultural leaders.

One hundred years ago, Muslim society realized that the cycle of its civilization had reached its end. Today, it is again at the pre-civilization stage. It has been attempting for almost one century to reset itself in motion. However, its "take-off" seems to be taking place with difficulty in comparison to a "contemporary" society such as Japan or to a society whose take-off started at a much later time such as Popular China. Its difficulties have been interpreted in two different ways. According to the supporters of the colonialist thesis, Islam is the factor of the delayed take-off, whereas it is colonialism according to the nationalist thesis. Both interpretations suffer from a fundamental defect whose origin is a matter of great ambiguity. By pinning all the problems on Islam, the first group would like us to forget that colonialism is responsible for a great portion of the present chaos in the Muslim world. In contrast, by pinning everything on colonialism, the second group would have us forget their demagoguery, which has increased the acuteness of the problem, instead of alleviating it.

While the former overlooks the historical reality by ignoring the role of Islam in one of the most magnificent civilizations of mankind, the latter ignores or pretends to ignore that the most backward countries are precisely those, which have not experienced the colonial challenge such as Yemen. The problem, therefore, should be handled without any unnecessary prejudices, especially on behalf of the Muslim who tries to understand the sociological roots of the present chaos in the Muslim world.

In the next chapter, we shall see that every society has to face some trends towards imbalance. This is something that necessarily accompanies any historical development. At present, Muslim society suffers more specifically from such trends because its "renaissance" has not been planned or thought out in a manner that takes account of the agents of dissipation and obstruction. Its intellectuals have failed to develop any system of analytic and critical thought except in the sense of an apologetics meant to praise and exalt the values of Islam. Its political leaders have no belief in the necessity of such a system to control the course of affairs in their countries.

Thus, for one century now, its historical action has been evolving outside the criteria of efficacy. That action has been carried out in a chaotic state of ideas. As a result, it has come up against many difficulties and has been entrapped in a waste of time and means as well as in deviations resulting from the incoherence and chaos of ideas and the despotism of either objects or human beings.

We have thus far dealt with the first aspect of the problem, that is, the incoherence of the realm of ideas to which we will return in the next two chapters, for it is the keystone of this study. We shall now devote the remaining part of this chapter more particularly to the other two aspects of the problem in the present stage in which the Muslim world faces the despotism of objects at various levels.

1. The psychological and moral level: when the cultural universe is centered on the objects, the "object" stands on the top of the scale of values and the qualitative judgments are stealthily converted into quantitative judgments without their authors having any doubt about their sliding into *choseisme*,[1] that is, the evaluation of everything with the scale of objects. Thus, an official would measure his rank in the administrative hierarchy by the number of machines he has whether he utilizes them or not. In this connection, I have counted in only one office of a high-ranking official four telephones in front of him and five air-conditioners around him. In the same Arab capital, a young intellectual, the son of a personality of high moral prestige, used to greet me but he has now stopped doing so since the day he saw me getting off the train from the third class!

Choseisme thus leads to very frequent typical lapses, especially in the field of political literature. A motion of support for a given country would include the phrase "the government and its people" where the possessive has "its" people rather than the people having "their" government. The possessor has become possessed. Yet, this lapse is only a symptom of the reversal of values.

2. The social level: dealing with the quantitative aspects of the problems will lead us to formulate the solutions in terms of quantities, thus neglecting their qualitative aspects. The administrative officers of a "revolutionary" body equipped their headquarters with so many fantastic desks, which they did not know where to put. I saw a considerable number of them piled up on one another in a courtyard. Luckily for them it is not a rainy country. However, the sun can also damage the wood for it was really a mountain desk! Similarly, in a hospital, a decision was made to equip its park with new cars. I then saw a large number of new cars standing on their tires. It was explained to me that they had been there for two years!

In consequence, *choiseisme* generates a state of entropy at the social level; that is to say, an alienation of the society's power and dissipation of its means. *Quantitatism* and *choseisme* thus result in unexpected social phenomena. At the door of an administrative office, an officer would check the visitors and even register their names. If you come back the next day, you would see the register but not the officer who controls it. Then, you would enter, for the function has gone with the functionary.

3. The intellectual level: the despotism of objects has also its characteristic symptoms. A writer who has just finished a book would not be asked how and what subject he has dealt with. Instead, he would be asked how many pages he has filled up. Sometimes, it is the author himself who would succumb to the logic of *choseisme*. In this connection, an Algerian intellectual once informed me that he had written a book of so many pages!

4. The political level, *choseisme,* i.e. the despotism of the object, still alienates the social power in many other fields especially as regards planning when a country faces under-development either by means of investing foreign capital or by raising the tax rate in such a way that would paralyze every private economic activity by laying down the basis for a system of fiscal favoritism in the country. Nonetheless, at the present stage of Muslim society, there is convergence between the despotism of the object and that of the person. The despotism of the person generates its harmful effects especially at the moral and political levels.

On the moral level: when the ideal is personified, there is a twofold danger, since all the mistakes and lapses of the person are accounted for to the detriment of society which has incarnated its ideal in that person. This loss takes either the form of a rejection of the fallen ideal or that of a veritable apostasy, as it is believed to compensate the frustration by the adoption of a new ideal. In one case as in the other, we have surreptitiously and unwittingly substituted the problem of the persons for that of ideas. Such a substitution has caused much harm for Islamic ideal represented by persons whose qualifications do not live up to them. Anyway, who can personify ideas without jeopardizing society?

The Qur'an expressly signaled the danger of such incarnation to the conscience of the Muslims:

> *And Muhammad is only an apostle; all the [other] apostles have*

> *passed away before him: if then, he dies or is slain will you turn about on your heels?*
>
> Āl 'Imrān 3: 144

This warning does not imply an expectation of error or lapses in conduct, which are impossible as far as the Prophet is concerned. Rather, it is meant to signal the danger of the incarnation of ideas as such.

On the political level: one can enumerate in a single Muslim country so many disasters. Such disasters could have been avoided had some driving ideas not been alienated by means of incarnation. One of the great driving ideas that could make the colonialist machinery in Algeria tremble was born with the Algerian Popular Muslim Congress in 1936.

It was wished that it be embodied by an intellectual politician and thus it died just one month later because that intellectual was unfit to serve as a support for it. Yet, Algeria is not the only Muslim country to have paid heavily for the personified ideas.

The cult of both the "providential man" and the "unique thing" manifests itself everywhere in the present Muslim world and is sometimes at the origin of spectacular political failure. If we consider the matter in terms of the ideological struggle, we can see how colonialism could exploit this morbid trend of ours towards personifying our ideas, especially at the political level. This inclination toward incarnation often prevents us from benefiting from our failures because of tracing their causes right away back to somebody, "the nefarious man", instead of reflecting seriously upon the lessons that can be derived from them.

For example, when the breakdown of the Syrian-Egyptian union took place in 1961 thus marking a distressing failure of the idea of Arab union, I was listening to Damascus – and mainly Cairo – radio broadcasting in order to hear the explanation that was being given to that deplorable event. It was attributed to "a nefarious man", the Syrian army officer al-Kuzbarī who led the coup d'état, instead of seeking, profoundly and more usefully for the Arab people, its real causes in our cultural universe.

Indeed, it was clear that the coup would to take place with or without al-Kuzbarī because our cultural universe does not contain an antidote for it. On the contrary, it contains all factors favorable for such a turn of events. Thus, the "providential" or "the nefarious" man has always been unwittingly exploited to abort certain ideas. Generally speaking, it is this opposition of the idea to the idol that has guaranteed for colonialism its most brilliant successes as regards political abortions in Muslim countries by sometimes making use of our intellectuals themselves.

Most frequently, Muslim intellectuals are the least convinced people of the social value of ideas. This explains the fact that for the last thirty years, a considerable number of intellectuals in Algeria have preferred to revolve around certain idols rather than putting themselves at the service of certain ideas.

Finally, we should, in this chapter, point out another kind of despotism, that is, the despotism of ideas. It is the typical evil and disease of the elites. In a civilized society, this points to the moment in which intellectuals start losing their adaptation to social life, that is to say, the moment they no longer believe in its motivations in the caves of Saint-German or even in the lost tracks of Nepal at the bottom of the Himalayas. More so, they would use their available vital energy in erecting barricades, as happened in the days of May 1968 in Paris, without being able to clearly designate any goal for their élan.

In contrast, in an underdeveloped country, it is not the non-adaptation and the disaffection of a betrayed realm of ideas that assume despotic forms, but rather adaptation itself. Here, it is the ideas acquired in bookish form that generate a despotism that sometimes manifests itself in ludicrous forms. On a pharmacology course, the teacher was doing his utmost, badly rather than well, to describe a plant instead of simply stretching out his hand and picking it from the courtyard of the faculty and show it to the students; he was looking for it in a book whilst it was under the window of his classroom!

Chapter Nine

The Idea-Object Dialectic

The cultural universe has a dynamic structure the successive aspects of which correspond to variable relations between its structured elements, namely objects, persons and ideas. In the foregoing chapter, we tried to show the moments of crisis in a society as the equilibrium of its cultural universe undergoes a breakdown for the benefit of the despotism of one of its elements. As far as the other moments are concerned, they are interludes determined by the tendencies corresponding to the age of society and the stage of its civilization. An interlude is the threefold duel within the cultural universe, whereas a crisis is the culmination of that duel with the triumph of one of the three protagonists and the rise of a despot taking hold of power within the cultural universe.

We shall here focus on the interlude of the idea-object duel because of its particular sociological significance. This connection is not significant only with regard to Muslim society that at present faces *choseisme* and all its psycho-sociological consequences. It has also to be considered with respect to a civilized society as a means of analyzing its present situation from the psycho-sociological point of view. It is even more important since every idea developed in Europe, and concerning more or less directly our subject, may sometimes enlighten and enrich us even with its contradictions.

In fact, the problem has a twofold aspect. In an under-developed country, the "object" imposes its despotism by virtue of its scarcity. It thus generates a frustration complex and a tendency towards "accumulation" which becomes, on the economic level, a matter of mere wastage of means. In contrast, in a developed country and given its degree of development, the "object", due to its over-abundance, dominates by generating a saturation effect. It imposes the unbearable feeling of the "routinely seen" thus creating a tendency towards "escapism" which is a flight forward that pushes civilized man to frequently change his frame and fashion of life or to go to breathe air somewhere else. The system of paid leave is nothing but the price paid for this state of affairs, a painkiller for the disease of instability reigning in consumer society.

Thus, a destitute society reacts under the obsession with the realm of objects that it does not possess, whilst a saturated society reacts under its hallucinations. Yet, by these two reactions, they do face the same disease. They face the despotism of the object which, although experienced differently, generates the same psychological consequences. These consequences are manifested in the fact that the object chases the idea away from the city by driving it out of the consciences of both the satiated and the starving men.

In Muslim society, these effects sometimes take ludicrous forms when the object is naively substituted for the idea in order to constitute false solutions to its vital problems. This phenomenon is sometimes observed even in high levels of the newly independent states. It is manifested even at the level of the institutions of higher education, which are, however, supposed to determine the general trends of their intelligentsia. I shall here textually cite the following memoirs taken from a document pertaining to the management of the Algiers Dental School in 1965: "A significant indication of the present situation of the Dental School is the state of its technical material. In fact, 57 out of the 60 surgical wings have broken down at this moment (1965). This means that in budgetary terms about three hundred million old francs are frozen in a non-productive investment".

It must be added that even the choice of that material was in principle wrongly made because it is unwise to give away a brace destined for use by a dentist to an inexperienced student who is still in the beginning of the process of learning. In the dental schools of the developed countries, apprenticeship is done by means of inexpensive material, especially ordinary chairs. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that while there is (in this dental school) a plethora of fixed and costly material that is by no means necessary, there is a shortage of small and simple material that is indispensable for the practitioner and especially for the apprentice. Thus, the institute is finally nothing but a sort of material stall rather than a workshop and a learning laboratory.

Accordingly, education is in fact devoid of any scientific character, as if it were meant to merely train teeth extractors rather than dentists. For example, a professor of dentistry is entrusted with delivering a course in urology! The timetables are so chaotic that a teacher would choose any group of students to deliver his course at any time! The result is that at the end of the year, and because of this rampant disorder, the honest teacher does not know how to grade the students' work.

This simple administrative document manifestly points out the imbalance that might affect the "idea-object" relationship in an under-developed country even at the university level. This imbalance is so evident that its negative effects are manifest on the economic and educational levels as well. Yet, such effects can be calculated and controlled if there is an administrative board concerned about its good management. In the example given here, we have to deal with an imbalance that affects the relationship to the detriment of the idea thus amounting to the state of *choseisme*, that is to say the level of infantile primitive materialism.

In a developed country, the despotism of the object might be masked by much more misleading appearances. Thus, the imbalance is manifested at a higher cultural level. Being more latent, its effects are more or less perceptible indications of future ideological, indeed political crises. One can, however, read this between the lines of some current events. These signs do not, however, fail to attract the observer's attention in the capitalist and communist societies alike.

Ten years ago, a French analyst conducting an enquiry about the failure of socialism in England under the title "The Sociology of a Failure",[1] observed that the European country which counts the largest number of wage-earners has never given more than fifty percent of the votes to its socialist party because the goals the latter promised to realize for them have been secured by the conservatives. By defining the phenomenon on the political level, Edgar Morin[2] does not provide sufficient explanation of the psychological development, which imperceptibly generates, in the English laborer's conscience, such a disloyalty to the socialist idea – which led their struggle during the heroic times of Jaurès[3] and Vandervelde[4] – for the benefit of the material "object" promised by socialism.

Herein lies the crux of the problem in its psychological dimension, for it is the "object" that ultimately determines the polling operation in favor of the conservatives. The fact of passing over this essential point has led Edgar Morin to a dangerous, or at least risky, therapy which consists of curing one illness by another without being certain whether it is the "illness" that will ruin the ill or vice-versa. In fact, he first pointed out what he considered as frightening void, solitude and despair that are camouflaged by the civilization of welfare. He could also perceive with great lucidity the consequences of this situation, which he described as follows:

"Nevertheless, if the developed societies pursue their race for progress, there will follow from that the irrationality of the rationalized existence, the atrophy of a life with no real communication with the other and no genuine and creative achievement, the alienation in the world of objects and appearances, a life submerged into the youth crisis of violence and existential torments of intellectuals."

What a prophetic vision it was! This was a perfect description of the events of May 1968 and the furies of youth that accompanied them, made ten years before they took place! It was an impeccable pathological diagnosis. But Edgar Morin drew from it a risky, or at least, incomplete therapy as he concluded with a decisive tone that "the civilization of welfare has to be lived deeply to the fullest, we should indulge thoroughly in the welfare civilization which has to be fully realized through the civilization of abundance so as to generate its own criticism as well as its own meta-order".

This pragmatic conclusion is both self-contradictory and self-defeating. After all, Edgar Morin seems not to have taken account, in his therapy, of the pathology since he suggests that the illness should be left to reach its ultimate end so as to generate its own remedy. Consequently, the "self-criticism" which would come about, as it happened in Paris in May 1968, would take the form of protests aimed not at establishing order, but at establishing disorder for its own sake. Neither would it be liberation nor disenchantment (*désaliénation*) vis-à-vis the power of the object. Rather, it would only be an explosion of ideas in the city.

Before being social, the disease is of a psychological order. It does not lie in the degree of saturation of society because it consumes. Rather, the disease lies in the meaning of the "idea-object" relationship in its conscience, a meaning whereby that relationship is either turned toward the idea or the object. It is the imbalance of this relationship for the benefit of the object that generates the state of malaise. This state is not, as far as the developed countries are concerned, peculiar to and characteristic of those saturated with things, but has also stretched out to those countries with a lower level of "consumption" such as the Soviet Union!

We know something about the latter's situation thanks to the open debate on "The spiritual World of Modern Man" conducted by the *Komsomolskaia Pravda* shortly before Morin's investigation! In 1959, the Soviet youth organization published the letters (probably not all) of the young men who had participated in that debate from which we can pick up two letters[5] reflecting a gripping image of the malaise amongst the Soviet intelligentsia.

According to an engineer, "A society in which there would be so many engineers who would devote themselves exclusively to their task and a few people who would be scattered in search of a general culture will be stronger than that society in which there would be many humanists and a few technicians!"

In another letter, apparently a reply to the previous one, a student of philosophy wrote, "If people were living only to eat, then a society materially well provided and technologically advanced such as Sweden would constitute the example to follow. But if the essential goal of each society is to have the largest number of men devoted to their jobs, then the USA should be our ideal..."

Here it is already a question of the thesis and anti-thesis clearly manifested in the one-party country with its monolithic ideology, at a moment when the imbalance of the idea-object relationship is being experienced. This imbalance is assuming a counter-direction not in favor of the Marxist idea, but in favor of an idea that is not yet comprised in the present "order of things".

The student of philosophy is already on the borders of the Marxist ideology in his search for a certain synthesis still indefinable in another cultural universe. This is a critical moment in the Soviet culture, that is, a psychological moment in which the object becomes sacred as it clearly appears from the engineer's statement. It is worth mentioning that the latter does not derive the arguments of his thesis from the realm of ideas but from that of the objects that make "the most powerful society"!

Moreover, it should be noted that the student of philosophy is not decisive in his contribution on behalf of a Marxist idea supposed to ensure the conditions of welfare and power of society as his elder countryman would have done a few decades ago. We see him groping about, putting one foot in the USA and the other in Sweden, to establish what at the end? Nothing except a spiritual void now reigning in the world of productivity and weighing on its conscience! He does not use jeopardizing words in the country of dialectical materialism. But one should consider his words in the context of the investigation on "The spiritual World of Modern Man" and trust the sense of timeliness of those who conducted this investigation.

Within this framework, the engineer's philosophy is that of the man who is possessed by the cult of power. Likewise, he belongs to a cultural universe in which the "objects" which constitute power are consecrated. On the contrary, the student of philosophy is already suffocating in this context. Thus, it is clear that his letter is an implicit reply to the former; it is an attempt to free himself from the object's despotism, to re-establish the balance of the "idea-object" relationship in favor of an idea which he does not formulate or has not discovered yet. It is a search for a paradise not found yet, or maybe for a paradise already lost!

Accordingly, Soviet society no longer finds within itself those impressed notes which inspired the great moments of its edification during the time of Lenin and Stalin, nor does it find the mystical élan which propped it up at Stalingrad! By reaching its half-century, it has entered the second stage of civilization, the stage in which the basic notes start becoming illegible in the disc of its original cultural universe. At this stage, it undergoes the idea-object duel in which the chances, still shared between the two antagonists, are sometimes inclined towards one side, as the student of philosophy expresses his ideas, and sometimes towards the other, as the engineer expresses his.[6]

In another communist society, Popular China, the duel was about to be decided at a certain moment in favor of the object, as was the case in the English labor class. Right in the midst of the Cultural Revolution, Liou Shaou Chi attempted to stop the great revolutionary wave by throwing one more bowl of rice and a better wage to the labor class. However, the Chinese proletariat was not fooled by this generosity, which would only deliver him to the power of the object.

Mao Tse-tung had only to pronounce a single word so as to re-restore the balance in favor of the idea. He then voiced the condemnation of *economism* and the Chinese people continued on their revolutionary march. He, in fact, had the great advantage to speak at a time when China was still singing the hymns of its birth, those hymns which the USA was to hear by China's first satellite as it passed through the American skies! Nonetheless, the Liou Shaou Chi episode has provided us an important lesson: all pseudo-revolutionaries do not fail to use the power and temptation of the objects against the ideas.

Today, these methods are being applied in Arab sectors. Just at the moment when an idea sprang out with the Palestinian revolution standing a good chance of sweeping the entire Arab world in its wake, a small Liou Shaou Chi (named George Habache[7]) has made use of the fascination with the object (hijacking an aircraft here and there) both to captivate part of the revolutionary prestige and to bring to light a leftist deviation which is liable to warn the Arab conscience against that idea. The idea-object duel is sometimes the product of history in the process of a civilization just as it is sometimes the product of a political scheme as in the case of Liou Shaou Chi.

Muslim society had already made such a step annunciating the near breakdown in the heart of its cultural universe the day 'Aqīl,[8] the brother of 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, announced: "Performing my prayer with 'Alī is better for my conscience and eating at Mu'āwiyya's fare is better for my subsistence."[9] This psychological dichotomy between the prayer and the fare was symptomatic of the fact that the idea-object duel had already started. Ever since, it had carried on its course such that when Imām al-Ghazālī, four centuries later, was thinking of renewing the relationship of Muslim society with its cultural universe, it was already too late. As the third stage of the civilization's cycle had already started, Muslim society had only to slide along the slope down to the post-Almohad era. It could no longer regain its original balance on that fatal slope!

Chapter Ten

The Idea-Idol Duel

We have shown in the previous chapters that the realm of persons is embedded in the cultural universe of the society independently of both the stage of its development and its psychological age at that stage. This is a universal situation. However, it becomes the particular case of a society at a certain stage or as a result of a cultural accident, when such a society starts elaborating its thought and formulating its judgments according to certain criteria by means of which the idea-person relationship becomes increasingly inclined towards the person at the expense of the idea.

In such a case, it is a question of a cultural imbalance the excess of which generates a kind of despotism whose sociological consequences for some Muslim countries we have already pointed out. This imbalance may even be more radical when the cultural activities are not only polarized around the realm of human beings in general, but around one specific person and in a particular manner.

It is here a question of a radical imbalance in which the idea-person rapport is alienated to a person who captivates, for his own benefit, all the sacred bonds in the cultural universe. In fact, the relationship becomes mythic and mystifying when it takes the extreme form of idea-idol relationship. This is a matter of cultural accident the occurrence of which is quite usual. Twentieth-century culture has experienced two such accidents: one in Italy with Mussolini, and the other in Germany with Hitler.

We would like, here, to point out a case observed in a Muslim milieu, i.e. Algeria, because of its direct relationship with the subject of this study.[1] The Qur'an has called *jāhiliyyah* (ignorance) the paganism that had been prevailing in pre-Islamic Arabia. The *jāhiliyyah*, however, was not lacking in literary production; the greatest names of Arabic letters belong to that era. Yet, it has remained *jāhiliyyah* or ignorance because its sacred bonds were not with ideas, but with the idols of the Ka'bah. Lacking any creative germs, the Arabic discourse at that time consisted only of sparkling phrases.

If paganism is ignorance, then reciprocally, ignorance is necessarily pagan. Thus, it is by no means a matter of chance that primitive people would embrace every kind of fetishism. This dialectic determines the nature of the idea-person relationship which, carried to the extremes, becomes an idea-idol relationship. It was on the basis of such a carried-to-extremes relationship that the Algerian people had founded the pantheon of its *marabouts* and maintained its cult and service throughout the post-Almohad centuries. Until 1925, the idol had been reigning in the shadow of the *zāwiya*[2] where our idle souls would go to seek costly blessings (*barakas*) and miraculous talismans.

Each time the idea disappears, the idol prevails anew and vice-versa. In 1925, it was the opposite that took place: the idea of *iṣlāḥ*[3] which had just appeared shook the old pantheon whose idols collapsed in a manner that deeply agitated our ants who witnessed the extinction of the fires of the customary noisy charity feasts (*kermesses*) offered in memory of a saint. The *maraboutic*[4] fever thus fell allowing the Algerian conscience to capture once again the notion of duty. The gratuitous paradise once assured by the *sheikh* then gave way to the notion of a paradise that one can win only by the sweat of one's brow.

The *iṣlāḥ* could still hold in its hands the destiny of the renaissance by putting at its service the spiritual forces of Muslim society just pulled out of its lethargy. It was a privileged moment in which the idea-person relationship was instituted in favor of the idea of *iṣlāḥ*, which experienced its Archimedean moment, its apotheosis, in the Algerian Popular Muslim Congress in 1936. But was that victory of the idea a decisive one?

The 'ulamā' needed just a disturbing agent in their cultural universe so that the idea-person relationship would be trans-formed anew into an idea-idol relationship. They were unfortunately carrying within themselves an inferiority complex toward the *intellectomaniac*[5] politicians whom they considered as their protectors. In fact, the 'ulamā' themselves were not sufficiently immune so as to prevent the return of the idol now disguised in the character of a *za'īm*, the maker of political miracles, and with him, the return of the amulets in the form of ballot papers as well as the return of the *maraboutic kermesses* in the form of electoral *zerdas*[6] to which the 'ulamā' themselves were inviting the people to offer sacrifices! The dizzy heights struck them when they reached the peak of successfully leading the *iṣlāḥ* movement by launching the Popular Algerian Muslim Congress in 1936.

On those heights, the idea-person relationship escaped from their control and fell into a political morass in which the idol had taken the place of the idea. Thus, the *iṣlāḥ* sunk into the gutter in which was flowing the champagne of the electoral feasts, sometimes mixed with the people's pure blood that is shed many a time for the sake of unclean causes.

It was claimed that, in this way, the colonial authorities would be forced to grant some reforms for the people. This may be a good intention were it not, however, to be judged by means of scientific criteria. Moreover, any administration is but an organ that might or might not adapt to [its environment. If it does not adapt, it will then disappear as Bever-Bridje reminds us by quoting in his book *Le Monde est Un* (The World is One) the following enlightening passage of Edmund Burke:[7] "The government which is not able to guarantee real changes cannot have the means to preserve its very existence either".

The 'ulamā' who were ignorant of this fundamental law implicitly exchanged, without realizing it, the politics that would impose upon the colonial Administration the qualifying round of Burke's law for a claiming politics which endowed colonialism with a moratorium and left the initiative for it. Likewise, the 'ulamā' went further as they broke the salutary balance which they had themselves struck in the Algerian cultural universe in favor of the *iṣlāḥ*. Thus, the idea was banished and the idol seized power in Algerian public life. Consequently, the reformist current broke down and a demagogic, noisy, foaming and sterile current that prevented the country from hearing the clock striking the decisive hours of 1939, soon captivated the popular convictions.[8]

Accordingly, the politics that ignores the fundamental laws of sociology, being the biology of social organisms, is nothing but sentimental verbiage, wordplay and demagogic claims. However, the betrayed ideas always take revenge. The nemesis of the *iṣlāḥ*, betrayed in 1936, was therefore impeccable. As a result, the machinery started running backwards and the country started going back over the stages it had already left behind. Once again, Algeria revived the *zerdas* the day its "élite" invited it to burn its remaining incense (*jāwī*) in the *zerdas* organized after the death of the Muslim Congress. The ceremonials were not this time commemorate a saint but to celebrate a political idol.

On that very day, there started the new *maraboutism*, a *maraboutism* that was not selling amulets, *barakas*, paradise, and its delights, but one that was buying rights, citizenship and ... the moon with the ballot papers. Likewise, it was forgotten that right is but a corollary of duty and that a society can create its charter and its new social statutes only by changing its "spiritual attitude".

What a sublime law! ... Change that which is within yourself (*âme*) and you will change your history! But in 1936, as the 'ulamā' had transgressed this, the transformation already begun was thus halted and then vanished in political mirage. No one ever spoke of "duties"; only "rights" were being spoken of. There is no need to pursue the consequences of such a begging politics (*revendication*). Those consequences were clearly manifested in the stubborn silence of the nationalist parties in the decisive hours of 1939 and November 1942.[9]

Instead of remaining a workshop for our humble and efficacious efforts for recovery as it had been since 1925, the country became, right from 1936, a forum and an electoral fair in which each café became an auditorium and each [pedestal was converted into a rostrum! The people were became a mere audience, an electoral herd, a blind caravan which deviated from its path paved by the idea but lost in the wake of idols. What a swindle that is still going on![10] If the idol is something short-lived because of its inefficacy, it is, however, a sort of chrysalis that is renewed in multiple forms in the suitable climate where maraboutism, the generator of idols, reaches maturity.

This phenomenon manifested itself during the Algerian revolution. The Algerian intellectual elite was not "ideologically" centered on the idea of revolution, but rather on those idols to which this idea was glued by some press quarters. This meant that we were not yet cured of our ailment. One should add that, at the level of the élite, the disease was not as simple as it was at the level of the common people, the reason being that our intellectuals were ready to eat at every manger. Alas! Nothing is worse than ignorance as it disguises in the garb of science and comes to the fore! Indeed, the simple ignorance of common people is clear; like an open wound it can easily be cured. On the contrary, 'learned ignorance' is incurable because it is unintelligent, insidious, deaf and pretentious.

In 1936, therefore, when the 'ulamā' surrendered our cultural universe to the power of the idol, this was but the movement backwards, the return to darkness. The machinery then started running upside down, thus reflecting the new aspect of the problem as the idea gave way to the idol. A long time ago, al-ʿIzz b. ʿAbd al-Salām[11] already used to blame the jurists of his time for succumbing to *taqlīd* [blind imitation] which constitutes for Islamic thought the first manifestation of substituting the idol for the idea, that is to say, the manifestation which marked the end of *ijtihād.*

Chapter Eleven

Genuineness and Efficacy of Ideas

A genuine idea is not always efficacious, nor is an efficacious idea necessarily genuine. These are two aspects the confusion of which might lead to erroneous judgments so prejudicial to the history of nations, especially when such confusion becomes, in the hands of the experts of ideological struggle, a means for violating the consciences. Genuineness is intrinsic, specific and independent of history. An idea comes to the world either true or false. If it is true, it will always pre-serve its truthfulness. In contrast, it might lose its efficacy in the course of its historical career even if it is true. The efficacy of an idea has a history beginning with its Archimedean moment when its original propelling force brings the world order into disruption or when it is believed to constitute the necessary base to stir up the order of that world.

As they come into being, ideas that make the history of the world are generally always efficacious, since they bring about storms as well as edifying something or wiping it out, or simply turning on one page in the history of mankind. However, not all such ideas are necessarily genuine. No matter how genuine or false an idea might be at the theological, logical, scientific and social levels, its history will not, however, depend on its intrinsic characteristics. It will rather depend on its dynamism and power within the context of a given cultural universe as well as on the prevailing circumstances.

For example, though discovered in the twelfth century of the Christian era by the Arab-Muslim physician Ibn al-Nafīs,[1] it was another four centuries later before the notion of the bloodstream could start its scientific career with the English physician William Harvey.[2] The circumstances of the time had compelled it to expatriation so as to seek better chances of its implementation. In short, it had remained true throughout four centuries without, however, being efficacious. This is only natural since many scientific ideas meet with their of Archimedean moment only a long time after their coming to light. Similarly, the theory of the expansion of the universe formulated by the Belgian mathematician G. H. Lemaître[3] had to wait for Albert Einstein to start its scientific career. Mendel's[4] theory of genetics also could find its Archimedean moment, that is to say its efficacy, only with the founding of the French and American schools of biology at the beginning of the twentieth century.

On the other hand, history swarms with false ideas whose efficacy has, however, been terribly far-reaching in a variety of domains. To enter history, such false ideas have been often veiled, that is compelled to wear masks of originality just like a burglar entering a house with a false key. Being not only a mathematician of genius, Leibniz,[5] who had certainly read Machiavelli,[6] thus recommended in his political reflections, to "hide the profane and the useful under the guise of the sacred ..."

Because it is efficacious under certain circumstances, an idea may sometimes acquire a sacred character in the eyes of the people at a given time. Nineteenth-century Europe had thus confided its destiny to three words: *science, progress and civilization*. It was these sacred ideas that allowed Europe to both lay down the foundations for the twentieth-century civilization internally and establish its domination over the world internationally.

Until the First World War, no 'heresy' could have a chance nor could any protest be possible in opposition to such established notions, for they were efficacious ideas! Whether they were true or false did not matter, since everyone had only to submit to their laws, the laws of the most efficacious, of the strongest. And today, what is the situation after two world wars?

Nobody can deny the power of these ideas in the realm of objects. Nevertheless, everyone, especially in Europe, questions their sacred character, even after the instant full of the thrilling and exciting moment experienced by mankind during the first landing on the moon of the American astronauts. Nevertheless, it is not a question of giving oneself away were it absolutely necessary to call into question the sacred aspect of an idea, no matter how genuine or false it might be. Although the French physicist Henri Bouasse[7] did not admit the validity of Einstein's theory of relativity until he breathed his last, his stand did not undermine his worth in the eyes of the French scientific community. Yet, one would become ridiculous just the moment one started denying the efficacy of an efficient idea be it true or false!

At the beginning of the Qur'anic era and even at the very apogee of Muslim civilization, one could, in bad faith or unintentionally, deny the authenticity of the Islamic idea. Even its adherents were not able to agree, after the age of the Prophet Muhammad, on its doctrinal arrangement and understanding. Thus, Sunnites, Shiʿites and Khārijites emerged... Nevertheless, the imperative character of the Islamic idea was being consolidated and increased by its temporal successes and achievements, that is to say, by its efficacy which was to determine the outstanding pragmatic logic already used by the envoys of ʻUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb to Rustum, commander of the Persian army, on the eve of the battle of al-Qādisiyyah.[8]

Whilst the brilliant victories, which laid down the foundations for the political power of the Islamic commonwealth, were promoting such logic of efficacy, they were at the same time increasingly embedding the notion of the authenticity of the Islamic truth in the consciousness of the Muslim community. So much so that when the Islamic civilization was, during al-Ma'mūn's[9] time, showering the world with its lights streaming from Baghdad and Cordova, one could still admit or reject the authenticity of the Islamic truth – being as a matter of fact disputed by Christians and Sabaeans in the court and presence of the caliph himself. However, calling into question its efficacy would only drive one into ridicule and absurdity. The centuries then stretched over such a horizontal stage of history wherein a civilization, being no more capable of reaching new heights, would only slip far away along the slope of its decline.

Yet, even when Islamic civilization was at the twilight of its development, the Muslim genius was still making many magnificent achievements. The works of a certain al-Ghazālī and an Ibn Rushd were the product of that stage.[10] As the sun went down over Baghdad, a false dawn was rising in Samarkand with Tamerlane's epic.[11] The truth of the Islamic idea is so powerful that it still could win over new followers and convert entire peoples, especially in Europe following the fall of Constantinople in 1453. Its efficacy, however, went on diminishing throughout the post-Almohad era up to the moment the bell struck the hour of Western colonialism in the world.

The brutal encounter of the Muslim conscience with the new Western civilization occurred under the worst conditions. Europe gave primacy to the values of efficacy over those of truthfulness in its colonial order. From then onwards, its cultural universe has had two faces: one which is turned to her own ego with its peculiar ethics and the other turned to the rest of the world with no concern except efficacy. Muslim élites formed in European universities see only one of these two faces. The other is hidden from them like the other face of the moon that is hidden from the earthly observers. This has resulted in a deplorable confusion of two distinct aspects of ideas: truthfulness and efficacy.

This confusion in the psychology of the present Muslim élite constitutes the maneuvers of the ideological struggle. The great masters who are in possession of the secrets and means of this struggle know perfectly well how to take advantage of such confusion by pitting against each other the truthfulness and efficacy of the Islamic idea before the eyes of our university youth. The average per capita income thus becomes the major argument of the logic of efficacy used to undermine the authenticity of the Islamic idea in the minds of young Muslim intellectuals. Such tricks are nowadays being thoroughly used even in studies done by young Arab intellectuals who are directly or remotely controlled by the "patrons" of European universities.[12]

Nonetheless, we know only too well that the Muslim awareness in this regard does not date back to yesterday. Already in the last century, ʿAbd Allāh al-Nadīm[13] had noticed the sophistry of such efficacy logic used by European colonialists to introduce the inferiority complex into the Muslim conscience. "If you were similar to us, said he, you would have acted the way we do".[14]

By putting this simple phrase in the mouth of Europe, ʿAbd Allah al-Nadīm did more than merely pointing out the tricks which consist of contrasting efficacy with originality "each time Europe, as he noted, undertakes an enterprise inspired either by civil imperialism or by religious expansionism..." We must believe that the minds were much more lucid in the time of this revolutionary precursor who, carrying on his criticism, could draw the following conclusion of which it is worth reminding the present generation. He said, "By acting in this manner, these people (Europeans) aim at keeping the Eastern man under the domination of the Western man out of need as well as maintaining the East as a competition ground for the Europeans..."[15]

Though a whole century has elapsed, this judgment still preserves its topicality, especially as the ideological struggle of our time has been aggravated by the introduction of the twentieth-century advanced technology, and by the flaws an uncontrolled development has generated in our cultural universe throughout the present century. During the time of al-Nadīm, the citadel was being attacked from outside, that is, invaders wanted to occupy it with their ideas in order to lay down the ideological foundation for their colonial authority. At present, the battle takes place inside the very walls of the citadel between those who want to defend it and those who are ready to surrender it to alien ideas.

There so many Muslim intellectuals who are fascinated with modern things and, therefore, bewitched by the logic of efficacy without any discernment of the limits of its compatibility with the tasks of a society aspiring to realize its renaissance without losing its identity. These intellectuals actually confound the fact of "being open to all the winds of thought" with the act of surrendering, like a treacherous army, the citadel to the attackers. These inveterate imitators have no idea of the creativity of those whom they et out to emulate. They have no idea of the motivations of that creativity, nor of its price in all the domains in which they emulate them. Thus, they fail to be creative in their own right and according to their own motivations.

It should, nevertheless, be noted that it is not the efficacy of a dynamic society, such as Japan, that serves for them as a model to imitate, but rather a certain philosophical mold which right away turns out to be an anti-Islam logic. Hence, our emulators choose Marxism and especially Trotskyism to which they add a Maoist touch so as to please the gallery's visitors![16]

Anyway, their case imposes upon us an important lesson: the cultural universe of the Muslim world at present is not only a scene in which the conflict opposing the idea to both the idol and the object is unfolding, it is also the ring wherein the victory must be won in a duel imposing the logic of efficacy. Therefore, in order for the Islamic idea to stand up to the efficacious ideas of the twentieth century dynamic societies, it has to recover its original efficacy, that is to say, to resume its position among the ideas that make history.

Chapter Twelve

Ideas and Social Dynamics[1]

In an age marked by the logic of productivity, it is not sufficient to tell the truth in order to be right; just as it is unwise, in our times, to state that two plus two equal four and die of starvation next to someone who states that "they equal only three" and yet guarantees his loaf of bread. The prompter (*ésprit souffleur*) of our age will certainly prove the first one to be wrong and the second to be right. Accordingly, to establish the truth of an idea is not a matter of philosophical argumentation nor is it a question of moral assertion. It is rather of a pragmatic order: an idea is sound and true as long as it brings about success. Mao Tse-tung used to assert that the best proof of the correctness of his ideas was their success in the economic field!

However, there is no question of Muslim society accepting or rejecting this or that type of pragmatism. Instead, it has rather to defend its cultural universe against the prompting spirit of the age. It is not enough to simply proclaim the sacred values of Islam. We should rather provide them with what would enable them to stand up to the spirit of the age. It is, therefore, no question of making any concessions to the profane at the expense of the sacred. What is at stake is to free the latter from certain vanities that might be fatal for it.

For all that, it is simply a question of recovering the spirit of Islam itself. In fact, the Prophet never left any occasion pass without warning Muslims against such vanities whose inhibiting effect on the development of the contemporary Muslim society we have well experienced. Upon returning from a military expedition in the middle of the fasting month of Ramaḍān and though fasting was so hard for those who had performed it, he, however, attributed the merit of the expedition's victory to those who had exempted themselves, as permitted by Islamic law, from fasting that day[2] so as to attend to the needs of the expedition.

Today, more than ever before, we need to remind ourselves of these aspects of such teaching which gives, in a specific situation, priority to the virtue of efficacy over that of genuineness. It is worth highlighting this very aspect of the Islamic tradition precisely at the moment it is being insidiously contradicted with the pragmatic values of the industrialized countries with the aim of demonstrating the irrelevance of Islam to the twentieth century. Muslim society should, therefore, salvage its most cherished traditions together with the sense of efficacy.

To show convincingly the world that its ideas are genuine, Muslim society has only one way to do so: to prove that it can secure for each one of its individuals its daily bread. The question is on the agenda of Muslim countries, at the very least since the Second World War. The time distance is, therefore, quite sufficient to judge the efficiency of both the means used and the paths followed and to bring to light, on the way, the causes of backwardness and stagnation on those paths.

In fact, the present economic panorama of the world provides us with a fairly accurate picture of the situation of Muslim countries as we examine the process of their development in comparison with that of other countries during the last twenty-five years. After the Second World War, some of them, such as Indonesia, were obviously the favorites of the race (*favoris de course*) thanks to their incredibly ample natural resources. Yet, they are today far much behind many other countries, such as Japan and Germany, which started their development process under the most unfavorable circumstances. In other words, one should never stop repeating that there is no question of means. Rather, it is a question of methods and, therefore, of ideas.

Luckily, however, this phenomenon is no longer a matter of ignorance in the Muslim world. Some intellectuals have started realizing it with a noticeable sense of observation. On the eve of a meeting held in Algiers in 1967 and attended by a number of intellectuals concerned with the economic situation in the Arab countries, Mr. Mohamed al-Rīfī, a young Moroccan economist, was able to present a pertinent overall view about the conditions of economic dynamics. He wrote: "compared to the five-year plan covering the period 1960-64, the so-called three-year plan covering the period 1965-67 marks a manifest decline at the level of its general conception as well as with regard to the conditions anticipated for its implementation".[3] Thus, we are at the very heart of the problem: instead of gaining new positions, planning in a Muslim country might even lose the old ones.

We must generalize this painful conclusion to the entire Muslim world. When an anomaly is repeated in spite of the availability of resources and the exceptionally qualified planners, this should be of utmost concern. Although Indonesia had benefited from the most favorable conditions of economic take-off, namely, the rich resources of its land and the collaboration of the renowned Dr Schacht,[4] it failed to realize its take-off. The notion of planning which so brilliantly proved itself in many other countries, from the Soviet Union to Popular China, thus lost every meaning in Indonesia despite the ideas and qualifications of the planner, on the one hand, and the abundance of resources, on the other.

In 1955, the Bandung Conference could well have developed an economic strategy suitable to Africa and Asia had it taken into account such relative failures and negative results whose experience the indicative value of which would have at least given us a good lesson. The conference should have been devoted to introducing a certain intellectual order by profiting from past experiences and new ideas in order to provide the Afro-Asian economy with a new and comprehensive orientation, which it was precisely lacking. Far better than far than any specialist obsessed with his professional blinkers, Tibor Mende[5] could grasp the fundamental deficiencies which prevented the Afro-Asian countries from promoting genuine social dynamics. Indicating that the problem of these countries is more related to the specialization of the "socio-biologist" than to that of "the social engineer",[6] he has rightly situated it insofar as it is question of starting from the zero-point.

Evidently, this implies no ready-made solution. However, for a country at its zero-point, this sociologist's reflection is more significant than the plan of an economic specialist losing sight of the human reality whose intrinsic equation enters inevitably in the plan's implementation. Dr Schacht's plan for Indonesia failed because it did not take account of this equation.[7]

Next comes the choice of the doctrinal foundations of the plan that has to be perfectly designed. It should not consist of any mixture of capitalist and socialist elements, for any project conceived according to the ideas of one doctrine and implemented according to the means of another will lead nowhere. The purpose of planning is clear: it must create the conditions of social dynamics. Thereupon, the means by which to generate such a dynamic movement must be accurately defined. As a matter of fact, we do not invest what we wish, but what we can. Therefore, we do not invest the means of others. Rather, we should invest the means that are actually at our disposal.[8]

That being so, what are the means that a country, at the zero-point of its take-off, may have at its disposal?

In 1948, Germany started its development process with only 45 Deutsch marks per person. It was a very insignificant investment indeed. Nevertheless, the real investment lay in the stock of ideas (*capital-idées*) in the head of every German person and in the determination of the German people and in the German soil which, though poor and under occupation, constituted the necessary support for any activity. In the same period (1949), Popular China took off under yet more adverse conditions and with far much deeper effects of war. Regardless of its ideological choices, China had to create its initial capital of ideas. Its experience, taking place under socio-economic conditions quite similar to those of most Muslim countries, can better enlighten us on the primary means of take-off. In general, the available means for a country at such a stage are:

1. Its more or less outmoded agriculture.
2. The available natural resources either in the market or under the ground.
3. The potential labor (the number of hands) capable of being transferred into actual labor hours.

This analytical balance sheet represents the economic potential of any under-developed society, such as Muslim society. It represents that potential at two stages of take-off:

1. The stage of a subsistence economy.
2. The stage of a development economy, that is to say, the take-off.

However, being in its primitive state, this power represents the necessary, though still insufficient, precondition for the promotion of social dynamics. Therefore, more is needed in order to set in motion all the productive forces. Still more, a capable starter is needed to start the engine of those forces. This is essentially the function of a plan, a unique opportunity a planner has to seize in order not to fail like Dr Schacht in Indonesia for not taking account of the particular starter needed for a "case" which he had confusedly identified with the case of his own country, Germany.

It is certainly regrettable for a man of science to be confused by the blinkers of his original culture. However, this does not happen to European economists alone as they examine the problems of the Third World. It is even more regrettable that the Afro-Asian élites, notably in Muslim countries, also wear the blinkers of their masters whilst facing those problems.

The question of the appropriate economic starter for the situation of Muslim countries has, therefore, to seek its solution elsewhere than in the doctrines of an Adam Smith[9] or a Karl Marx. Muslim society can regain its efficacy by basing right away its planning on the following twofold postulate:[10]

1. Every mouth has to be fed.
2. Every hand has to work.

Then, its ideas will never be accused of, or burdened by, inefficacy because its arms will have set in motion the wheel of its social dynamics. Its defenders will also realize that there is no question of defending the truthfulness of Islam, but rather to simply restore its efficacy by resetting its productive forces in motion.

Chapter Thirteen

Ideas and the Revolutionary Process

When a society is utterly exhausted, revolution is for it the most recommended detonator to spark off a crisis so as to set in motion the wheel of its destiny. But is setting the society's forces, thus liberated, in motion all that is needed?

The history of revolutions in the world shows how precarious and risky their destiny is after their launching. The Muslim world itself has witnessed many revolutionary experiences before and during the phase of de-colonization. At this very moment, it is living the Palestinian revolution in respect of which it is sufficient to only remember that it has so many heads (such as the one named George Habache) in order to realize that we still do not possess the means of control that would save us against the errors of judgement in this field.

The phenomenon of revolution is yet to be submitted to a normative science that would subject its process to strict control. In fact, we are indebted to Marxist thought, especially as it has matured in Beijing, for a method of analysis that to a certain extent permits certain a posteriori control. In brief, this method consists of detecting and remedying those errors once they have occurred, not of a warning system that immediately alerts the society's defense system whenever an error is in prospect.

Marx analyzed the errors of the Commune of Paris[1] so that they should not be repeated in other revolutionary processes. If they are repeated in different forms, then there is only one way to face them, that is, to resort to an emergency operation called "cultural revolution". Nevertheless, in no Muslim country, including the self-claimed revolutionary ones, has such a debate been opened as if things were all well in the best of worlds! While it so happens that in many a Muslim country people find themselves, after the events of a revolution, in a situation worse than the pre-revolution stage. They might even find themselves dominated by a totally alien ideology in which the martyred heroes would not recognize the ideas and ideals for which they died. It is as if, during the revolution, the latter's engine and guiding ideas start, at a given moment, running backwards.

What is abnormal here is that such situations develop up to the end of the revolution without apparently anyone realizing the reversal of values. It is even more abnormal that when after the revolution people realizing such problems, certain self-styled sages would appear who believe that such anomalies would disappear by natural extinction, counseling that things should be left to pan out all right. I wonder how such pragmatists would envisage the extinction and panning out of anomalies such as the insertion of a certain George Habache into the Palestinian revolution, while it is already clear that such a phenomenon will not disappear before stripping the revolution of its soul and spirit.

With such abnormal revolutionary situations the problem will undoubtedly remain unsettled. The classical Marxist method does not seem to be able to solve it. If Marx had analyzed such situations, he would certainly have done so based on the logic of a dialectic whose constituent elements were all part and parcel of one and same cultural universe that was his own universe. In contrast, in the colonized and ex-colonized countries, such situations are the complex result of a dialectic obtaining in an original cultural universe as well as of the dialectical relationship between the latter and an alien cultural universe, that of colonialism. Just like the dialectic between the inductor and the induced electrical current, so too there are induced phenomena in social matters.

Moreover, Marxist thought was shaped within a cultural climate in which ideas can stand on their own without any crutches. On the contrary, ideas in the post-Almohad Muslim society in general have to rely either on an object or on a person in order to establish their validity. In fact, the abnormal revolutionary situations of Marx's time and milieu were so simple in the sense that a revolutionary idea had only to face a set of ideas belonging to that same milieu, that is, to its own cultural universe. Under such circumstances, the analysis could easily have control over the errors arising directly from that very universe which is the inductor of ideas.

In post-Almohad Muslim society, on the contrary, we have to face "induced" errors originating from another different cultural universe, which serves as an inductor. The phenomenon George Habache/Abbane Ramḍhane[2] insinuated in the Palestinian and Algerian revolutions respectively is not an inherent error. Rather, it is induced from outside and is, therefore, an induced error. This is exactly the characteristic aspect of our "revolutionary anomalies" Explaining what he considers as the five conditions of revolution, Jean-François Revel[3] wrote the following: "A revolution cannot be an improvisation... The true revolutionary spirit follows the method of planned invention that always leaves the door of initiative open to all, but in which the implementation is always rigorous, technically competent and never tentative (*approximative*)".[4]

In Muslim countries, it might happen that a revolutionary process is from the beginning born in the form of a disguised counter-revolution launched at a certain point in time so as to occupy the strategic positions before a genuine revolution does.[5] It might also be born in the form of a genuine revolution that gradually gives way to a counter-revolution that would use its name and visible attributes as well as its means in order to kill it and take its place while still preserving its appearances. These appearances would serve as the curtain behind which the inversion of things and values would be carried out in the post-revolutionary era.

It is such appearances that constitute, therefore, the crux of the problem in any revolutionary critique. If we were in front of an illusionist's scene, we already know that his illusions are mere appearances, which are possible only owing to his dexterity and knowledge of our normal reflexes. Here we have before us a political scene in which the illusionist is called colonialism. To understand what kind of illusions the latter may produce on our senses, we need to indicate what we, as psychological specimens, are in its master's eyes and what, in turn, the illusionist represents in our eyes in relation to both our moral and political excitations.

It is not difficult to define the problem with regard to the second point. In the eyes of every Muslim, colonialism portrays the character of Satan. However, it must be added that the masters of colonialism know this fact very well. They also know so many things about us, of which we are ourselves ignorant, particularly the automatisms of our own behavior. For example, they know that when Satan says that "two plus two are four", Muslims will say: "this is not true because it is *Shayṭān* that states it!" On the contrary, if a voice regarded as 'truthful' states that "two plus two are three", Muslims will say "this is true since it is a 'truthful' voice that says it!"

This predisposition of Muslims to formulate their judgments according to the criteria of the realm of human beings rather than those of the realm of ideas is perfectly known to colonial powers. Their activities on the political scene constantly make use of facts pertaining to a psychological map. This is the basis of the entire technique of induced errors. The results of this technique are almost infallible in a world in which the idea has to rely either on an object or on a person in order to "go well".

The virtuoso illusionist situated on the stage, indeed not completely on the stage but in the prompter's box so as to be hidden from our sight, needs only to produce as many illusions as he wishes in front of an audience whose psychology attitude has already been conditioned. The procession then unfolds from the east to the west of the Muslim world wherever the necessity arises to launch a counter-revolution under the guise of a genuine one.

The present Muslim world has witnessed many deviations of this sort. For example, Pakistan owes its very existence to such a genre of deviation, that is to say, to an error induced in the psyche of a conditioned Muslim conscience hypnotized by a *za'īm*.[6] The *za'īm* does not only serve to divert the revolutionary forces set in motion, but he also serves to break off any unifying ideological current incompatible with the political strategy of balkanization being applied to the Muslim world.

For all that, it is not necessary that the *za'īm* "be in the know". Thus, Messali Hadj[7] had certainly inadvertently played his role and his behavior was simply in conformity with the colonial designs. In his school a multitude of petty leaders (*za'īmillous*[8]) were brought up who finally killed him and betrayed the revolution, which he himself renounced out of arrogance. On the contrary, Abbane Ramḍhane was undoubtedly aware of his role. His prying attitude leaves no doubt in this regard. Until the last moment of his life, he had voluntarily accepted to play the role of the illusionist so as to rob the revolution of its true direction as launched on the first of November 1954 and usurp its power and try to use it against the revolution itself.

It might also happen that the politician in the Muslim world is not such a petty ambitious and mercenary person playing the part of the *za'īm* on the political scene. One has only to be a trustworthy leader capable of promoting a great idea that exerts on the masses the irresistible attraction of a noble and grandiose goal.

It is natural that specialists of the ideological struggle would from the beginning subject such an idea to accurate evaluation. They would also subject the personality of the leader embodying it in the eyes of the masses to the most detailed analysis with the view to detecting all his flaws and weaknesses. Colonial powers will then put such fissures under the control of their valve-like system so as to pursue a double goal. On the one hand, they aim at preventing not only the radiation of the idea but also the leader's personality from reaching the people's collective conscience. On the other hand, and above all, they will isolate the real image of the idea's career from the leader so that he becomes unable to follow effectively his course of action and come up with the needed correctives and clarifications.

The struggle would then go on with no 'radar' that would instantly provide the leader with the full information required by the situation, whenever the idea and the person of the leader himself are confronted with the realities of such a struggle. Finally, the leader may become prisoner of his own system, the latter transformed into a mere valve-like system controlled by the colonial powers. Likewise, the leader is driven into self-destruction by means of a mechanism he believes is under his own control but which rather controls him.

This self-destruction is not always, nor even often, a physical end of the leader. It is rather a political fall brought about in a gradual manner so that the idea embodied through his errors and defects is devalued and subsequently drawn out. In other words, the idea is actually devalued by "induced errors" which are introduced into the leader's politics by means of the valve-like system. The end of a certain Soekarno[9] or that of a certain Nkrumah[10] was but a painful self-destruction; however, they are only two cases among so many others. In brief, the valve-like system functions on behalf of colonialism as a mechanism that generates the "induced errors" and stands, if need be, as a protecting system for those errors against any vague attempt or desire for criticism (*velléité critique*).

In the political life of Muslim countries, no room is allowed for criticism, especially when it is a question of maintaining a counter-revolution which is under way in the darkness necessary for its unfolding, or of keeping its causes secret in case it has already occurred. Indeed, darkness and silence are the best allies of both the masters of the ideological struggle and the abortionists of revolutions. Curiously enough, the watchword circulated amongst the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) in Cairo was: "Silence!

Keep quiet! Colonialism is eavesdropping." This is but a masterpiece of the masters of the ideological struggle, a touch of artists who cleverly know how to maneuver our sensitive strings.

On a different occasion, a few days after the breakdown of the Syrian-Egyptian Union,[11] I was listening to a critique, which was, I believe, broadcast by the Aleppo radio. Everything was all right in such a manner that one could hear every word so long as the criticism was directed against the idea of the union itself in order to devalue it and undermine its basis. However, as soon as that critique touched on the problem of the valve-like system which served to introduce in Arab politics the fatal "induced errors" of the idea of union, the words disappeared in the fog, as broadcasting interference took them away. Whether this perturbation was coming from the American Fifth Fleet or directly from Tel-Aviv does not matter here.

How long is this situation going to last? There is no room to venture any prophecy, which is more often than not belied by actual events. It is, therefore, not a question of predicting that one event or another is capable of bringing such a situation to an end. We should rather trace it to its psycho-sociological causes and show how it will consequently come to an end along with those causes.

We have already pointed out the two types of errors that might affect our revolutionary process: the inherent and induced errors. Their root cause is, however, one and the same. It lies in our psychology: our minds and souls are subject to the despotism of both the object and the person. As soon as the authority of ideas is restored in our cultural universe, this cause will ultimately disappear. Consequently, our judgments in general and in the political field in particular will acquire or recover their systematic and generalizing character. This will enable us to integrate the multitude of details in a unified and comprehensive whole and to cast them in a consistent synthesis.

Plagued with atomism,[12] the post-Almohad mind in its attempt at systematization does not proceed by integrating the respective facts. Atomism, in fact, is the flea-jump from one detail to another, which never permits one to perceive in a given host of details a certain situation that reflects in a precise manner the problems of one stage of the revolutionary process. Likewise, every detail remains isolated from and independent of the objective situation surrounding. It will rather be added to the rosary of our dreams.

How many amber beads the masters of the ideological struggle have added to the rosary of our dreams! The names of Abbane Ramḍhane in the Algerian revolution and that of George Habache in the Palestinian revolution are only some such beads! It is not so long ago when the masses demonstrated in the streets of Cairo, 1919, shouting: "Protectorate with Zaghlūl better than independence with ʻAdlī Pasha!" Such heresies will happen again and again so long as our cultural universe is under the twofold domination the object and the person.

The masters of the ideological struggle are well aware that it is easier to come to terms with an idol than with an idea. Their local followers are of the same opinion. They, too, know it is easier to tamper with persons than with ideas. The most important thing for both groups is to prevent a revolutionary process from being centered on an idea. One can perceive the instant of relief which both of them enjoyed with the publication of Franz Fanon's[13] book on the Algerian revolution, for he reduced the image of the revolution to a mere "act of violence"! Without perhaps being aware of it, he liberated both the *zaʻīm* and *zaʻīmillous* from any concern to think and rid them, more specifically, from the guilt complex towards the betrayed ideas.

Yet, the betrayed ideas take their revenge, and their nemesis is very obvious in the Muslim world!

Chapter Fourteen

Ideas and politics

According to Clausewitz,[1] war is "but the continuation of politics by different means".[2] Taught for one century in military academies, this definition of war is worth teaching in the faculties of political science. It incidentally makes politics part of an order in which the ideas leading a war represent a superstructure, in contrast to an infrastructure consisting of the ideas which represent the body of the political doctrine *per se*. This relationship means that the solidity of the military superstructure depends on the strength of the political infrastructure.

A superficial military critic, contemporary of the campaigns that followed immediately after the death of the Prophet, would not have failed to consider as a fatal mistake Abū Bakr's launching of the Muslim army in three simultaneous wars: one inside the Arab peninsula and two abroad, on its borders. However, in addition to ignoring the circumstances that had left no choice for the caliph, such a critic would certainly have forgotten the fact that accurate calculations had been made on the basis of the political facts and realities of the time. We should also not lose sight of the fact that there were, in Madīnah, men of high caliber such as Abū Bakr and 'Umar. The strength of the Islamic army actually stemmed from the confidence in the political base that was protecting the army's rear and providing for its front.

In this connection, the historian Will Durant[3] has reported an enlightening dialogue on politics between Confucius[4] and one of his disciples, Tsze-kung, who was questioning his master on political power:

Tsze-kung asked about government. The Master said, '(The requisites of government) are three: that there should be sufficiency of food, sufficiency of military equipment, and the confidence of the people in their ruler'. Tsze-kung said, 'If it cannot be helped, and one of these must be dispensed with, which of the three should be forgone first?' 'The military equipment', said the Master. Tsze-kung asked again, 'If it cannot be helped, and one of the remaining two must be dispensed with, which of them should be forgone?' The Master answered, 'Part with the food. From of old, death has been the lot of all men; but if the people have not faith (in their rulers) there is no standing (for the state).[5]

Islamic jurisprudence has concretized this philosophy by means of a reciprocal relationship between the ruled and the ruler. The citizen owes listening and obedience to the ruler, but he ceases listening and obeying as soon as he observes any deviation from the rules of the *sharīʿah* on the part of the ruler. for the reciprocal relationship is thus broken and no longer binding for him.

'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb was so aware of this. When a Bedouin one day refused to listen to and obey him, he did not look for a way to intimidate such a recalcitrant person. Rather, he tried to justify himself on a piece of cloth he had to take from his son's share and add it to his own tunic because he was a tall man. Thus, the ruler was not the only man of moral integrity, since all the companions of the Prophet enjoyed this quality.

One day, Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī,[6] one of the noblest figures of the Prophet's time, asked to be appointed as governor of one of the Islamic provinces. The Prophet, however, declined to accept such request despite the profound esteem he maintained for the great companion until his last days. Moral integrity alone is not enough. It has to be complemented by competence and, still more, compatibility.

More than one governor was dismissed by 'Umar, but "neither for lack of integrity nor for lack of competence" as 'Umar himself used to say. Even Abū 'Ubaydah b. al-Jarrāḥ, "the trustworthy man of the *ummah*"[7] as the Prophet named him, was dismissed despite his competence and integrity. Yet, it was of Abū 'Ubaydah that 'Umar, on his deathbed, was thinking when he was facing the problem of his succession under the circumstances surrounding his own end. "Ah! he said, if Abū 'Ubaydah were alive, I would entrust him with the destiny of the *ummah*!"[8] Was this a contradiction on the part of 'Umar?

No doubt, integrity and competence are necessary qualities for the man of power in the Islamic polity whatever his position. But a particular degree of compatibility between the person and the position is also required, a quality which 'Umar found in Abū 'Ubaydah. The Islamic city is founded on a set of such virtues that qualify both the ruler and the ruled.

In order to see to the preservation of those virtues, Islamic jurisprudence has established the institution of *ḥisbah*. Resembling, though from a distance, what is at present called self-criticism and criticism, *ḥisbah* is a system aimed at ensuring the effective continuity and efficacy of those values in public life. Henceforth, the Islamic city is not merely a more or less motley collection of various social groups. Rather, it is the home (*foyer*) of a community whose members, rulers as well as ruled, are unified by reciprocal trust. Yet, it has nothing to do with Plato's republic more or less plagiarized by al-Fārābī[9] in his ideal city.

Its model is Madīnah itself, at the time of 'Umar. It is to this high classicism that we should compare our political structures and ideas in the present Muslim world so as to measure our discrepancies with regard to it. Indeed, we are far from it in both types of present Muslim politics: that which we see in the so-called conservative countries and that which we find in the self-claimed progressive countries. In both versions, the ruling élites show no preoccupation to gain, as a major concern, the confidence of the people whom they govern.

Alone, Ayub Khan[10] could set for his people the best example in democracy and magnificent political humility when he, voluntarily and freely, abdicated the post of presidency. With this exception, the present

Muslim world has never experienced, in its political life, any gesture like that of Charles de Gaulle after the referendum of 1968 which did not give him a majority.

In order for it to acquire its historical significance, politics has to be ethical, aesthetic, and scientific. "Our politics is never mistaken because it is science", said Chou En Lai[11] recently! In so far as science is not erroneous, this statement is correct. Indeed, politics has to be a science, an applied sociology.

In this connection, the Chinese intelligentsia has invested in the country's revolution a thirty-year experience of sociological and historical thinking. A politics, which assimilates such a considerable amount of knowledge, must necessarily become a science being applied to the vital problems of China. For this, that is to say, independently of its Marxist ideological orientation, which has helped in introducing the fecund principle of self-criticism, China has acquired, thanks to its intelligentsia, the methods of scientific work.

If such methods have proven their efficacy under the Maoist regime, this would only mean that this regime was aware of what to expect from them. It was equally aware of what to borrow from China's high traditions while remaining faithful and responsive to the requirements of the revolution, as in the case of the legend of Yuking who is believed to have moved the mountains!

By virtue of its very quest for the truth, science is also an ethics. Thus, it cannot tolerate ongoing mistakes without bringing the needed correctives for them. Muslim countries, however, do not seem to have the will to take a look backwards despite the fact that it is sometimes necessary to retrace our steps when there is a possibility to learn from our errors through an open dialogue on them between the rulers and the ruled. The best example of returning to the sources to restore confidence and trust, has also been provided by Popular China trough the "Cultural Revolution" which encompassed all its social strata and cultural universe from top to bottom, thus renovating the whole country.

Muslim countries today have before them such lessons of high politics capable of generating the miracles we have seen. They also have behind them the most sublime lessons of Islamic culture, which can help them to recover some invaluable notions, such as that of *ḥisbah,* which are worth integrating into the political systems of even the most modernized countries.

Chapter Fifteen

Ideas and Bilingualism

Amongst the many phenomena concerning the social, economic and administrative structures of the colonized countries, colonialism has generated a particular phenomenon that pertains to their mental and cultural structures, that is their ideas; this phenomenon is bilingualism. Even those Muslim countries, which have not experienced the actual – administrative and military – presence of the West, have not, however, been immune to the more or less intensive impact of its culture. For them, such influence is perceptible even at the linguistic level though to different degrees and varying measures according to each country. It can be said that such influence was almost nil in the case of a country like, for example, Yemen. However, we cannot deny any such influence that would have affected it via another Muslim country that is more exposed to that influence.

Egypt, where the foreign language – being English – affects a specific sector of the intellectual activity, can be singled out as the type of country facing the problem of bilingualism at the university level. On the other side of the continuum, we can single out Algeria as another type of country exposed to the said influence. Here, not only does the foreign language – namely French – respond to the needs of the intellectual activity, but it also fulfils the ordinary needs of daily life. Consequently, we face the problem of bilingualism at the level of the masses.

The sociological consequences of such a situation are by no means similar. In one case, bilingualism can be a starter that resets the cultural universe in motion. Thanks to a more or less accurately translated message of another culture, the impressed ideas, which previously had no echo, no dialogue with life and no influence on its course, would regain their efficacy. Thus, they start anew generating expressed ideas that might be more or less confused owing to their twofold origin. However, such expressed ideas will remain original in their relationship with the impressed ideas.

While writing his treatise on Islamic theology, Sheikh Muhammad ʻAbdu was undoubtedly inspired by that pseudo-classicism which stamped al-Azhar's cultural milieu in his time. Nevertheless, he succeeded, thanks to the new form and manner of expression he adopted in his *Risālat al-Tawḥīd,* in inaugurating a neo-classicism. This classical framework has been at times somewhat shaken as was the case with ʻAlī ʻAbd al-Rāziq.[1] An old student of al-Azhar university, who became a student of Oxford, the latter did not intend to only rid himself of that Islamic pseudo-classicism, when he called into question its ideas and fundamental values as he disputed, for example, the notion of *khilāfah.*[2]

Herein, the alienation caused by bilingualism in the cultural universe of a Muslim country is not only aesthetic, but it is also of an ethical and philosophical nature. Nonetheless, it may take more radical forms in some other Muslim countries where bilingualism does not only serve as a mere starter resetting in motion a cultural realm whose rhythm of intellectual life had stopped beating. In Algeria for example, even after independence, it is not a question of a mere starter but rather of dynamite hurled into the midst of the cultural universe. Although this dynamite has not destroyed everything, it has, however, generated the most peculiar cleavages in society.

First, in terms of the leadership, two groups have come into being in the ranks of the élite. The first would speak Arabic and strive with Sheikh ʻAbd al-Ḥamīd ibn Bādīs[3] to recover, in the Islamic sources, an authentic idea which has for good escaped from it after the failure of the *iṣlāḥ* movement whose followers took flight in the civil service, after the revolution. The second group would speak French and wear all kinds of masks such as Kemalism, Messalism, anti-Messalism, Berberism, Progressivism, pseudo-Existentialism, false Marxism etc., to serve, according to each of these labels, the gods of the age and mascots of the day, nay, in fact to serve their own interests under all these masks.

The interlude has been growing for half a century within a motley cultural universe in which no sufficiently self-assured idea could arise to lead the Algerian people along the straight path to its destiny. The first group has failed to reestablish the genuine contact of the Algerian soul with the authentic tradition of the forefathers (*salaf*) due to the lack of a genuine contact with its archetypes. In contrast, the second one has not succeeded in establishing any real contact with modern civilization because of its failure to understand its pragmatic spirit.

Due to the lack of genuine ideas on the one hand, and of efficacious ones, on the other, we have been marking time, making no headway! Betrayed on both sides, the archetypes have only had to take revenge. Thus, a half-century has elapsed in time marking.

It was the Algerian people who at last broke the silence of that interlude. In 1954, it, indeed, abandoned all its 'spiritual leaders' to undertake on its own the launching of the revolution. The foe-brothers immediately became 'friends' so as not to be outstripped by the people over whom they intended to resume control. Thus, they apparently rallied to the revolution, but they actually rallied to the *zaʿīms* who were distributing grants and rewards in Tunis and Cairo.

We should mention for the sake of history that as soon as its first leadership – known as the *niẓām*[4] – was decapitated in the Aurès Mountains, the revolution no longer had a leadership. It only had a bursar's office (*intendence*) catering for ceremonial rather than combatants' needs.

Whatever is the case, as the curtain is raised anew on the Algerian scene, it is easy to see the effects of bilingualism in a clearer situation relieved of the shadow projected on it by the presence of colonialism.

as by the subtle games played throughout the years of the revolution would disappear. From then onwards, we could see that the cleavage engendered by bilingualism is much deeper. It, in fact, has affected both top and bottom.

Thus, the country does not only comprise two 'élites' but rather two super-imposed 'societies': one representing the traditional and historical aspect of the country and the other wishing to start making its history from the zero-point. The impressed ideas of the former and the expressed ideas of the latter could not co-exist in one and the same cultural universe. The two societies speak two different languages. If all that is being expressed on the radio, in the press or even in textbooks is able to reflect the expressed ideas of one of the two 'societies', it has, however, no significance with regard to the impressed ideas of the other.

It should be mentioned that we do not intend here to study the etiology[5] of this phenomenon, for its causes belong in one way or the other to the domain of ideological struggle.[6] Here, we are only concerned with its consequences.

In pre-revolutionary Algeria, which was not ignorant of this phenomenon that it denounced by the voice of the *iṣlāḥ*, these consequences were nevertheless more or less hidden by the shadow of colonialism and by the 'sacred universe' of the country that reacted unanimously to this as well as on other aspects. But as soon as the early years of the revolution had gone by, one could perceive the phenomenon under a new light. In fact, its consequences had started manifesting themselves from 1956 in the new style of the revolution. And from 1958 onwards, they began taking shape in a debate concerning the very language of the revolution itself. Certain terms were being discussed so that new ones could replace them.

Thus, people started speaking more and more of the *jundī*[7] who had earlier been *al-mujāhid*. The debate went beyond the terminology to include the structures themselves. Consequently, the *niẓām* disappeared and was replaced by prefabricated structures that had been carefully baptized in the Soummam Congress.[8] Likewise, the 'Executive Committee' (C.E.S.) and 'the National Congress of the Algerian Revolution' (C.N.R. A.) came into existence!

In the beginning, *al-mujāhid* used to obey a leader called the *sheikh,*[9] but towards the end the revolution had its 'colonels'! Ever since, an entirely new vocabulary has come into existence conveying ideas that are totally alien to the cultural universe in which both the revolution and its motivations were born. Since independence, there have been two clans markedly opposing one another at the top and two super-imposed societies at the bottom that constitute the Algerian socio-cultural reality.

It is at this level, therefore at the roots, that we should examine the consequences of this phenomenon. It is here that it has acquired a *sui generis* nature, which is nowhere else as clearly manifested as in the daily reality of Algeria. We need here to draw a binary diagram consisting of two columns so that we can put side by side the things that concern each society, in such a way as to make the comparison more striking.

On the one hand, we have the ideas of the post-Almohad society, that is to say, a society whose impressed ideas are in a state of confusion, like a blotted out film or disc on which we do not find any signs of life. On the other hand, there are the expressed ideas, which are actually meaningless. They are like a disc that would have preserved no trace except the harmonics separated from the fundamental ideas left on the disc of another cultural universe. Thus, again, the expressed ideas represent intellectual material still more confused and unable to produce any efficacious operational modalities.

It is, on the one hand, the intuition that grasps the reality in a flash, which cannot be translated into a plan of action. It is, on the other, the thought that confounds the existentialist movement of a post-civilization stage with the intellectual effort marking the starting point of a civilization. There is, on one side, the subjective and literary form and, on the other, the pseudo-objective and pseudo-scientific form. On the one hand, we have the stiff society that imposes its customs, prejudices and superstitions as being authentic traditions. On the other, we have the self-styled revolutionary society, which in fact does not rebel against the false but rather against the most authentic values. On one side, there is the idea that has lost its social radiation. On the other, there is the idea that has rather a deadly radiation. On one side, there is inertia and stagnation; on the other, there is pseudo-dynamics and screaming anarchy.

No matter how schematic it might be, the balance sheet of bilingualism does not stop here. It extends far beyond these limits to include even the domain of the most serious creative efforts. Its complexes do not seem to have spared even Arab arts and letters, this special field in which the talent of Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm,[10] who is certainly the best Arab playwright at present, has radiated. It is, indeed, both distressing and surprising to see a talented author compromising himself into interestingly very indicative attitudes, thus showing how our most original works betray the archetypes of our culture out of complacency for a badly assimilated alien culture.

For example, in a remarkable theatrical adaptation, Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm has admirably succeeded in knotting the drama around the dilemma of truth-power conflict. However, the character through whom the problem is posed is far from being any ordinary one. It is al-ʻIzz ibn ʻAbdul al-Salām, the *qāḍī* who will always remain the model example of the magistrate who never compromises as to the requirements of his task and obligations.

Moreover, Islamic jurisprudence has its own terminology whereby every word is loaded, besides its literal significance, with all the emotional and moral charge it has acquired throughout the history of a culture. Accordingly, the notion of *law,* especially on the lips of such a *qāḍī* like al-ʻIzz ibn ʻAbd al-Salām, has to be expressed by the term *sharīʻah* in order to acquire its real weight in a moral issue. However, it is surprising to notice that the actor assigned to play Ibn ʻAbd al-Salām's role in Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm's play expresses the idea under question by the word *qānūn* like any ordinary magistrate or small barrister (*avocaillon*) in the Cairo or Algiers of our time!

This aspect of bilingualism, which has generated the most unexpected effects even in the Arabic expression of thoughts, is not the least significant one. As for the expression of our thoughts in a foreign language, it sometimes takes the form of total ignorance of our national culture, if not a neat betrayal thereof. Here is, for example, what one can read in the very first sentence of a book entitled *L'Architecture Algérienne* (Algerian Architecture): "In the past, architects were called work masters (*maître d'oeuvres*). They would be called on to construct palaces, temples, churches and fortresses!"

It is distressing to notice that the architectural nomenclature of such a book published by the Ministry of Information has omitted the term "mosque". It is a question of a characteristic term of Islamic architecture, were one to study it in France, in England or in Germany! The least one could say here is that bilingualism can generate the most inconsistent and bizarre effects with respect to our national culture.

Chapter Sixteen

Dead and Deadly Ideas[1]

An occasion that took him to pass through Paris inspired the great genius of contemporary Arab poetry to pay a lyrical homage to the city of lights! While leaving to posterity such a masterpiece, it did not come to the late Aḥmad Shawqī's[2] mind that he was at the same time supplying an argument that would posthumously be exploited against him by some worthless amateurs of fundamentalism (*integrisme*).[3] For these people, apparently concerned with the integrity of our cultural universe, we should block up all the latter's windows in order to be protect ourselves against contamination! In their opinion, we should also control, indeed suspend, if need be, our intellectual breathing and finally put 'gas masks' on our minds in order to ward off all possible contamination. When McCarthy[4] was thinking about regulating intellectual respiration (*respiration mentale*) in his country, international opinion simply looked at him as an old witch! But when such an attitude originates from a very honest and respectable person devoted to educating our children with all disinterestedness, we should neither under-estimate his personal opinion nor unconditionally consider it as mere demagoguery.

I was listening to an old student of al-Zaytūna.[5] I knew his opinion about Ahmad Shawqī was not his own brainchild. It was rather the opinion formed in a cultural universe whose ideas, deprived of their roots and subsequently transformed into dead ideas, coexist side by side with other ideas which have become deadly because they have left their roots in another cultural universe from which they were badly borrowed. What was then the mistake of the great poet, Shawqī, in the eyes of that distinguished colonized and colonizable man?

As the old student of al-Zaytūna university explained, Shawqī's mistake was his lyric reflected the pernicious effect of Western culture that had driven almost ninety percent of the Muslim élite to be, consciously or unconsciously, at the service of colonialism. The danger of such an assertion is even more serious considering that it is endorsed by appearances. What matters here is, however, the pathological reality that underlines the above assertion, that is, the dead ideas originating from our sociological heredity standing side by side with the deadly ideas borrowed from the West. Here, one can see at another level, that of ideas, the two aspects of the colonial tragedy, namely *colonizability* and colonialism, translated in cultural terms.

Anyway, the dead ideas bequeathed to us by post-Almohad society would, however, appear certainly more mortal had one to discriminate between the two categories. In order to be convinced of this fact, one should have a glance at the historical balance sheet of the ideas which have killed post-Almohad society and which still constitute the 'liabilities' of the renaissance of Muslim society, which does not yet seem to have got rid of them.

No doubt, these ideas did not see the light of day neither in Paris or London, nor in the lecture rooms of the Sorbonne or Oxford universities. They were rather bred in Fez, Algiers, Tunis and Cairo. They were therefore born at the foot of the minarets of al-Qarawiyyīn,[6] al-Zaytūna and al-Azhar during the post-Almohad centuries. Likewise, as long as they are not eliminated by a systematic effort, they will constitute the hereditary viruses, which would undermine the Islamic body from within by misleading its defense mechanism. We should here transpose the scientific thought and method of Pasteur[7] into the educational domain in order to grasp this pathological aspect of the cultural life of the present Muslim world. Otherwise, the dead ideas will continue to exert their influence on the social and political levels as they did in the time of the brave Muṣaddiq[8] whose government was toppled by means of such destructive work. In fact, Kāshānī[9] was a dead idea, that is, the internal virus destroying the experience that arose for a while on the horizon of the Iranian people. It is significant that Muṣaddiq was not at the end defeated by colonialism as we usually call it and as represented by the most powerful Oil Trust. Rather, he was defeated by *colonizability* gesticulating in the person of Kāshānī on behalf of God.

But no sooner had we started tackling the problem of the dead ideas, which have lost their roots in the original cultural plasma of the Muslim world, than we came against the deadly ideas, which have left their roots in their original cultural universe when they came to our environment. It is sometimes the same individuals who exemplify the two aspect of the problem: the 'hereditary' virus in a way 'absorbs' the alien microbe. In other words, a dead idea attracts, indeed invites, a deadly one in Muslim society. It was thus difficult to convince the honorable critic of Shawqī of the ontological cause linking the two pathological aspects of the problem, that is to say, the post-Almohad mind 'secreting' dead ideas, on the one hand and absorbing deadly ideas, on the other.

In its second aspect, this twofold 'capillarity' phenomenon generates a problem, which we should be careful not to mishandle. For there is no question as to why there are deadly elements in Western culture. Rather, the question is: why do Muslim élites precisely set out to search for those very elements? This is the proper way of addressing the problem. In fact, it is the content of the post-Almohad conscience that determines, in a voluntary or involuntary way, the 'choice' of this élite rather than the content of Western culture. Certainly, there is a 'choice', for it is a matter of fact that not all the Western cultural universe is deadly, as it generates life in a civilization which is still dominating the destiny of mankind.

Accordingly, the deadly elements we find in that cultural environment are nothing but waste, that is, dead elements of Western civilization. Therefore, if it is precisely post-Almohad Muslim conscience that sets out to collect, in Western cities, such scraps, no one else should be incriminated in its place. However, we should take into consideration the effects of such scraps as they are introduced into the cultural metabolism of the society that absorbs them. Evidently, the result will only be the rottenness that the superficial mind in our countries would confound with Western culture.

The confusion in this regard emanates form our position on the question of culture in general and consequently from our position regarding European culture in particular. It is nevertheless clear that if the ideas we borrow were also deadly in their original environment, they would play in it the same role and their effects at the social level would also be the same, that is to say, a mere rottenness. Yet, we must also admit that there is something else in a civilization, the strong and healthy elements which after all constitute its power and strength.

This paradox would become clearer as we draw some comparisons. At the individual level, we find, for example, a person such as Muhammad Iqbal,[10]11 who makes a passion out of his culture and who deserves much respect, at least for his disinterestedness. On the other hand, there are caravans of intel-lectuals (*intellectomanes*) who in their countries represent, more or less consciously, the 'fifth columns' of alien cultures, indeed of alien political strategies. This personal difference stems essentially from the fact that Iqbal succeeded, by a personal effort or thanks to an exceptional chance, 'to liquidate' the stock of dead ideas which he had found in his milieu upon his birth. It is significant in this respect to discern in his work a keen concern to reconstruct the ideas of his milieu whose fruits he has bequeathed to posterity under the title *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*.

However, what is more conclusive is the comparison between two distinct categories of students vis-à-vis Western culture. Muslim society started its modern renaissance in the same period as another society, that of Japan. Both societies set themselves up at the same time, towards 1860, as students of the Western school of civilization! Yet, Japan is at present the third economic power in the world. The deadly ideas of the West could not divert it from its path and it has remained faithful to its culture, traditions and past. In 1945, in the most pitiful as well as glorious episode of the Second World War, the Kamikaze[12] demonstrated to the world that the Samurai spirit was still alive.[13] On the contrary, Muslim society, after one century, is at present no more than an underdeveloped society despite the praiseworthy efforts that its history has devoted for the sake of renaissance.

It thus is abundantly clear that the problem facing us does not concern the nature of Western culture. It actually concerns the particular character of our relationship with it. In this respect, the Muslim who stood as a student at the school of Western culture was one of two types: the genuine student and the 'tourist' student. Neither of them goes to the real roots of a civilization. Rather, they go either to its distilled products or to its garbage. That is to say, they go to where it loses its life, its warmth as well as its reality embodied by the ploughman, the craftsman, the artist and the scientist, that is, those multitudes of men and women who daily perform, in the cities and the countryside alike, the great work of civilization.

This essential aspect has escaped from us for generations because the dead ideas and the post-Almohad age have put some blinkers on our eyes in such a way that we have been unable to see and discern anything except what is futile, absurd or even deadly. Now, we can better understand the nature of the debate that arose between Shawqī and his opponents. Depending on whether the great poet's lyric was inspired by the deadly ideas or the position of his opponents was inspired by dead ideas, we can tell who was right and who was wrong.

Anyway, it happened that in the conversation that had spurred on this debate between the old student of the al-Zaytūna and myself twenty years ago, it was a simple Algerian worker in Paris who spelled out, with a modesty dignifying such an ordinary person, the words that settled peremptorily the problem. "I believe", he said, "that it is the same story as in grafting: the graft does not (if it has to) bear the fruits of the stock in which it is grafted, but rather the fruits of the original one". No better way than this would enlighten the problem of heredity in the realm of ideas.

Chapter Seventeen

Nemesis of Betrayed Ideas

A dead idea is an idea whose origins have been betrayed, one that has deviated from its archetype and thus no longer has any roots in its original cultural plasma. In contrast, a deadly idea is an idea that has lost both its identity and cultural value after having been cut off of its roots that are left in their original cultural universe. On both sides, there is a question of a betrayal of ideas, which makes them either passive or harmful. Such un-faithfulness is not specific to Muslim society. The same psycho-sociological factors have caused the same inhibiting effects in other societies at different periods of history.

It appears that it was as a precaution against such effects in a society still enjoying all its strength that Socrates was denouncing what he called the *idéophages,* that is the killers of ideas. However, what history has added to the wisdom of Socrates is that the killed and betrayed ideas take revenge in a terrible way.

We know since the discoveries of Pasteur in France and Koch[1] in Germany that the diseases considered as contagious are transmitted from one individual to another through specific bodies: the microbes. Yet, the millennial history of mankind has put us face to face with another genre of diseases that affect the institutions, organization and life of human society. The contamination of this kind of disease is transmitted from one generation to another. Here is a new problem that imposes upon us the following question: what are the agents that transmit organic diseases in social life?

If we are to be guided by this analogy, we must adopt the approach of medicine in the field of pathology as it deals with the deficiencies of the body's physiological functions. A special branch of sociology is needed to deal with social pathology, that is, the defects affecting social organisms and public institutions in the same manner medical science treats organic disease. This analogy should not, however, be pushed too far in order not to be driven, like the philosophers of antiquity, into anthropomorphism.[2] In this respect, we can wonder whether the germ of the disease that attacks social institutions and finally ruins them is directly generated within the concerned institution, or transmitted by means of a certain kind of osmosis from a seat of contamination. The way we locate the causes of the disease will help us to properly pose the problem we address here.

No doubt, the Republic of Rome was an old and noble institution. In order to save its institutions from any blows by its victorious generals, Rome had already taken the necessary measures according to which those generals were not allowed, upon their return from the battlefield, to cross the Rubicon River without the Senate's permission. Yet, despite those prophylactic measures, its republic died on the very day Julius Caesar[3] crossed the Rubicon and entered Rome without any authorization from Cato[4] and the members of his Senate.

Several hypotheses can be put forward to interpret the significance of such an event from the sociological point of view. There are institutions that grow old and die peacefully in old age. Thus, had it not been abolished by men in the nineteenth century, slavery would have been wiped out by twentieth century machinery. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that its end had occurred in the realm of ideas before it took place in the realm of things. This is, therefore, a presumption that can be put as follows: an institution that no longer enjoys the support of ideas seems to be doomed to disappear.

This is not yet a proof, but only a presumption that indicates a certain direction of inquiry. There are institutions, such as marriage, which do not grow old. If marriage had been abolished in a society, we should not say that this institution has grown old, but that the society is rather a sick society. In such a case, the origin of the disease is rooted in the cultural universe itself. In some North-European countries, the cultural crisis, which has engendered the hippies, tends towards replacing conventional marriage by a free union; or rather a more complex and abnormal union as it is a homosexual one! These are psychological transformations that bring economic and political transformations to the surface of the social life.

Thus, the *psychological* precedes and conditions the *sociological.* By any means, we are thus always led out to the very principle expounded by the Qur'an in the form of a maxim: "Verily, God does not change men's condition unless they change their inner selves..." (al-Ra'd 13:11). The Qur'anic verse contains the germs of all the conclusions one can draw as to the nemesis of betrayed ideas.

Accordingly, it was not Julius Caesar who had killed the Republic of Rome. Rather, its death was the result of the unnoticed transformations that had been taking place at the level of the Roman spirit itself. It is significant in this connection that the death of Julius Caesar, who was stabbed by Brutus[5] and the plotters, could not restore the Republic of Rome. Similarly, the Republic did not die in Athens because of a certain 'Julius Caesar'; it was rather a casualty of the same psychological transformations that had led to its death in Rome.

Likewise, the psychological transformations unfolding in the process and manifesting themselves in the social and political domains first occur at the level of the motivations that determine the human behavior. This is what we can observe vividly in the process that led Muslim society, after the year 38 of the *Hijra*, to the decline of the democratic spirit.[6] The symptoms of such a transformation are noted in the half-heartedness, indeed disaffection of 'Aqīl, the brother of 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, during the struggle in which Mu'āwiyya opposed 'Alī. 'Aqīl justified his strange stand in an even stranger way by stating that: "Praying with 'Alī is more commendable but eating with Muʿāwiyya is more substantial."[7] Here, we clearly see the breakdown of the initial motivations that had animated the early companions of the Prophet. This breakdown will again become obvious when, twenty years later, al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī, yielding to the insistence of the people of Kūfah, the old followers of his father, started marching to Madīnah. His cousin, ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbbās who had accompanied him for a part of the journey, tried to dissuade him from that enterprise by saying: "These people will betray you as they did with your father. Behold, their hearts are with you but their swords are with Yazīd!'[8]

This explanation given by the most objective witness of the time, whose testimony has been confirmed by history, today provides us with the key to the causes of the breakdown of motivations. It thus pinpoints the dichotomy that has ever since divided the Muslim into two parts: his prayer on the one hand, and his meal on the other; his heart, on one side, and his sword, on the other. Likewise, we are only at the beginning of the degradation process. However, the two cases mentioned above enable us to measure the deviation from the principle established by the Qur'an:

> *Say: Behold, my prayer and [all] my acts of worship, and my living and my dying are for Allah [alone], the sustainer of all the worlds.*
>
> al-Anʿām 6:162.

It is in the light of this verse and, therefore, with regard to an established principle, an idea or an archetype of the cultural universe founded by the Qur'an, that we started recording the early shifts or, as it is said in our time, the first deviations in the Muslim behavior. We therefore know that if we judge any kind of inefficacy in the Muslim behavior such as the two historical examples mentioned above, we should take care not to pin them right away on Islam. This is, nevertheless, the most common mistake of Western Orientalists and sociologists in their studies devoted to the contemporary Muslim world.[9]

Be that as it may, if we admit that every action is subjected to the order of ideas in both its motivations and operational modalities, it is must be mentioned that social activity depends on the idea not in its pristine state, but in the state in which it is integrated with our behavior, that is to say, in the manner we interpret, comprehend and assimilate it. When we assess a society's deficiency or efficacy, we actually assess the positive effects of its 'realm of ideas' in its actual state. On the other hand, we know that it is the betrayal of the assimilated ideas, that is, the discrepancy of the common (*idées courantes*) ideas from the fundamental ones that represents in a certain manner the inefficiencies of a society. These inefficiencies slip from one generation to another through certain psycho-sociological complexes and types of behavior.

Mimesis in human behavior takes place through the vehicle of ideas. Its pathological aspect is reflected in the social contagion transmitted from one generation to another by the osmosis of those ideas when they are separated from their archetypes in the original cultural universe. Thus, ideas stand for the 'microbes' transmitting social diseases. An idea of this kind is always an idea that has betrayed its archetype. The diseases are spread in the society as it undergoes the effects of any degeneration affecting its cultural universe. Sometimes, the repercussions of betrayed ideas occur at the end when their falsehood is discovered.

The day 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb burst out laughing after he had appeased his racking hunger by devouring his sugar-made idol was but the indication that the cultural universe of the *Jāhiliyyah* had already been shaken. Its archetypes had to disappear soon with the idols of the Ka'bah on the capture of Makkah, in the sixth year of the *Hijrah*, in order to give way to a new cultural universe and a new society.

Infidelity to the archetypes may still have other aspects and even more serious implications for society. The consequences of such infidelity, whether with regard to our own cultural universe or that of another society whose ideas are betrayed in the process of borrowing, may be much more harmful. Muslim society at present is precisely facing this twofold problem. It is undergoing both the nemesis of the archetypes of its own cultural universe and the terrible revenge of the ideas it has been borrowing from Europe without taking into consideration the conditions that would preserve their social value. This has resulted in the devaluation (*dévlorisation*) of both the inherited and acquired ideas, thus generating the most pernicious harm to the moral and material development of the Muslim world.

All that we see in the form of inefficacy, that is, in the form of diverse deficiencies in our social activities, reflects the social consequences of that devaluation. On the one hand, the ideas that manifested their efficacy in the construction of Muslim civilization one thousand years ago have today proven to be inefficacious as if they have lost their adherence to reality. On the other hand, the ideas of Europe that have edified the order we call European civilization, in turn, are losing their efficacy in the present Muslim world.

Accordingly, our present behavior is plagued with twofold unfaithfulness. Muslims have lost contact with the archetypes of their original cultural universe. They have also failed to establish, as Japan did, a genuine contact with the cultural universe of Europe. Likewise, we are experiencing the effects of this double depreciation, as the betrayed ideas on both sides take a terrible revenge. We are at the moment suffering from the effects of an implacable nemesis!

Conclusion

Though it has emerged from the post-Almohad era since the last century, the Muslim world it is still out of sorts. Like a rider who has lost control over the stirrup and failed to recapture it, it has been struggling to attain its new equilibrium. Its secular decadence, condemning it to inertia, apathy, impotence and *colonizability*, has nonetheless preserved its traditional values in a more or less fossilized condition. It has emerged under such conditions at the time when the twentieth century reaches the peak of its material power but when all the moral forces have started disintegrating since the First World War.

At present, it is blown off course by contradictory and conflicting ideas: on the one hand, the ideas which put it face to face with the problems of the technological civilization without establishing real contact with the roots of that civilization and, on the other, the ideas which link it to its original cultural universe without embracing the archetypes of this universe despite the praiseworthy efforts made by reformists. Yet, either out of craze or by force of sliders put under its feet, the Muslim world risks to be carried away by the 'modern ideologies' at the very moment when they are celebrating their failure in the West where they were born.

Were it tempted, as it appears from its general atmosphere or perhaps because of an undeclared desire of its élites, to follow in the footsteps of Europe in all the fields of life, then it would run the risk to constantly lag one stage behind the train of history, as it would have to repeat at its own expense all the unsuccessful experiences of Europe, notably the Marxist experience which seems, however, to have already been surpassed both scientifically and philosophically.

Western élites, having been dizzied by the dialectical materialism especially since the end of the Second World War, have begun to sober up in recent years, thus regaining their autonomy of thought with regard to this doctrine. In contrast, we see that it is more occupying and preoccupying the minds of some Muslim intellectuals as if they had met with their Archimedean moment! We can never make history by simply following in others' footsteps along the beaten tracks. Indeed, this is possible only by opening up new paths. Making history is only possible on the basis of genuine and efficacious ideas responding to all the moral as well as developmental problems of a society that is in need of reconstruction.

We have attempted in this work to show the difficulties in which Muslim society has been struggling in order to face its problems at the level of both morality and efficacy. We have ideas that interfere with one another. By stirring the problem of ideas, we have aimed at demonstrating its weight in history and in the destinies of mankind as well.

If we have not succeeded in presenting a clear solution to this problem, we believe, however, that we have accurately defined it. In addition, we have had no claim other than opening an essential debate that is far from being closed by the end of this book.

Algiers: 21 Ramaḍān 1390 AH
21 November 1970 AD

Endnotes

Preface

1 The author refers here to his book entitled *al-Ṣirā' al-Fikrī fī al-Bilād al-Musta'marah* (The Ideological Struggle in Colonized Countries) which was his first attempt to write in Arabic. It was first published in Cairo in 1960 and then republished by Dār al-Fikr in Damascus together with Bennabi's other works under the series title *Mushkilāt al-Ḥaḍārah*. The latest print of this book was in 2000.

2 Ariadne: In Greek mythology, the daughter of Minos, the king of Crete. She enabled Theseus, her lover, to escape from the labyrinth by giving him a ball of thread that helped him find the way out of the castle. He fled with her, but deserted her on the island of Naxos, where she eventually became the wife of Dionysis. The expression "the Ariadne thread" is usually used to signify the ways or means that guide a person's steps amidst difficult and complicated matters and situations.

Chapter One

1 Jeremiah or Jeremias: One of the Biblical prophets who was active in Judah c. 627-587 BC and who died apparently after fleeing to Egypt from Jerusalem. To him is attributed the *Book of Jeremiah,* a major prophetic work of the Hebrew Bible (Old Testament), a work which is notable for its record of the prophet's inner struggles, persecution and despair. Warnings of disaster for Judah's immorality and idolatry are tempered only briefly by support for King Josiah's reforms; the warnings anticipated the fall of Jerusalem (587 BC) and Babylonian

captivity of the Jews. See Bennabi's analysis of Jeremiah's personality and career in his *The Qur'anic Phenomenon: An Essay of a Theory on the Qur'an*, trans. Mohamed El-Tahir El-Mesawi, Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2001, pp. 46-52.

2 Leo Nikolayevich Tolstoy (1828-1910), Russian novelist and moral philosopher. Joined the army (1852) and served in the Caucasus and Crimean War (1854-1856). Visited some European countries. Published his great novels amongst which are *War and Peace* (1865-1865) and *Anna Karenina* (1875-1877). He underwent a spiritual transformation that led him to develop a form of Christian anarchism and to devote himself to social reform and religious preaching. He recorded his conversion and new beliefs in works such as the autobiographical *Ispoved* (1882) and plays such as *Vlast Tmy* (1886) and essays, mainly his *What is Art?* (1898).

For Bennabi's reference to Tolstoy's reflections on art, see Leo Tolstoy: *What is Art? And Essays on Art*, trans. Aylmer Maude, New York: Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 86-118 and 251-88. The following paragraph from Tolstoy's book (pp. 258-59) would fairly summarize his criticism of the Western conception of art. After analyzing the views of a number of European thinkers and philosophers on art, he says:

> "Expressed in the form of a doctrine, these positions startle us. In reality they are implied in the ideal of art serving beauty. The art of our upper classes has educated people in this ideal of the superman – which is in reality the old ideal of Nero, Sténka Răzin, Jenghiz Khan, or Napoleon, and all their accomplices, assistants, and adulators – and it supports this ideal with all its might. *It is this supplanting of the ideal of what is right with the ideal of what is beautiful,* that is, of what is pleasant, that is the fourth consequence, and a terrible one, of the perversion of art in society." (Italics added)

3 Babylon, 32 33N 44 25E, From the eighteenth century BC the capital of the Babylonian Empire, situated on the River of Euphrates south Baghdad, modern Iraq. It is said that its inhabitants set out to build a tower by means of which they aspired to reach the heavens. This endeavor ultimately failed when the wrath of God descended upon them, thus dividing their nation and their language, from which comes the use of "Babylon" to allude to chaos and confusion.

4 Daniel Defoe (1660-17931), English author and adventurer, born in London. He appears to have traveled widely in Europe before setting up in the hosiery trade in London in 1683. He took part in Monmouth's rebellion and joined William III's army in 1688. He could earn the favor of this latter. On the accession of the House of Hanover in 1714 he tried to justify his career as a double agent in his *Appeal to Honour and Justice* (1715). Then, he turned to the writing of fiction, which was all passed off as actual history. In 1719-1720, at the age of 60, he published his best-known work, *Robinson Crusoe*. The latter work is considered by many critics to be well reflective of the new spirit of European adventurous expansionism and individualist capitalism.

5 Abū Bakr Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Malik ibn Ṭufayl: he was probably born in the first decade of the 6th/12th century near Ghamāṭah (Granada). He first of all practiced as a physician in Granada, and then became secretary to the governor of Ceuta and Tangier (North Morocco), a son of 'Abd al Mu'min, and the founder of Almohad or *al-Muwaḥḥidūn* dynasty, Sultan Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf. He is the author of the celebrated philosophical novel *Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān*, one of the most remarkable books of the Middle Ages. He wrote two treatises on medicine, and corresponded with Ibn Rushd about the latter's medical work *al-Kulliyyāt*. According to Ibn Rushd, he had some original astronomic ideas. He died in 581/1185 at Marrakech (Morocco), the caliph himself attending his obsequies.

6 Daniel Defoe: *Robinson Crusoe*, London: Galley Press, The Golden Heritage Series, 1987, p. 87.

7 Abū Bakr Ibn Tufayl: *The History of Ḥayy IbnYaqẓān*, translated from the Arabic by Simon Ockley, London: Darf Publishers Limited, 1986, pp. 56-57.

8 Friedrich (Wilhelm) Nietzsche (1844-1900), German philosopher and critic. He was a strongly religious child. Influenced by Schopenhauer, he dedicated his first book, *Die Geburt der Tregodie* [1872, The Birth of Tragedy] to his friend Wagner, whose operas he regarded as the successors to Greek tragedy. He was determined to give his age new values, Schopenhauer's *will to power* serving as the principle. His major work, which appeared in the period 1883-1885, is his *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, which develops the idea of the 'superman'. Much

of his doctrine appealed to the Nazis, and he has been a major influence on existenliasm and post-modernism.

9 Zarathustra, mod. Zaradusht (630-553BC), Iranian religious leader and self-proclaimed prophet, the founder of the ancient Persian religion known as Zoroastrianism. He appears as an historical person only in the earliest portion of the Avesta, the sacred book of Zoroastrianism. The keynote of his system is that the world and history exhibit the struggle between Ormuzd and Ahriman (the creator or good spirit, and the evil principle, the devil) in which at the end evil will be banished and the good will reign supreme.

10 See Friedrich Nietzsche: *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, trans. Thomas Common and revised and introduced by H. James Birx, New York: Promotheus, 1993, pp. 33-37.

11 Salamān: In Ibn Ṭufayl's philosophical tale, a man of wisdom to whom Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān went to communicate the fruits and discoveries of his spiritual and philosophical journey, which started upon the death of his mother-deer.

12 We have drawn the reader's attention to this aspect notably in our *L'Afro-Asiatisme: Conclusions sur la Conférence de Bandoeng*, Cairo: Imprimerie Misr, 1956, pp. 181-182. – Author.

13 Lecretius (Titus Lucretius Carus) (99-55 BC), Roman poet and philosopher. He was said to have died mad from the effects of a love potion given to him by his wife Lucilia. His great work is his hexameter poem *De Natura Renum*, in six volumes, in which he tried to popularize the philosophical theories of Democritus and Epicurus on the origin of the universe, with the special purpose of eradicating anything like religious belief, which he savagely denounces as the one great source of man's wickedness and misery.

14 Max Karl Ernst Planck (1858-1947), German theoretical physicist, the formulator of the quantum theory, which revolutionized physics. His work on the law of thermodynamics and black body radiation led him to abandon the classical principles of dynamics and formulate the quantum theory (1900), which assumed energy changes to take place in violently abrupt installments or quanta. This successfully accounted for and predicted certain phenomena inexplicable in the Newtonian theory. Albert Einstein's application of the quantum theory to light in1905 led to the theories of relativity and in 1913 Neils Bohr success-

fully applied it to the sub-atomic physics. In1918, Planck was awarded the Nobel Prize for physics.

15 Auguste Comte (1798-1857), French philosopher and social theorist, born in Montpellier. He is usually regarded (by Western scholars) as the founding father of sociology. From 1818 he became strongly influenced by Saint-Simon (1760-1825), a French social reformer and founder of French socialism.

His professional and personal life was very precarious; nonetheless, he completed at least two major works: the *Cours de Philosophie Positive* (6 vols. 1830-42), and the *Système de Politique Positive* (1851-54). His "Positivism" sought to expound the laws of social evolution, to describe the organization and hierarchy of human knowledge, and to establish a *true science of society as a basis for social planning and regeneration*; in this vision 'Humanity' itself becomes the object of religious reverence and love – "Catholicism minus Christianity", as Thomas Henry Huxley dubbed it.

Chapter Two

1 If the child is isolated upon its birth, its adaptation to social life will become difficult, indeed impossible. Thus we come across the case of the "wild infant" (*l'enfant sauvage*) studied by some sociologists such as Watson, which would imply that the story of Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān is merely a spiritual journey. – Author.

The idea of 'wild infant' (*enfant sauvage*) refers to human children abandoned in desert areas or vast forests. Being lucky to survive in a non-human environment, such children are said to haye lived a perfectly animal life. Some of them are said to have been raised by beasts such as wolves, bears and gazelles. The numerous cases of such infants, which have been discovered in different parts of the world, have been of great interest for anthropologists, sociologists and psychologists. Some such scholars have gone so far as to find in those cases a scientific ground to deny the existence of a specific nature that characterizes human beings and distinguishes them from other animal species. Thus, they claim that man has no specific nature, but has a history. For more detail see Lucien Malson: *Les Enfants Sauvages: Mythe et Réalité* (The Wild Children: Myth and Reality), Paris: France Loisirs, 1964.

Bennabi has discussed this issue in some detail in his book *The Question of Culture*, translated from the Arabic by Abdul Wahid Lu'lu'a, Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust and the International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2002.

2 Karl Marx: *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy* (3 vols.), London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1867, vol. 1, p. 178. Could we say that, by virtue of this statement, Marx was an idealist?

For a profound philosophical analysis of how the human spirit works and how thought and action progress, see Ibn Khaldūn, *The Muqaddimah*, trans. Franz Rosenthal, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967, vol. 2, pp. 413-16. To explain that process, the great philosopher-historian gives the following example. He says (pp. 414-13), "For instance, if a man thinks of bringing into existence a roof to shelter him, he will progress in his mind (from the roof) to the wall supporting the roof, and then to the foundation upon which the wall stands. Here, his thinking will end, and he will then start to work on the foundation, then (go on to) the wall, and then (to) the roof, with which his action will end. This is what is meant by the saying: 'the beginning of action is the end of thinking, and the beginning of thinking is the end of action'."

3 Jung's analytic psychology: Refusing Freud's insistence on the psychosexual origins of the neuroses (the libido), Jung rather saw in the libido a mere elementary and universal energy that may be either introvert or extrovert. He instead developed the theory of *archetypes*. According to this theory, the archetypes constitute the collective unconscious, and are an outcome of mankind's experience throughout history.

4 *Eureka*, an exclamation of triumph on discovering or solving something. Greek: "eureka I have found (it)", traditionally the exclamation of Archimedes (287–212 BC, Greek mathematician and physicist) when he realized, during bathing, that the volume of an irregular solid could be calculated by measuring the water displaced when it was immersed. He thus elaborated a law in physics stating that the apparent loss in weight of body immersed in a fluid is equal to the weight of the displaced fluid.

5 *Désengouement:* (French) a state in which a person gives up any kind of interest in the affairs of life and falls in assort of complete withdrawal.

Chapter Three

1 The author does not consider it necessary to dwell upon this point which he has analyzed in a previous study entitled *L'Oeuvre orientaliste et son influence sur la pensée musulmane moderne* (The Work of Orientalists and its Impact on Modern Islamic Thought). – Author.

This study was translated into Arabic under the title "Intāj al-Mushtashriqīn wa Atharuhu fī al-Fikr al-Islāmī al-Ḥadīth" and constitutes part of the author's posthumous work *al-Qaḍāyā al-Kubrā* (The Great Themes), Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1412/1991, pp. 167-198.

2 Ibn Khaldun: *The Muqaddimah*, trans. Frenz Rozenthal, Princeton University Press, 1967, vol. 1, p.64.

3 Al-Muhallab b. Abī Ṣufra (7/628-83/714), one of the outstnding military leaders of the Umayyads. He waged successful campaigns against the Kharijite (Khawārij) forces.

4 *Al-Mu'allaqāt*: Seven famous long poems or odes which the pre-Islamic Arabs universally celebrated by making them part of the decoration of the idol-filled shrine of Makkah or the Ka'bah.

5 Tamāḍur bint 'Amr b. al-Ḥārith, al-Khansā' (d.645), famous Arab poetess. She is said to have been mourning her brother, Ṣakhr, long after his death in one of the Arab tribal wars, out of affection and love for him. After she embraced Islam, she underwent such a radical change that she was very happy to see all her sons being killed as martyrs in the early battles between the nascent Muslim community and the Makkan Arab polytheists. She even motivated them to participate whole-heartedly in those battles. On the eve of the battle al-Qādisiyyah, she addressed her four sons in the following impressive manner:

> "Oh my sons, you have obediently submitted to (the will of) Allah Almighty and you have voluntarily emigrated. I swear by Allah, the One and only God, that you are the progeny of one single man and one single woman. I have never betrayed your father nor have I caused scruple and shame to your uncle (i.e. her brother)! You know very well what Allah has promised to the *mujāhidīn*; so go on to fight your enemy, be aware and seek assistance and victory from Allah Almighty."

Quoted by Muḥammad Sa'īd R. al-Būṭī in his book *Manhaj al-Ḥaḍārah al-Insāniyyah fī al-Qur'ān* (The Foundation of Human Civilization in the Qur'an), Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1987, p. 82.

6 Ḥātim al-Ṭā'ī (d.605 AD), famous pre-Islamic Arab poet, well-known for his bravery, largesse and generosity.

7 Ghār Ḥirā': a cave in Mount Ḥirā' (near Makkah) where the Prophet Muhammad used to withdraw into seclusion before the revelation of the Qur'an was made to him. It was in this cave that, thirteen years before the *Hijrah* (July or August, 610 AD), the very beginning of the revelation of the Qur'an took place. The following five verses of Surah *al-'Alaq* (96) were the first to be revealed to the Prophet: "(1) Read in the name of thy Sustainer, who has created – (2) created man out of germ – cell! (3) Read for thy Sustainer is the Most Beautiful One (4) who has taught (man) the use of the pen – (5) taught man what he did not know."

See Bennabi's reflections in this respect in *The Qur'anic Phenomenon: An Essay of a Theory on the Qur'an*, trans. Mohamed El-Tahir El-Mesawi, Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2001, pp. 81-84; cf. Kenneth Gragg: *Returning to Mount Hira': Islam in Contemporary Terms*, London: Bellow Publishing, 1994, pp. 7-15.

8 The *Muhājirūn* and *Anṣār:* the two main constituent groups of the early Muslim society in Madīnah. The *Muhājirūn* consisted of the Muslims who had been compelled to migrate from Makkah, while the *Anṣār*) consisted mainly of the two tribes of Aws and Khazraj who received the Makkan Muslim emigrants in Madīnah, thus constituting with them the human basis for the emergent Islamic society and independent polity.

9 Abū 'Abd Allāh Muhammad b. Sa'd b. Māni' al-Baṣrī al-Hāshimī kātib al-Waqidī (168/784-230/845), Muslim historian and traditionalist (*muḥaddith*) born in Baṣra (Bossorah). He was client (*mawlā*) of the Banū Hāshim, for his grandfather had been a freedman of Ḥusayn b. 'Abd Allāh b. 'Ubayd Allāh b. 'Abbās. Ibn Sa'd traveled in search of traditions and studied under many authorities. Later he settled in Baghdad and attached himaslef to al-Wāqidī, became his secretary and transmitted his works. He also studied genealogy under Hishām b. al-Kalbī.

During the *miḥna,* he and six other scholars were, as al-Ṭabarī reports, summoned by order of al-Ma'mūn and were made to declare their adherence to the Mu'tazilī doctrines. Ibn Sa'd's fame rests on his magnum opus work on the classes *(Kitāb al-Tabaqāt al-Kabīr).* This book was intended as an aid to the study of traditions by giving information on some 4250 persons (including 600 women) who, from the beginning of Islam down to the author's time, had played a role as narrators or transmitters of traditions about the Prophet's sayings and doings.

10 *Za'īm*: Arabic term meaning 'leader', especially in politics.

Chapter Four

1 St Thomas Aquinas (1227-1274 AD) was an Italian philosopher and theologian. He studied philosophy and theology in various European centers of learning, especially Naples (Italy), where he came into contact with philosophical Islamic works. His intellectual endeavor was centered on harmonizing reason and belief by reconciling the fundamentals of Christianity with the philosophical theories stemming from the Aristotelian system.

2 The author has used this diagram in the following two books: *Les Conditions de la Renaissance* [The Conditions of Renaissance], Algiers: S. E. C., 1992, p. 25 (Arabic translation: *Shurūṭ al-Nahḍah*, Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1407/1987, p. 74), and *Mīlād Mujtama'*, Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1406/1986, p. 55 (English translation by Mohamed El-Tahir El-Mesawi as *On the Origins of Human Society,* Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2002, p. 63.)

3 The apostasy wars or *ḥurūb al-riddah*: In the early history of Islam and immediately after the demise of the Prophet peace be upon him, the Muslim community faced a movement of disobedience and rebellion against the central political authority of the Islamic state in Madīnah. One of the outstanding features of this movement was its refusal to pay *zakāt* to the officials of the first caliph, Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq. After a heated debate between the caliph and the leading Companions, it was agreed that it was an act of apostasy and a belligerent movement threatening to undermine the faith and cause political and social instability to the Muslim community. Thus, the resolute decision was made to face and eradicate it.

4 Stakhanovism: A moment launched in 1935 in the Soviet Union; it is named after Alekskey Stakhanov, a model coal miner, whose innovative methods greatly increased productivity. This movement rewarded "innovators" with higher pay and other privileges.

5 John Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975), British historian, born in London. He served in the Foreign Office in both World Wars and attended the Paris conferences of1919 and 1946. He was Professor of modern Greek and Byzantine history at London University (1919-1924) and Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (1925-1955), and Research Professor of International History in the University of London. His major work is his twelve-volume *A Study of History* (1934-1961).

6 Vedic Thought: the thought relating to and inspired by the *Vedas*, i.e. the most ancient sacred writings of Hinduism, especially the *Rig-Veda*, *Yajur-Veda*, *Sama-Veda* and *Atharva-Veda*.

7 It appears as if Bennabi's positive appreciation of the edifying aspect of the Chinese Communist revolution had carried him so far away that he made such a hasty and sweeping judgment. Thus, he seems unaware of the fact that the Chinese Communist theoreticians, especially Chairman Mao Tse-tung, made a serious intellectual effort to adapt Marxist concepts and thought-categories to the age-old Chinese culture and values, including Buddhism itself.

8 The Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 in which the Israelis occupied the Palestinian West Bank, the Syrian Golan Heights and Egypt's Sinai Desert.

9 The post-Almohad era refers to the stage in Muslim historical that started after the fall of the Almohad or al-Muwaḥḥidūn. Founded by Muhammad al-Mahdī ibn Tūmart in 1133, the Almohad dynasty ruled over the entire Muslim West (i.e. North Africa and the greater part of Muslim Spain). The Almohad era flourished the field of thought and the various branches of knowledge with scholars such as Ibn Ṭufayl, Ibn Rushd and Ibn Zuhr (Lat. Avenzoar). With the death of the fifth Almohad ruler in the year 1213, the first symptoms of decline noticeable. This dynasty ultimately ended in the year 1269 with the death of its ruler, 'Ulā Idrīs al-Wāthiq.

In Bennabi's cyclical conception of the historical development of Islamic civilization, the end of the Almohad rule marked the beginning of the third stage of that civilization, thus denoting its decline and disintegration.

Chapter Five

1 Serge Tchakhotine: *Le Viol des Foules par la Propagande Politique* (The Rape of the Masses by Political Propaganda), Paris: Gallimard, 1998 (1939), pp. 50-51.

2 Libido: In psychoanalysis, psychic energy emanating from the primitive instincts and energies in the unconscious mind that modified by the ego and the superego, underlie all psychic activity.

3 The last and most scandalous (exhibition), because of its publicity, was launched this year, 1970, in Copenhagen. – Author.

4 See the relevant verses according to the chronological order of revelation: *al-Naḥl* 16: 67; *al-Baqarah* 2: 219; *al-Nisā* 4: 43 and *al-Mā'idah* 5:90-91.

5 See details on these two schemes in our book *Le Phénomène Coranique,* section: Valeur Sociale de La Notion Coranique, [pp. 154 – 156; published by S.E.C., Algiers, 1992. Annotated English translation by Mohamed El-Tahir El-Mesawi as *The Qur'anic Phenomenon: An Essay of a Theory on the Qur'an,* Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2001, pp. 260-62.

Chapter Six

1 Genghis or Jenghiz Khan (1162-1227 AD), Mongol conqueror, born in Deligun Bulduk on the river Onon, the son of a Mongol Chief. Called at 13 to succeed his father, he had to struggle for years against hostile tribes. His ambitions awakening with his continuous success, he spent six years in subjugating the Naimans, between Lake Balkhash and the Irtysh, and in conquering Tangut, South of the Gobi Desert.

From the Turkish Uigurs, who 'voluntarily' submitted, the Mongols derived their civilization, alphabet and laws. In 1206, he dropped his name Temujin for that of Genghis Khan, 'Universal Ruler'; in 1211, he overran the empire of North China, and in 1217 conquered and annexed the Kara-Khitai Khanate empire from Lake Balkhash to Tibet. In 1218 he attacked the powerful empire of Khawarezm, bounded by the Jaxartes, Indus, Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea, took Bokhara, Samarkand, Khawarezm and other chief cities. Two of his lieutnents penetrated northwards from southern Russia and the Crimea, everywhere routing and slaying, and returned by way of the Volga.

Genghis Khan was not only a warrior and conqueror, but also a skillful administrator who, conquering empires stretching from the Black Sea to the Pacific, organized them, in his own way, into states, which outlasted the short span that usually measures the life of Asiatic sovereignties!

As for the lassa, it is an old Turkish word, which means 'social law'. As reported in historical references, when Genghis Khan felt his power and rule secure, he thought about improving his kingdom both morally and socially. To this end, he laid down a set of rules and regulations that were meant to govern men's moral conduct and social interaction and he wanted them to have a religious-like binding character.

2 Maximilien de Robespierre (1758-1794), one of the foremost leaders of the 1789 French Revolution. He is well known for the absolutist government he established and his bloody dealing with political rivals.

3 Degradation of energy: according to the law governing the transformation of energy in physics, this means that an amount of the latent energy in the concerned body has to be utilized in proportion with the movement meant to be produced. For more detail on this central concept in physics see Rathan Spielberg Bryon D. Anderson: *Seven Ideas That Shook The Universe*, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1995, pp. 169-170.

4 Bilāl b. Rabāḥ, of Abyssinian (i.e. present-day Ethiopia) origin, he was a slave of one of a Makkan notable, Umayyah ibn Khalaf. He was amongst the early people who embraced Islam for which his master subjugated him to severe torture and persecution. Abū Bakr who paid a ransom to Ummayyah liberated him. Bilāl is well known for endurance and patience for the sake of Islam. It is also reported that he was the first to have used his voice to call for prayer.

5 Catacombs (or Roman Caves), subterranean Jewish or early Christian cemeteries found in certain parts of the Roman World – notably Rome itself – where soft rocks made the tunneling of passages and caving of burial niches easy. The practice, it is believed, had been derived from the ancient Jewish cave burials.

6 The Burning Bush, referred to in the Qur'an as the "Fire" (Surahs *Ṭā Hā*: 20 and *al-Naml*: 27) and in the Bible as the "Burning bush", refers to the period of Prophet Moses' wanderings subsequent to his flight from Egypt. "According to some of the earliest commentators, as quoted by Tabari, the "fire" (*nār*) is [...] synonymous with "light" [*nūr*], namely, the illumination which God bestows on His Prophets, who – one may presume – are a prior "near it" by virtue of their inborn spiritual sensitivity'. See Muhammad Asad: *The Message of The Qur'an*, Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus, 1984, p. 577, note 7.

7 Blaise de Pascal (1623-1662), French mathematician, physicist, theologian, and man-of-letters. He instituted the theorem on a hexagon inscribed in aconic. He collaborated with his father in experiments to confirm Tovicelli's *theory*, unpalatable to the schoolmen that nature does not, after all, abhor a vacuum, which led to the invention of the barometer, the hydraulic press and the syringe. Pascal was very influenced by his sister Jackeline who was leading a monastic life as well as by many events in which he felt the interference of the Providence, which led him to retire into seclusion in an abbey in Port-Royal.

He was severe in opposing the Jesuits in their interpretation of the Divine grace and the concept of Salvation in Christianity.

8 *Die Ewige Wiederkehrung* or "the law of the eternal recurrence": It is believed in some primitive societies that the time of the origins of the universe is the genuine and creative time in which came into being the archetypes of everything and that this paradisiacal time can be experienced time and again by means of religious rituals performed in the honor of the deities.

Nietzsche, the famous German philosopher ended up believing in the idea of eternal recurrence as a joyful interpretation of ultimate reality. He had planned to write a systematic and definitive volume to prove this idea and delineate its implications in terms of science and reason. But his fatal illness in 1889 prevented him from fulfilling his plan. See further detail in H. James Brix's introduction to Nietzceshe's *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, pp. 20-26.

9 The Bastille was a fortress in Paris that had been a prison until its destruction, in 1789, at the beginning of the French Revolution.

10 Peter the Great, also Peter I (1672-1725), emperor of Russia from 1682 to 1725. He is credited with leading Russia from the Middle Ages to the modern world and making it a major European and world power. He laid down the foundation for the Tsarist regime which had ruled over Russia until the advent of the Communist Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917.

11 Ersatz ideas: inferior ideas used as substitutes for the original ideas.

12 Nicholas Boileau (1636-1711), French poet and literary critic. He was contemporary of Louis XIV and the great classical writers and artists. He is recognized as one of the eminent theorists of the French classicism thanks to his book *Art Poétique* (Poetic Art).

13 Nicholas Boileau: *Art Poétique*, Paris: Flammarion,

14 *Colonizability* (Fr. *Colonisibilité*): a term coined by Bennabi to denote the society's state of being susceptible to colonization and domination by alien forces. He thus considers colonialism a consequence rather than a cause of the internal conditions and structures of Muslim and Third World countries. He elaborated this view in his book *Les Conditions de La Renaissance,* Algiers: Société d'Ēdition et de Communication, 1992, pp. 71-77; Arabic translation: S*hurūṭ al-Nahḍah,* Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1407/1987, pp. 149-160.This book was first published in 1948.

Chapter Seven

1 **A.** Homer (Gr. Homeros), (c. 9th century BC) Greek poet to whom are attributed the great epics, *the Iliad,* the story of the siege of Troy, and the *Odyssey, the Tale of Ulysses's Wanderings.*

B. Euclid (Gr. Eucleides) (330-275 BC), Greek mathematician who taught in Alexandria about 300 BC, and was probably the founder of its mathematical school. His chief extant work is the thirteen-volume book *Elements,* which became the most widely known mathematical book of classical antiquity, and is still much used in geometry. The approach, which obeys his axioms, became known as *Euclidian geometry.*

C. Pythagoras (580-500 BC), Greek philosopher and mathematician. He founded a moral and religious school at Crotona, Magna Craecia, c.530 BC. Phythagoreanism was first a way of life, of moral abstinence and purification, not solely a philosophy; its teaching included the doctrine of the transmigration of souls between successive bodies. The school is best known for its studies of the relations between numbers.

D. Socrates (469-399 BC), Greek philosopher born and died in Athens. By Plato's account, he devoted his last 30 years to convincing the Athenians that their opinions about moral matters could not bear the weight of critical scrutiny. His technique, the so-called Socratic method, was to ask for definitions of such morally significant concepts as piety and justice, and to elicit contradictions from the responses, thus exposing the ignorance of the responder and motivating deeper inquiry into the concepts.

Socrates was tried on charges of impiety and corruption of the youth by zealous defenders of a restored democracy in Athens. Found guilty, he was put to death by drinking hemlock.

E. Empedocles (490-430 BC), Greek philosopher and poet, born at Acragas, Sicily. In his book *On Nature* he agreed with Parmenides that the world is the result of separating four everlasting elements, Earth, Water, Air and Fire. The doctrine of four elements became central to Western thought for 2000 years through its adoption by Aristotle.

F. Plato (427-347 BC), Athenian philosopher, born probably in Athens to an aristocratic family. He became a disciple of Socrates, who appears in most of Plato's 35 dialogues. He founded his own academy in Athens, where he remained since 368 BC up to the end of his life. The main interlocutor of his dialogues is Socrates, and the main interest is the definition of moral concepts.

Plato is particularly known for his theory of ideas, or forms: the world of transient, finite, ever-changing objects of sense experience is to be distinguished from that of the timeless, unchanging, universal forms which are the true objects of knowledge.

2 Salmān al-Fārisī (d. 655), truth-seeker Iranian Magian. He was attracted by Christianity and thus, while still a boy, left his father's home to follow a Christian monk and, having changed his teachers several times, arrived in Syria. From there he went right down to the Wādī al-Qurā in Central Arabia seeking the prophet who was to restore the religion of the Prophet Ibrāhīm (Abraham), the imminence of whose coming had been predicted to him by his last teacher on his deathbed. He was betrayed by some Bedouins and sold as a slave to a Jew. He had the opportunity to go to Yathrib (old name of Madīnah)

where soon after his arrival the migration of the Prophet Muhammad took place. Recognizing in Muhammad (peace be upon him) the mark of the prophet described to him by the Christian monk, Salmān embraced Islam and purchased his freedom from his Jewish master.

The name of Salmān is specifically associated with the siege of Madīnah by the Makkan polytheists (*mushrikūn*), on which occasion he advised the digging of the ditch (*khandaq*) as a means to defend their city from falling in the hands of the enemy (*al-aḥzāb*).

Salmān al-Fārisī was one of the most prominent companions of the Prophet peace be upon him as well as one of the most important figures of Muslim history; may Allah (SWT) be pleased with him and bless his soul.

3 Reported by al-Bukhārī on the authority of Anas b. Mālik. – Author. See *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIlmiyyah, 1412/1992, vol. 3, part 5, ḥadīths 4098-4100. For further detail on the battle of Ditch, see Emile Dermenghem, *The Life of Mahomet*, translated from the French by Arabella Yorke, London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1930, pp. 236-45; Martin Lings, *Muhammad: Hi Life Based on the Earliest Sources*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983, pp. 215-19.

4 Reported by al-Bukhārī on the authority of ʻAbd Allāh b. Masʻūd. – Author. See *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, op. cit., vol. 3, part 5, ḥadīth No. 4687, p. 260.

5 The story of the Muslim lady (i.e. al Ghāmidiyyah) who asked the Prophet peace be upon him to implement the *ḥadd* punishment of adultery on her is reported by so many traditionalists amongst whom Muslim (No. 16950), Abū Dāwūd (No. 4433 and 4449) on the authority of Buraydah. It is also reported by al-Tirmidhī (No. 1435) and al-Nasā'ī (vol. 4/63) on the authority of ʻImrān b. Ḥuṣayn.

6 Al-Bukhārī with precision supplied as to the meaning of *al-mukhallafīn*, "Those on Whose case the Prophet peace be upon him was reserved". – Author.

7 *Al-mukhallafūn* or "al-thalāthah alladhīna khullifū": those who 'had been left behind" at the time of the expedition to Tabūk; the commentators of the Qur'an "assume that it is a reference to three

persons-namely, Ka'b b. Mālik, Marārah b. al-Rabī' and Hilāl b. Umayyah (all of them from among the *Anṣār*) – who abstained from the campaign and were therefore ostracized by the Prophet and this Companions" until the verse clearing their case was revealed (Surah al Tawbah, verse 118). (See Muhammad Asad: *The Message of the Qur'an*, pp. 283-384).

For further detail on the story of these three Companions, see Ibn Hishām, *al-Sīrah al-Nabawiyyah*, ed. Muṣṭafā l-Saqqā et al., Beirut and Damascus: Dār al-Khayr, 1417/1996, vol. 2, part 4, pp. 136-40; *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, op. cit., vol. 3, part 5, ḥadīth No.253-54; Martin Lings, *Muhammad*, op. cit., pp. 315-21.

8 *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, op. cit., vol. 1, part 1, ḥadīth No. 438, p. 141.

Chapter Eight

1 *Choseisme*, a neologism from the French word *chose* (thing, object) coined by Bennabi to depict a sate of mind whereby people would indulge in the cult of, and obsession with, material things for their own sake, thus losing sense of ideational criteria and higher values of life.

Chapter Nine

1 Prepared by Edgar Morin, the report was published in the French weekly *Le Nouvel Observateur*. – Author.

2 Edgar Morin was born on 18 July 1921 in Paris where he completed his university studies in history, sociology, economics and philosophy. He also studied geography and law. During the Second World War he was enrolled as a voluntary fighter in the French Resistance and from 1942 to 1944 he became lieutenant of the fighting French Forces. In 1945 he occupied the post of attaché at the headquarters of the first French army in Germany.

In 1946 he published his first book entitled *L'Année zéro de l'Allemagne* (The Year Zero of Germany). During the 1950s and early 1960's he took to journalism and became director of two major magazines in Paris (*Arguments* and *Communications*). Between 1950 and1989 he occupied first the post of research director and then that of director emeritus at the Centre National de Recherches Scientifiques

(CNRS). In the following years he became president of the European Agency for Culture (UNESCO) and co-director of the Center for interdisciplinary studies at the Ēcole des Hautes Ētudes en Sciences Sociales de France. He is also founder and director of L'Association pour la Pensée Complexe (APC) whose mission is to promote diverse forms of complex thought capable of responding to the challenges that the complexity of the world, the human being and society poses to scientific inquiry.

As philosopher and sociologist, Morin has for the last twenty years devoted himself to the search of a method that can come to terms with the complexity imposing itself not only in the field of scientific research, but also in the human social and political problems. The unity of his research and intellectual effort strives to overcome the state of what he considers a mutilated and compartmentalized knowledge so as to arrive at a knowledge that would respect individuality and singularity while considering its context and the wider whole to which it belongs. Thus for him, the study of man and society has to add to the human anthropo-sociological complexity the biological and imaginary dimensions.

Edgar Morin is a prolific writer who has produced more than forty books and a countless number of articles. His magnum opus is his five-volume book *La Méthode* in which he has developed what he considers the complex science of man and society. The first volume of this work had been published in 1977 while the part one of the fifth volume came out in 2001.

3 Jean (Auguste Marie Joseph) Jaurès (1859-1914), French Socialist leader, writer, and orator, born in Castres, S France. He lectured on philosophy at Toulouse, became deputy (1885), co-founded the Socialist paper *L'Humanité*, and was the main figure in the founding of the French Socialist Party. He was assassinated in Paris while advocating reconciliation with Germany.

4 Èmile Vandervelde (1866-1938), Belgian statesman and Socialist leader. He entered parliament in 1897, and served in many cabinets, notably as minister of justice (1918-21), foreign minister (1925-27) and vice premier and minister of public health (1936-37). He resigned in protest when the cabinet, headed by Paul van Zeeland, recognized the Franco government in the Spanish civil war.

Influential in Belgian politics and in European labor movement, Vandervelde played a leading role in the Second Socialist International (1889-1914) when he served as the first president of the International Socialist Bureau. He also taught political economy at the University of Brussels from 1924 until his death and wrote several works on political science.

5 The two letters at stake were reproduced in the French weekly magazine *Le Nouvel Observateur* of 26 November 1959. – Author.

6 At present, the intellectual life in the Soviet Union vividly manifests the effects of this antagonism. The problem that has been analyzed by the academician Sokharov, the historian Medeev and the mathematician Gourtepine to bring to the attention of Brezhnev and Kossyguine "the global decrease in the creative power of all professions" is but the illustration of this phenomenon. – Author.

7 George Habache was born on 2 August 1926 into a family of Greek (Christian) Orthodox merchants in the Palestinian town of Lydda. Like thousands of families, Habache and his family were forced in July 1948 to leave their native town and live as refugees in Lebanon where he studied pediatric medicine in the American University of Beirut from which he graduated in 1951. Immediately after his graduation, he plunged in political activism amongst the Palestinian Diaspora, especially in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. In December 1967, and in the wake of Six-Day Arab-Israeli War, he played a key role in the founding of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, an resistance organization combining Marxist-Leninist ideology and Palestinian nationalism.

Habache and his front violently opposed to the Oslo Agreements of 1993 following which he withdrew from the PLO and contributed to the organization of the Damascus-based opposition that included for the first time Islamic organizations outside the PLO, namely HAMAS and Islamic Jihad. As described by Alain Gresh, the French analyst of Arab politics, remaining intransigent, affectionately called ***hakim*** ("the Doctor" or "the Sage"), George Habache has maintained a great amount of respect among Palestinians, notably for his consistent refusal to align his organization with any Arab regime and for his revolutionary zeal in pursuing his goal of liberating Palestine. In May 2000 he resigned from the Front due to old age.

8 Abū Zayd ʻAqīl b. Abī Ṭālib, he was twenty years older than his brother Alī, the fourth caliph. He lost his sight and died during the reign of Mu'āwiyya, the first Umayyad caliph, over eighty years of age.

9 The exact story about 'Aqīl's attitude goes as follows. In the conflict between 'Alī and Mu'āwiyya 'Aqīl sided with 'Alī. As he was facing a difficult financial situation he asked 'Alī to provide him with money, but the latter did not fulfill his request. He then went to Mu'āwiyya who treated him with great kindness and gave him a very big sum of money. In an attempt to exploit this incident politically, Mu'āwiyya asked 'Aqīl to announce it publicly and contrast it to what had experienced with 'Alī. 'Aqīl is reported to have made, among others, the following statement in which he contrasts the religious conduct of both rivals with a clear approbation of 'Alī's. As he said, "I left him (i.e. 'Alī) better to himself than you are, whereas you are better for me than he." For more detail, see Shams Eddīn Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. 'Uthmān al-Dhahabī: *Siyar A'lām al-Nubalā'*, ed. Muḥammad Na'īm al-'Arqasūsī et al, Beirut: Mu'assassat al-Risālah, 1405/1985, vol. 3, pp. 99-100; also his *Tārīkh al-Islām,* ed. 'Umar 'Abd Assalām Tadmurī, Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, 1413/1993, vol. 2, pp. 84-84; Jurji Zaydan: *Umayyads and 'Abbasids* (being part four of his *History of Islamic Civilization*), trans. D. S. Margoliouth, New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 1978, pp. 82-83.

Chapter Ten

1 The author dealt with this aspect in his book *Les Conditions de la Renaissance* from which this chapter has been excerpted in its entirety with certain modifications. – Author.

See the French edition, pp. 14-20 and the Arabic edition, pp. 30-40.

2 *Zāwiyyah*, in North Africa, a shrine of the grave of a *waliyy* (saint) or marabout, usually venerated and visited by common people especially women, to seek assistance and spiritual blesing.

3 *Iṣlāḥ* refers to the movement if Islamic reformism which set out, under the leadership of some 'ulamā' such as Sheikh Ibn Bādīs, to lay the ground for the Algerian popular resistance to, and revolution against, the French colonial presence.

4 Maraboutic, of or related to a marabout.

5 *Intellectomaniac*: from *intellectomane* which is a pejorative term coined by Bennabi to designate what he considers as a "caravan" or herd of intellectuals whose credentials are nothing but demagoguery and jesting.

6 Zerdah: in North African countries, ritual celebrations made at the shrine of a marabout's grave to venerate his soul and, sometimes, to invoke his help!

7 Edmund Burke (1729-97), British politician and writer who strongly defended Britain's occupation of America. In 1770, he published his book *Reflections on the Revolution in France* in which he expressed his firm stand against the idea of revolution.

8 Reference is made here to the breaking out of the Second World War in 1939.

9 Reference I made here to the fall of Paris in the hands of the Nazi forces in 1942.

10 These lines are excerpted form our book entitled *Les Conditions de la Renaissance* first published in 1947, many years before the Algerian Revolution started. – Author.

Bennabi refers here to the first French edition whose Arabic translation was first published in Cairo in 1960. See the new Arabic edition by Dār al-Fikr in Damascus 1987.

11 Izzedine or al 'Izz ibn 'Abd al-Salām (d. 660 H/1240 CE), Muslim jurist and judge who lived in Syria and Egypt. He is well known for his firm stands against *taqlīd* (imitation) in matters of *fiqh* and jurisprudence. His strong commitment to observe the requirements of justice and to care about the people's interests led him to uncompromising opposition to the injustices and atrocities of the Mamlūk rulers of Egypt at the time. His famous book entitled *Qawā'id al-Aḥkām fī Maṣāliḥ al-*Anām (Principles of the Sharī'ah Commands Concerning Men's Good) has been a major inspiration for many Muslim scholars and writers in their quest for reformulating and rejuvenating Islamic legal thought based on the knowledge of the spirit and objectives (*maqāṣid*) of the *sharī'ah.*

Chapter Eleven

1 ‘Alā’ al-Dīn ‘Alī b. Abī al-Hazm Ibn al-Nafīs al-Qurashī al-Dimashqī (died in 1288 AD), a distinguished seventh/thirteenth-century Muslim physician and author in many fields. Besides medicine, Ibn al-Nafīs studied grammar, logic and Islamic religious sciences. He moved from Damascus to Cairo where he was given the important post of Chief physician of Egypt and became the personal doctor of Sultan al-Ẓāhir Baybars (1223-1277), the real founder of the rule of the Mamluks in Syria and Egypt.

In prescribing, as al-‘Umarī says, “he never departed [from] the method to which he was accustomed; he did not prescribe a remedy as long as he could prescribe a diet, and he did not prescribe a compound remedy as long as could prescribe a diet, and he did not prescribe a compound remedy as long as he could content himself with a simple drug”. Though he seems to have been a theorist rather than a practical physician, the range and depth of his general culture are impressive.

His works include, among others, 1) *Kitāb al-Shāmil fī al-Ṭib*, an encyclopedic compendium on medicine, 2) *Mūjaz al-Qānūn*, an extract from all parts of the *Canon* of Ibn Sīnā, as well as many works on grammar, logic, rhetoric, etc.

The most important achievement of Ibn al-Nafīs in the field of medicine is his theory of the lesser or pulmonary circulation of the blood, from the right ventricle to the heart to the pulmonary artery (*vena arteriosa*) to the lung and from there through the pulmonary vein (*arteria venosa*) to the left ventricle of the heart, boldly contradicting the accepted ideas of Galen and Ibn Sīnā and anticipating part of William Harvey’s fundamental discovery.

2 William Harvey (1578-1658 AD), English physician. He taught anatomy and surgery in the Royal School of Medicine, London. He became the personal doctor of the King. He discovered – after Ibn al-Nafīs – the lesser as well as greater circulation of the blood and gave a full account of it in the human body.

3 George Henri Lemaître (1894-1966), Belgian physicist, astronomer and mathematician. He anticipated the *Big-Bang* theory of the universe according to which the expansion of the universe began with an explosion of a highly condensed primeval “atom”.

A memoir on relativity and gravitation led him to the award of a traveling scholarship, which took him to Cambridge University in England and then to Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the USA. He remained in the University of Louvain as professor of astronomy from 1927 until his death.

4 Gregor Johann Mendel (1822-1884), Austrian botanist and plant experimenter. He was the first to lay the mathematical foundation of the science of genetics, in what came to be known as Mendelism. Mendel was respected and loved by his fellow monks and townsmen but unknown as the great scientist that he was. Fame came to him only after his death.

In 1900, three European botanists, Carl Erich Correns, Erich Tschermak von Seysenegg, and Hugo de Vries, independently obtained results similar to Mendel's and in searching the literature found that both the experimental data and the general theory had been published thirty-four years previously.

What followed is now a part of the history of genetics: confirmation and extension of his theory by biologists in many countries and its incorporation as the basis of a rapidly developing science with primary influence on the understanding of evolution, development, physiology, biochemistry, medicine, and social science.

5 Baron Gottfield Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716), German philosopher and mathematician. He advocated harmony between faith and reason.

6 Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527 AD), Italian political philosopher and politician. In his famous book, *The Prince* (1531), he formulated his political theory which has been subsequently known as Machiavellism and according to which the prince or ruler is advised to use whatever means in order to realize his goals, thus being summarized in the phrase: The end justifies the means.

7 Henri Bouasse (1866-1953), French physicist and engineer. He graduated from the Ēcole Normale Supérieure de Paris and became professor of physics at the Faculty of Science in the University of Toulouse. Acoustics or the scientific study of sound was the main field of his research. He wrote more than twenty books and hundreds of articles. His work on acoustics was edited in four volumes in 1986 and 1987. Bouasse was also actively involved in the reform movement of the French educational system during the first quarter of the twentieth century. His works

include, among others, *Acoustique générale, Tourbillons, forces Acoustiques, circulations diverses, Vision et reproduction des formes et des Couleurs*, and *Propagation de la lumière: théorie de la réflexion vitreuse et métallique.*

8 Qādisiyyah, al-: a city in Iraq where the Muslim army – under the command of Sa'd b. Abī Waqqās (595-675 AD) – defeated, in the year 635 AD, the military forces of the Persian Empire, then under the leadership of Rustum.

9 Abū al-'Abbās 'Abd Allah al-M'amūn b. Hārūn al-Rashīd (170/786-218/833), seventh Abassid caliph. He consolidated his position in the Caliphate after much trouble including bloody family conflicts against his brother al-Amīn. He adopted the doctrines of Mu'tazilism as an official ideology of the state and tried to impose it throughout the realm of his authority, which led to the rise of the strong opposition of the jurists and traditionalists. The events related thereto were known as the *miḥnat khalq al-Qur'ān,* i.e. the question as to whether the Qur'an was created or eternal. Al-Ma'mūn was the promoter of the cultural watershed of the 3d/9th century, encouraging the translation into Arabic from Greek (and from Syriac) of the philosophy, astronomy, mathematics and medicine of the Hellenistic period.

10 **A.** Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (450/1058-505/1111), Muslim philosopher, theologian, jurist and mystic, born in Tūs (near modern Meshhad in Iran). In 1091 he was appointed to the prestigious position of professor of philosophy at the Niẓāmiyyah College, Baghdad, where he exercised great academic and political influence. He was a prolific author, and some of his main works are: *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah* (The Intentions of the Philosophers), *Tafāfut al-Falāsifah* (The Incoherence of the Philosophers), *al-Munqidh mina al-Ḍalāl* (The Deliverance from Error) the monumental *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn* (The Revival of the Religious Sciences) and *al-Mustasfā min 'Ilm al-Uṣūl* (a treatise on the principles of Islamic jurisprudence).

B. Abū al-Walīd Muḥammad b. Ahmad Ibn Rushd (lat. Averros), (1126 – 1198 AD) Muslim philosopher, jurist and physician, born in Cordova, Muslim Spain, where he became a famous judge. He commented on the works of Aristotle in response to the request of Abū Ya'qūb Yūsuf, the Almohad ruler. His occupation with philosophy caused him much trouble with the *fuqahā'* who submitted to *taqlīd* and considered philosophy to be harmful to the Islamic faith.

Ibn Rushd tried to reconcile Greek philosophy, especially the Aristotelian system, with the teachings and principles of Islam. However, the influence of Greek philosophy seems to have been mush greater in shaping his views and ideas. Besides his commentaries and interpretation of Aristotle, his most prominent philosophical work is *Tafāfut al-Tafāfut* (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), a rebuttal of al-Ghazālī's views in his *The Incoherence of the Philosopher*. He also wrote a comparative and succinct manual of Islamic jurisprudence entitled *Bidāyat al-Mujtahid wa Nihāyat al-Muqtaṣid.*

11 Tamerlane, Ar. *Taymūrlenk* (1336-1465AD), Mongol commander, born in Samarkand. In 1363, he invaded Mongolia and announced himself as the king. In 1388, he proclaimed his conversion to Islam and himself as the Muslim Sultan after which he launched a campaign against Central Asia, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. In 1402, he defeated Sultan Bayazid I (Bazajet) in Angora. The Mongol invasion of Baghdad could be considered a turning point in the course of Muslim civilization and history.

12 See our book *L'Oeuvre orientaliste et son influence sur la pensée islamique moderne.* – Author. See the author's *al-Qaḍāyā al-Kubrā,* Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1991, pp. 167-198.

13 'Abd Allah al-Nadīm (1843-1896) Egyptian poet, journalist, orator and national leader, born in Alexandria. He graduated from Islamic schools, worked as a postman, and practiced commerce. He was ac-tively involved in establishing educational institutions with the aim of promoting national self-reliance and freedom. He strongly sided with the popular revolution led by Ahmad 'Urābī 1882 for which he was expatriated. He launched a number of journals and newspaper such as *al-Ustāẓ.*

14 Anouar Abdel-Malek: *Anthologie de la Littérature Arabe contemporaine* [An Anthology of Contemporary Arabic Literature], Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1965, pp. 47, 49. – Author.

15 Ibid. – Author.

16 It is interesting to note here that some Arab countries, especially in North Africa (namely Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco), have been a scene mirroring almost all the Marxist fashions and varieties that Marxian

thought and activism has engendered. This reflection is not only a matter of intellectual or cultural orientation, but also a matter of political and organizational appeal. Thus, the Marxist factions from Leninism and Trotskyism to Stalinism and Maoism, from Gramciism (Gramci) to Garaudism (before Garaudy embraced Islam) and Rodinsonism (from Maxime Rodinson) to post-Maoism and even Kujism (from Anuar Kuja of Albania) mushroomed during the 1950s through to the 1980s!

Chapter Twelve

1 The ideas of this chapter are derived from the author's article entitled "Conditions d'une Dynamique Sociale", *La Révolution Africaine*, issue of 28th May 1967, Algiers. – Author.

2 Reference is made here to the Prophet's statement during the Tabūk campaign "Those who did not fast have gained all the reward today". *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, op. cit., vol. 2, part 3, 'Kitāb al-Jihād', ḥadīth 2890, p. 303; Abū Jafar al-Ṭaḥḥāwī: *Sharḥ Ma'ānī al-Āthār*, Beirut: Dār l-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyh, 1399 H, vol. 2, 'Kitāb al-Ṣawm', p. 68.

3 Most probably, the Moroccan economist was referring to the economic situation in his country.

4 Horace Schacht (1877-1970), German economist and politician. He served as governor of the central bank and minister of finance in his country. He also served as economic adviser to some Third World and Muslim countries, including Syria, Indonesia, Iran and Egypt.

5 Tibor Mende (1915-84), born in Hungary and educated in England. He became French citizen. From 1965 to 1971 he was a senior official of the Secretariat of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. He was a professor in the political science faculty of the Sorbonne and at the *Centre d'Etudes Industrielles* in Geneva. His works include, among others, *Entre la Peur et L'Espoir: Reflexions sur l'histoire de Demain, World Power in Balance, The Chinese Revolution, From Aid to Re-Colonization: Lessons of a Failure* and *Southeast Asia Between Two Worlds.*

6 It seems Bennabi has freely expressed the view of the great Hungarian-French scholar. By consulting one of his foremost works dealing with the question of economic poverty and underdevelopment in the so-called Third World countries, we could identify Bennabi's reference to

Tibor Mende. As the latter says concerning what he considers the qualitative aspect of this issue thus pointing out to the inadequacy of the approach followed by Western development theorists, "Its definition has to rely more on *the historian and the sociologist than on the economist alone*. Poverty as such does not exclude development. Nor is continued underdevelopment incompatible with a growing national product. Yet under-development is a historical phase with its specific internal and external constraints which obstruct progress towards self-reliance and spontaneous, balanced growth", Tibore Mende: *From Aid to Re-Colonization: Lessons from a Failure*, London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd, 1973, pp. 26-27.

7 For more elaboration on the social equation, see the author's *al-Muslim fī 'Ālam al-Iqtiṣād* (The Muslim in the Realm of Economics), Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1407/1987, Part three, chapter 5, pp. 90-96.

8 For more elaboration on the two premises, see the author's book mentioned in the preceding note, Part three, chapter 2, pp. 73-78.

9 Adam Smith (1723-1790), Scottish moralist and political economist. He studied both at Glasgow and Oxford Universities. His works include *Theory of Moral Sentiments* and *An inquiry into the nature of wealth of Nations*.

10 See *al-Muslim fī 'Ālam al-Iqtiṣād*, Part III, chapter 3, pp. 79-84.

Chapter Thirteen

1 The Commune of Paris refers to the revolutionary government that ruled over Paris from 1789 to 1795. Karl Marx devoted to it a book by the title *The Civil War in France* (1871) in which he analyzed the causes and factors that led to the failure of that revolutionary experience. It presented him with a case study of how revolutions can end up against the original ideals and aspirations that have motivated them. According to Edmund Burke, a contemporary of the French Revolution, the policy of the leaders of the revolutionary government was "to assassinate every citizen whom they suspect to be discontented by their tyranny", *Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke,* vol. viii: The French Revolution (1790-1794), ed. L. G. Mitchell, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 1791.

2 Abbane Ramḍhane was an eminent ideologue of the Algerian Revolution and a key organizer of the Soummam Congress held in

August 1956 in the Summam valley in Kabylia. This congress put in place the organizational structure of the Revolution two years after its launching in 1954 thus giving rise to the FLN that assumed the leadership of the Algerian revolution against the French colonial forces. Abbane Ramdhane was chosen by the congress amongst the permanent members of the Revolution National Council and appointed minister in the GPRA (Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic) in charge of foreign affairs.

Abbane was of the view that the political wing should have primacy over the military wing in the revolution. The reasons behind his killing in December 1957 in Morocco remain still unclear. It is assumed that the Intelligence Services of Houari Boumedienne who had not much trust in the politicians had assassinated him. Bennabi's quite unreserved negative stand towards this Algerian politician is most probably due to his inadequate knowledge of the circumstances and events of that period, especially as Abbane Ramdhane and others who met with the same fate were portrayed by Boumedienne's propaganda as traitors of the Revolution and the nation.

See Mohamed Harbi: *Une vie debout: Memoires Politiques*, Paris: La Découverte, 2001.

3 Jean-Francois Revel, contemporary French philosopher born in Marseille in 1924. His book *Ni Marx ni Jésus* published in 1970 (English translation: *Without Marx or Jesus*, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1971) was received with wide acclaim both nationally and internationally. He is member of the French Academy. Revel is an enthusiastic advocate of what he considers the universal liberal revolution typically exemplified in the United States of America and internationally manifested in the phenomenon of globalization (see in this respect his latest book *L'Obsession anti-americaine* [The anti-American Obsession], Paris: Plon, 2002). Amongst more than twenty titles, his works include *Descartes inutile et uncertain, Histoire de la philosophie occidentale de Thalès à Kant, L'Oeil de la Connaissance*, and *Le Regain Démocratique.*

4 Jean-Francois Revel: *Ni Marx, ni Jésus* [Without Marx or Jesus], Paris: Robert Laffont, 1970, p. 20. – Author.

5 We refrain from mentioning each time the names of places and people for the authors of the events we analyze here are still alive. – Author.

6 Bennabi's unfavorable position concerning the creation of Pakistan and its independence from India can be understood and evaluated in the light of his views about a fruitful and creative interaction between Islam, on the one side, and Brahmanism and Buddhism, on the other. It can as well be judged in the light of his strong zeal and support for the idea of a bloc uniting the peoples of the South in their struggle for freedom and development as well as against the hegemony and exploitation of the North.

These views were elaborated in his book *L'Afro-Asiatisme* which he wrote on the occasion of the Bandung Conference convened from 18 to 24 April 1955 in Indonesia. The first French edition of this book was published in Cairo in 1956, and its Arabic translation came out in 1957. Bennabi was also of the view that the secession of Pakistan would only weaken the Muslim presence and influence in India and subsequently in all South Asia. He was too optimistic as to the cooperation between Muslims and non-Muslims in India as were some leading Muslim figures in the Sub-continent such as Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad. See his book *al-Ṣirāʿ al-Fikrī fī al-Bilād al-Mustaʿmarah* (The Ideological Struggle in Colonized Countries), Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1990, p. 106.

7 Messali Hadj (1898-1974), Algerian political leader considered the father of Algerian nationalism. In 1926 he founded, with others, the Star of North Africa (*Etoile Nord Africaine*, ENA) as a platform to mobilize Algerians in particular and the peoples of the Maghreb in general for the struggle for independence from French occupation. In 1937, the Star was changed into a national political party by the name of the Algerian People's Party (*Parti du Peuple Algérien*). After Algeria's independence in 1962, Messali Hadj, like many others, lived in exile in Paris where he died on 3 Jun 1974.

8 *Zaʿimillous*, a derogatory term coined by Bennabi from the Arabic word *zaʿīm* (leader) to point to the category of small *zaʿīms* or petty leaders whose concern is only to captivate the masses allegiance and exploit it for pursuing their personal aspirations and selfish interests.

9 Soekarno (1901-1970), Indonesian politician and one of the founders of the 'Indonesian Nationalist Party'. He was the first president of the Republic of Indonesia after World War II. He was ousted from power by a coup led by Suharto in 1966.

10 Nkrumah (1909-1972), Ghanaian political leader who held many high posts in the Republic of Ghana. Due to his tendency to concentrate all the authorities in his hands and to impose his own socialistic views and policies his anti-imperialist strong stand, he was toppled from Ghana's presidency in a coup d'etat, 1966, while he was on an official visit to Hanoi (Vietnam)

11 The Syrian-Egyptian union, announced in 1959 was no more than a stroke of a pen. It lacked any well-thought out measures to coordinate economic policies, banking systems, budgetary practices, etc. Its precipitous failure and breakdown in 1961 was due to the absence of a clear strategic vision of the cultural conditions and political requirements of lasting and enduring unity, despite the strong and seemingly passionate unionist language of Arab nationalist leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser.

12 As Bennabi describes it in an earlier book, atomism is "the turn of mind which is incapable of generalizations." It is "the modality of the human spirit in general when it has not yet attained a certain degree of development and intellectual maturity, or has passed it by. More precisely, the discursive spirit inscribes itself, in the historical evolution, between two stages of atomism. Thus, thought is necessarily 'atomistic' in its first take-off, as was that case in Europe in the pre-Cartesian period, and becomes so again when all intellectual effort ceases, as in the post-Khaldūnian period in the Muslim world". *Vocation de L'Islam*, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1954, pp. 15-16.

In this quotation we have here relied on Asma Rashid's English translation of the book as *Islam History and Society*, Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1991, p. 1; see also *L'Afro-Asiatisme*, pp. 88-89.

13 Franz Fanon (1925-1961), a psychologist and revolutionary from the Antilles Islands. He served as chief physician in the Psychiatric hospital of Blīda, south of Algiers. His most concern was focused on studying the aspects of alienation and loss of self-identity of the local population as a result of colonial domination. His strong support for the Algerian Revolution was the main reason for his being expelled from Algeria by the French colonial authorities. He formulated his views on and analysis of the social, political and cultural struggle for freedom in the Third World in general and Africa in particular in his major and famous works *The Wretched of the Earth.*

Chapter Fourteen

1 Carl Von Clausewitz (1780-1831), Austrian general, military strategist and theoretician. His famous book *On War* has exerted great influence on contemporary military thought. He maintained that "war is but an extension of politics through different means" and that "when a nation enters a war, it has to completely devote herself to that war and not only her army".

2 This definition is cited by Peter Paret in his introductory essay (The Genesis of *On War*) to Clausewitz's *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard & Peter Paret, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 7. In the footnote, Paret provides detailed information on the source of this statement.

3 Will Durant (1885-1981) American historian, born in North Adams, Massachusetts. Taught at Labor Temple School, New York City (1914-1927); after success of his *Story of Philosophy* (1926), he collaborated with Arial Durant (1898-1981, born in Prosurov, Russia) on the eleven-volume book *The Story of Civilization* (translated into Arabic as *Qiṣṣat al-Ḥaḍārah*).

4 Confucius (Kung Fu Tzu) (551-479 B.C) was a Chinese philosopher who emphasized moral order, the virtue of China's ancient rules, and gentlemanly education. His teaching and ideas had a great impact on the history and civilization of China.

5 Will and Arial Durant: *The Story of Civilization*, New York: Simon and Schusten, 1954, vol. 1: *Our Oriental Heritage*, Book Three: *The Far East*, A: China, pp. 671-72.

6 Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī (died in 652 AD) was one of the prominent Companions of the Prophet peace be upon him. He was known for his high spirituality and abstinence from worldly pleasures as well as for his strong and critical views with regard to wealth distribution which he expressed especially during the rule of the third caliph 'Uthmān b. 'Affān.

7 Reference is made here to a *ḥadīth* reported by al-Bukhārī on the authority of Anas b. Mālik as follows: Allah's messenger (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) said, "Every worthy man of this (i.e. Muslim) nation (ummah) is Abū 'Ubaydah b. al-Jarrāḥ".

8 The great companion died two or three years before 'Umar, during an epidemic plague in Syria.

9 Abū Naṣr Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Tarkhān al-Fārābī, very little is known about his early life in particular and his life in general. He was of a Turkish origin, and is said to have died at the age of eighty or more in 339/950 in Damascus.

He studied in Baghdad and wrote and published comments on Aristotle. He tried to combine and synthesize the ideas and theories of both Aristotle and Plato in his famous work *al-Jam' bayna Ra'yay al-Hakīmayn, Aflāṭūn al-Ilāhī wa Arisṭūṭālīs* (The Harmonization of the two Opinions of the Two Sages, Plato the Divine and Aristotle). He is known in Muslim intellectual history as *al-mu'allim al-thānī* (the 'second master', the first master being Aristotle). Al-Fārābī was very much concerned about political philosophy in which he wrote his utopia *Ārā'Ahl al-Madīnah al-Fāḍilah* (The Principles of the Opinions of Inhabitants of the Virtuous City). See a recent and comprehensive study on his political philosophy in Muhsin Mahdi: *Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy,* Chicago: The Chicago University Press, 2000.

10 Muhammad Ayub Khan (1907-1974), Pakistani soldier and President (1958-1969), born at Abbotabad. Educated at Aligarh Muslim University and Sandhurst, he served in the Second World War, and was the first Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan's army (1951). He became President in 1958 after a bloodless coup, and introduced a system of basic democracies. Following a widespread demand for democracy, which led to civil disorder, he resigned in 1969, and martial law was re-established. He died at Islamabad.

To the example of Ayub Khan, we should admirably add that of the Sudanese General Muhammad Hasan Siwār al-Dhahab. Coming to power upon a bloodless coup that toppled Ja'far Numeiri in April 1985, Siwār al-Dhahab promised that within one year he and his semi-military semi-civilian government would step down once an elected parliament and democratic government were in place. And thus it was. Exactly one year later, he announced the dissolution of his government and called upon the elected parties to take over. It is an irony that it was the civilian party leaders who requested him to extend the rule of his government to give them sufficient time so a to negotiate the formation of the new government.

After quitting the office of the presidency, Siwār al-Dhahab devoted his time to *daw'ah* and relief activities both in Sudan and abroad. With the exception of these two individual examples and the Islamic Republic of Iran and Malaysia where general elections have been held regularly and meaningfully, Muslim political life is plagued with the ninety-nine-plus-percent elections and referenda which only confirm those in power!

11 Chou En Lai (1898-1976), Chinese statesman and military leader. He held many political posts, at one time he held the presidency of the Cabinet of Popular china (1949); Prime Minister of the Chinese People's Republic (1949-1976). He participated, as a diplomat, in many international conferences; and was a strong supporter of the Red Guards during the "Cultural Revolution" in China.

Chapter Fifteen

1 'Alī 'Abdul Rāziq, (1305/1887-1386/1966), born in the Minya Province, Southeastern region of Egypt, to a well-established family of big landlords able to provide a good education for its members.

After graduating from al-Azhar in 1912, he set out to England and became a student in Oxford University. Upon hid return home in 1915, he was appointed to the post of judge in a sharī'ah court.

In 1925, he was dismissed from this post due to the publication of his book entitled *al-Islām wa Uṣūl al-Ḥukm* (Islam and The Principles of Governance) in which he claimed that Islam was only a religious spiritual and moral message That had nothing to do with the questions politics and government.

He was 'excommunicated' from the 'Board of Great 'Ulamā"!

When his elder brother, the scholar-philosopher, Sheikh Mustapha 'Abdul Rāziq became rector of al-Azhar, 'Ali regained his status as a *'ālim* thanks to a decision made by the 'Board of Great 'Ulamā"! He also became minister of *Awqāf* and Religious Affairs in the period 1948-49. Though his book is of meager intellectual value, it however caused a very hot and tensioned debate whose significance can better be understood in the light of the political and intellectual climate that had prevailed in Egypt during the twenties and early thirties of the twentieth century. For more detail see Muḥammad 'Imāra: *Marakat al-Islām wa Uṣūl al-Ḥukm*, Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1418/1997, pp. 20-162.

2 See Anouar Abdel-Malek: *Anthologie de la Littérature Arabe Contemporaine* (Anthology of Contemporary Arab Literature), Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1965, pp. 81, 86. – Author.

3 'Abdul Ḥamīd b. Muhammad Ibn Bādīs (1889-1940), born at Constantine (eastern part of Algeria). He memorized the Qur'an by heart in his home city where he also studied the Arabic language and the principles of the *sharīʿah*. At the age of thirteen, his family sent him to study at the Zaytūna in Tunis where some of his professors were followers of Jamaluddīn al-Afghānī's and Muhammad 'Abdu's reformist school, especially the two sheikhs Muhammad al-Nakhlī and Muhammad al-Ṭāhir ibn 'Āshūr. Upon returning home from the Mashriq, after accomplishing the *hajj* to Makkah, he devoted himself to teaching. From 1925 on, he published his first magazine *al-Muntaqid* (The Critic), then he launched another one that had a longer life: *al-Shihāb* (The Lightening Star). Careful to guarantee the survival of the journal, he founded also in 1925 the Algerian Islamic Press.

In 1931, he organized his sympathizers into the *Jam'iyat* (Association of) *al-'Ulamā'* to give his reformist convictions and ideas a systematic and more effective drive. This movement had an important and far-reaching influence in the struggle of the Algerian people for independence, especially by reasserting its Islamic cultural and historical identity and promoting the teaching of the Arabic language and Islamic studies.

4 This was the name adopted by the leadership of the Revolution during the heroic initial two-year period. – Author.

5 Etiology: the philosophy or study of causation as well as the study of the causes of diseases.

6 We have devoted a study to this aspect under the title *al-Ṣirā' al-Fikrī fī al-Bilād al-Musta'marah*. – Author. See translator's note 1 to the Preface.

7 The *jundī* is the equivalent of "trooper". – Author.

8 Soummam Congress: A meeting held by the leaders of the ALN (Army of National Liberation) and FLN (National Liberation

Front) of Algeria on 20th August 1956 in the Soumman Valley, in Kabylia, the Eastern part of Algeria. This congress was crucial in that it gave the Algerian Revolution its organizational structure and determined its ideological orientation.

9 This was the title of Shihani Bashir amongst his brothers in arms. – Author.

10 Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm (1898-1990), eminent Egyptian playwright. His works range between dealing with social and political issues and tackling moral and philosophical problems.

Chapter Sixteen

1 The main ideas of this chapter are borrowed from an article by the author that appeared in the daily *La République Algérienne* of 5 March 1954 and has been included in his *Fī Mahabb al-Maʿrakah* [In the Whirlwind of the Battle]. – Author.

See Malik Bennabi: *Fī Mahabb al-Maʿrakah*, Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1411/1991, pp. 143-152.

2 Ahmad Shawqī (1868-1932), great Arab poet, had born in Cairo to a family whose blood was a mixture of Arab, Turkish, Kurd and Greek origins. He first studied law after which he was sent by the Khedive Tawfīq of Egypt to study French literature and thought at Paris. He was expatriated to Spain where the Islamic sites of Cordova and other places inspired him to compose the best of his poems.

3 Bennabi does not use the term *fundamentalism* in the sense attributed to it with regard to Christianity, nor does he use it in the sense currently attributed to it when applied to the movements of Islamic revivalism.

4 Joseph Raymond McCarthy (1908-1957), American Republican politician and inquisitor born in Grand Chute, Wisconsin, USA. He studied at Marquette University, became circuit judge in 1939, and after war service was elected senator (1945). He achieved fame for his unsubstantiated accusations, in the early 1950s, that 150 Communists had infiltrated the State Department, and in 1953 became chairman of the powerful Permanent Subcommittee on

Investigations. The kind of anti-Communist witch-hunt he investigated became known as McCarthism.

5 Zaytūna, al-: the oldest mosque in Tunisia and the Islamic West (North Africa and Spain). Its building of this grand had been started in 79/698 and was completed in 114/732 during the governorship of 'Ubayd Allāh b. al-Ḥabḥāb, governor of Ifriqiya to the Umayyad caliph Hishām b. 'Abd al-Malik. Throughout the centuries and under the reign succeeding dynasties, al-Zaytūna had always been the main seat of learning and center of scholarship as the Grand-Mosque university of Tunisia until 1961 when Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia's former president, abolished it together with other Islamic institutions, considering it as antithetical to his secular-modernist ideology.

6 Qarawiyyīn, al-: old center of Islamic learning in the city of Fez, Morocco; now promoted as an Islamic university. It was founded in 245/859, during the reign of the Idrīsid dynasty.

7 Louis Pasteur (1822-1895), French chemist, considered the father of modern bacteriology. His work at first was chemical in nature, as on tartrate crystals and "left handed" tartrates. After 1865, he tackled silkworm disease, injurious growths, bear, splenic fever, and fowl cholera. He showed that it was possible to attenuate the virulence of injuries in microorganisms by exposure to air, by a variety of culture, or by transmission through various animals. His treatment of hydrophobia depends on similar proofs and in 1888 the Institute Pasteur, of which he became first director, was founded for the treatment of this disease by inoculation.

8 Mohamed Musaddiq (1297/1879-1387/1967), Iranian politician and nationalist leader. He obtained his doctorate in law from Teheran University in 1914. In 1919, he led an aggressive political protest against the treaty of alliance between Britain and Iran, following which he was exiled. In 1920, he was appointed governor of one of the Iranian provinces and came into sharp conflict with the central government that threatened of a civil war in the country.

In 1922, Muṣaddiq was given the portfolio of Minister of Finance. In this capacity, he decreased the salaries of government officers by fifty percent and suggested the dismissal of hundreds of others on the basis that they were actually getting high pays without doing any job. He was dismissed from his ministerial post mainly for his strong opposition to the institution of Reza Khan as emperor of Iran.

After thirteen years of withdrawal from politics he reappeared on the scene in 1940 to continue his relentless struggle against Western interfe-rence in Iranian affairs and was jailed for a period of four months. In 1951, the Iranian parliament under his chairmanship rejected an offer by British companies owning 53 percent of Iran's oil industry shares to give Iran 50 percent of oil revenues. Instead, a decision was made to nationalize Iran's oil industry. In the same year, Muṣaddiq became Prime Minister but was shortly removed by the Shah due to his sacking of the British from Abadan. Thanks to mass protests and public pressure, he returned to the office of prime minister to continue his anti-West campaign.

In 1956, and as a result of an American-British-Iranian complot, Muṣaddiq was accused of high treason and of planning to overthrow the regime of the Shah. He then was sentenced for three years of imprisonment. When he was released, he resumed his struggle against the Shah and Western economic and political dominance over Iran until he breathed his last.

9 Āyatullāh Abū al-Qāsim al-Kāshānī, Iranian *mujtahid* who played a role of some importance in the events of the early post Second-World-War period. Born in the late nineteenth century, al-Kāshānī went at an early age to Najaf in Iraq where he studied under two *mijtahids* prominent in support of the Iranian constitutionalist cause, Muḥammad Kāẓim al-Khurāsānī and Mīrzā Ḥusayn al-Khalīlī al-Ṭihrānī.

In 1919, he was sentenced to death *in absentia* by the British for opposing the mandate on Iraq, but escaped to Iran. Throughout the reign of Reza Shah he abstained from political activity, but was exiled in June 1942 by the British military authorities for alleged contacts with German agents.

Al-Kāshānī's postwar political career began in 1948 with the organization in Teheran of demonstrations against the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. With the beginning of the campaign for the antionalization of the oil industry, al-Kāshānī's importance grew as he came to be one of the chief organizers of mass support for Dr. Muḥammad Muṣaddiq's National Front. Personal differences arose between al-Kāshānī and Muṣaddiq, and al-Kāshānī became alarmed, moreover, at the militant irreligiosity that showed itself in the last days of Muṣaddiq's rule. He therefore supported the royalist coup d'état of 19 August that overthrew Muṣaddiq. Al-Kāshānī 's remaining years were uneventful, and his death in 1962 passed largely unnoticed.

10 Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) Born in Sialkot – an old historic town on the borders of West Punjab and Kashmir. He came from a poor family, but with the help of scholarships, which he won at school and college, he was able to receive a very good education. In 1897, he graduated from the Government College, Lahore; and got an M.A. degree in philosophy in 1899.

In 1905, he left for higher studies in Europe where he studied in both England and Germany. According to S. M. Ikram in his book *Modern Muslim India and The Birth of Pakistan* (Institute of Islamic Culture, 1977, p. 168), "Iqbal went to England a nationalist and pantheist, but returned a pan-Islamist and almost a puritan. The change was partly due to his research in the history of Islamic mysticism' the findings of which he formulated in his Ph. D. thesis on *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia.* After his return from Europe, Iqbal was an active participant in the movement for Muslim independence and self-assertion in India, and in 1930 he became president of The All-India Muslim League. Besides his numerous speeches and philosophical and mystical poems (composed in both Urdu and Persian), Iqbal's book entitled *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* stands as his major intellectual work.

11 Kamikaze: A group of Japanese pilots who, during the Second World War, performed suicidal missions against the forces of the Allies, especially against the Americans in the Pacific.

12 Samurai: The Japanese warrior caste from the 11th to the 19th century or a member of this aristocratic caste.

Chapter Seventeen

1 Robert Koch (1843-1910), German physician and pioneer bacteriologist, born in Klausthal in the Harz. He practiced medicine at Hanover and elsewhere, but his work on wounds, septicemia and splenic fever gained him a seat on the imperial board of health in 1880. Further research in microscopy led to his discovery, in 1882, of the

tuberclebacillus. In 1883, he was leader of the German expedition sent to Egypt and India in the quest for the cholera germ. In 1890, he produced tuberculin as a lymph-inoculation cure for tuberculosis, but it did not prove effective as a cure. In 1896 and 1903 he was summoned to South Africa to study rinderpest and other cattle plagues.

He won the Nobel Prize for physiology and medicine in 1905.

2 Anthropomorphism: Ascription of human attribute to the deity or to anything impersonal or irrational.

3 Gaius Julius Caesar (100-44 BC), Roman statesman and military leader. He was emperor of Rome during 49-44 BC. His rivals assassinated him.

4 Marcus Porcius Cato (95-46 BC), Roman statesman and military leader, known as Cato the *Younger*, Cato the *Elder* being his grand-father Marcus Porcius (234-149 BC).

5 Marcus Brutus (85-42 BC), Roman statesman and scholar. He was an intellectual and an idealist. But for all his good qualities, he was stuffy, aloof, and self-righteous. When war between Caesar and Pompey wrecked Italy in 49, Brutus was in dilemma as to where his allegiance should lie. Although Pompey had killed Brutus's own father almost 30 years before, Brutus consequently joined the Pompeius and fought for them until 48, when after the battle of Pharsalus, he surrendered and was pardoned by Caesar who made him governor of Cisalpius Gaul in 46.

But Brutus's loyalty to Caesar wavered. The killing of his uncle, Vato, in 46, must have had an impact on Brutus. He was reminded that his distant ancestor Lucius Brutus had slain the last Roman king and instituted the Roman republic; here was an example to be emulated. When Cassius (politician and general) organized his conspiracy against Caesar, he persuaded Brutus to join the conspirators. Besides being one of the actual assassins, Brutus gave the conspiracy its coherence, its prestige, and its symbol. Over Cassius' objections, he insisted that only Caesar be killed. Naively, he hoped the elimination of the dictator would bring the old republic back.

6 The author refers here to the Ṣiffīn conflict between ʻAlī b. Abī Ṭālib and Muʻāwiyya which resulted in the substitution of democratic "khalifal" authority by dynastic power.

7 See note 9 to chapter nine.

8 Yazīd b. Mu'āwiyyah b. Abī Sufyān also known as Yazīd I (25/645-64/683 AD), second Umayyad caliph after his father Mu'āwiyyah. He was responsible for the killing of al-Ḥusayn b. Ali b. Abī Ṭālib in Karbalā'.

9 The Cairo newspaper *Akhbār al-Yawm* echoed in its issue of 2 January1960, the strange judgment made by some American sociologists who claim "efficacy has developed solely in the areas where Christian and Jewish thought has existed, whereas inefficacy has evolved in the areas where the Islamic thought has existed"! Besides its strangeness, this statement is historically unfounded. – Author.

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